University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2019

The Causes, Dynamics, and Implications of Child Soldiering
Christopher Faulkner
University of Central Florida

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information,
please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Faulkner, Christopher, "The Causes, Dynamics, and Implications of Child Soldiering" (2019). Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. 6481.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/6481

THE CAUSES, DYNAMICS AND IMPLICATIONS OF CHILD SOLDIERING

by

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL FAULKNER
M.A. University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2013
MPA University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2010
B.A. University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2008

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida
Summer Term
2019
Major Professor(s): Güneş Murat Tezcür and Jonathan M. Powell

© 2019 Christopher Michael Faulkner

ii

ABSTRACT

Child soldiers continue to be regular participants in modern conflicts in many different parts of the
world. This dissertation addresses several interrelated questions about child soldiering employing
large-N statistical analyses, process-tracing, and in-depth interviews. First, it asks how foreign state
support and the characteristics of these donors influence rebels’ recruitment of child soldiers. An
important finding is that rebels supported by democratic states are less likely to employ child
soldiers. It then investigates the factors and conditions that lead some groups to diversify their
demographics in the types of recruits and others to not. Specifically, it considers why a rebel group
would recruit children, but refrain from recruiting women. It examines theoretical arguments that
contend group ideology, desires for patriarchal preservation, societal gender inequalities, and the
location/type of rebellion (rural vs. urban) can each significantly contribute to groups’ recruitment
behavior. Third, it considers a question that speaks directly to the first two questions. What factors
lead to the initial recruitment of children and how conflict conditions may impact the dynamics of
rebel recruitment over time? An in-depth analysis of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and the
employment of a unique dataset on deceased Kurdish militants allows for an exploration of the
temporal variation in the group’s recruitment patterns over four decades. It illustrates that inter-rebel
rivalries, conflict intensity, and the evolution of human rights norms shape rebels’ recruitment
behavior. The final section reorients the focus of the dissertation from rebel child soldiering to
government child soldiering. It surveys the conditions under which the United States holds foreign
governments accountable for their child soldiering practices through the restriction of certain forms
of security assistance. In depth analyses of four norm-violating states and interviews with policy
experts show that the strategic importance of a state and the systemic nature of child recruitment are
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strong predictors of when security assistance waivers will be granted. Together, this dissertation
advances scholarly understanding of the causes, dynamics, and implications of child soldiering.
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deserve attention. Know that you are not forgotten.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Nearly 30 years have passed since the near unanimous adoption of the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Amongst other protections, this major human rights treaty prohibited the
participation of children younger than the age of 15 in armed conflict. Yet three decades
removed, child soldiering remains a persistent issue in conflicts across the globe with two recent
independent assessments suggesting upwards of 75 percent of all insurgencies in the post-Cold
War era having included children in their campaigns (Lasley and Thyne 2015; Haer and Böhmelt
2016). Given the frequency at which children remain a central part of conflict, this dissertation
aims to examine four interrelated questions surrounding the issue of child soldiering. How does
foreign state support impact rebel organizations’ recruitment of child soldiers?; b) What
factors/conditions impact rebels’ recruitment of child soldiers over women combatants?; c)
When do rebel organizations first recruit children and what factors contribute to variation in
child recruitment over time?; d) When and under what conditions do states face penalties for
their recruitment and use of children in their national armies? Below I briefly outline each
respective chapter.
Chapter two examines the effect of foreign state sponsorship on rebel groups’
employment of child soldiers. Academic scholarship has largely pointed to the importance of
foreign state sponsorship as a resource which loosens rebels’ constraints on violence (i.e.
Salehyan et al. 2014). Yet, the majority of studies to date have relied on indicators which only
account for the degree of lethal violence perpetrated by rebels. Extending arguments by those
suggesting lethal violence is a poor proxy for overall patterns of rebel violence (Gutierrez-Sanin
1

and Wood 2017), I suggest that foreign state sponsorship increases the likelihood that rebels will
employ child soldiers. This is an innovative approach as extant scholarship suggests the
repertoire of rebel violence is often diverse and in need of further exploration. I condition this
argument by contending that the state sponsors matter. In other words, support from democratic
regimes is likely to function differently than support from their authoritarian counterparts.
Rooted in the principal-agent framework, I argue that rebels which rely on support from
predominantly democratic donor states are less likely to employ child soldiers as democratic
states are less tolerant of human rights abuses. Adopting a mixed methods approach, I test this
argument across a global sample of rebel organizations active between 1989-2009 and probe two
cases of Kurdish insurgent groups active in Turkey and Syria. Results from the statistical
analyses offer support for the mechanism. Case explorations qualify the findings by illustrating
that rebels might also be attentive to where support is coming from and will respond accordingly
in terms of their inclusion of child soldiers.
Chapter three explores the dynamics of rebel group composition. Specifically, I
investigate why some rebellions are inclusive of both women and children while others are more
likely to use child soldiers, but exclude women? Empirical assessments have investigated the
inclusion of children and women across rebellions independently with scholars having yet to
explore the intersection of these two groups. With estimates suggesting women are present in
over half of all rebellions (Henshaw 2016) and over three-quarters witness the inclusion of child
soldiers (Haer and Böhmelt 2016), this is a curious gap as descriptive analyses reveal over
twenty percent of rebellions include child soldiers in the absence of women. This study suggests
an interplay between societal gender norms, group ideology, the characteristics of children, and
the setting of insurgency (rural/urban) as important factors associated with group composition.
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Descriptive insights from a random selection of 72 non-state armed groups reveal interesting
patterns. Ethnonationalist groups are more likely to see women present in rebellion, but are also
more likely to see child soldiers present. The ability of such groups to mobilize popular support
can assist in explaining the presence of a more diverse set of actors. Secondly, I note that
maintenance of familial ties might help explain the significant overlap in the presence of both
women and children across rebellions, but temper this conclusion as certain organizations reject
recruits that have familial bonds that are seen as a sign of weakness and threat to their
commitment. On the other hand, I argue that groups operating in societies with high levels of
gender inequality in pre-conflict settings and those concerned with patriarchal backlash most
likely to exclude women while still including child soldiers. This is especially likely in rural
insurgencies as the barriers to gender equality and patriarchal norms are stronger while children
often occupy and are involved in adult economic activities that suggest their status in rural
communities may function differently than their urban counterparts. Children can be thought of
as a low-cost option that can diminish concerns over patriarchal backlash while serving a
functional purpose (i.e. augmenting group size). This can ensure the preservation of the
patriarchy as male members are likely to be less concerned with the inclusion of children than
with the incorporation of women who might demand empowerment and emancipation in postconflict settings, thus eroding the patriarchal environment that may be more beneficial for them.
This chapter also establishes the foundation for a portion of the theoretical argument of chapter
four, specifically related to government indiscriminate violence and its effect on child
recruitment.
Chapter four investigates child soldier usage in the PKK since the formation of the group
in 1978 and traces patterns of recruitment through 2016. This paper has the unique advantage of
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identifying demographic information on PKK militants including the age of recruits across
different time periods. The ability to examine the initial recruitment patterns of a rebel
organization and temporal variation in recruitment behavior provides critical insight on rebel
child soldiering that is absent in existing literature. I argue that the environment in which nascent
groups emerge is pivotal for understanding their recruitment decisions. Coupled with ideological
roots and international norms at the time of formation, I find that the competition amongst rival
Kurdish organizations can help explain why the PKK recruited children prior to its official
launch. Next, I suggest that conflict conditions and specifically the aggressiveness and level of
violence exhibited by a government’s counterinsurgency efforts, can lead rebels to decrease
remaining barriers to entry. This results in a less selective recruitment process which increases
the number of child soldiers active in the group. The investigation speaks directly to chapter
three as I also show that under such conditions, rebels are also likely to include women at higher
rates. Lastly, I assert that the entrenchment of international norms against rebel child soldering
can impact certain types of rebellions—notably those with separatist aspirations. These groups
are most likely to desire international legitimacy and I contend that when prospects for peace
increase and opportunities for goal attainment are more realistic, these groups have incentives to
adjust their child recruitment.
While chapters two through four explore the factors and conditions leading to the
inclusion of child soldiers in non-state armed groups, chapter five explores the consequences of
states’ usage of child soldiers in their national armies or support of armed groups that use
children. Although numerous states have agreed, in principle, that children should be excluded
from conflict, many still include those under the age of 18 in their national militaries. Directly
addressing this paradox, the United States passed the Child Soldier Prevention Act (CSPA) in
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2008, a law which aimed to punish states that continued to employ child soldiers. Specifically,
the CSPA prohibits the US from providing several forms of military/security assistance to states
found in violation of its parameters. I contend that a state’s strategic value and the nature of child
soldiering can assist in explaining when they will be held accountable and will they will be
granted both full and partial waivers. Employing a qualitative research strategy including
process-tracing and semi-structured interviews with policy experts, I show a state’s strategic
value to be paramount in identifying when full waivers to the CSPA are most likely to be
granted. However, the nature of child soldiering (i.e. the roles of children in the military and the
systemic nature of the practice) suggests that states will, at a minimum, face restrictions on the
disbursements of ‘lethal’ security assistance. Lastly, the case examinations reveal that those
states which support non-state armed groups that use child soldiers, but do not have children
within their national armies, are likely to face full implementation of the CSPA. I argue that this
finding can be explained, in part, by the lack of institutionalization of child soldiering. In other
words, because a recipient regime is not incorporating child soldiers directly into the national
military, full implementation can swiftly correct a state’s behavior. Cutting security assistance
can illustrate to recipient states that the US will not tolerate the continued violation of the CSPA
and recipient states’ compliance can easily be achieved by refraining from supporting non-state
groups that use children.
Together, the four components of this dissertation help uncover the causes, dynamics,
and implications of child soldiering. The results in chapter two suggest that rebels that receive
support from a higher percentage of democratic donors are less likely to be associated with child
soldier recruitment and illustrates that rebel groups do indeed pay attention to where support
comes from. Chapter three explores descriptive patterns of recruitment and identifies that the
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overwhelming majority of groups include both women and children in their rebellions. It
proposes a diverse set of theoretical explanations for the exclusion of women across those groups
that include child soldiers, but ultimately illustrates the complexities surrounding group
configuration. Chapter four clarifies some ambiguities left over from chapter three and shows
that rivalry, ideology, conflict intensity, and international norms can all explain rebel recruitment
of child soldiers at different points throughout an insurgency’s campaign. Lastly, chapter five
speaks directly to chapter two, asking how democratic states, specifically the US, might punish
violators of the norm against child soldiering, if at all. Focusing on bilateral interactions amongst
states, it shows that the US is willing to conditionally implement the CSPA. Strategic
interests/investment appear paramount in security assistance decisions, but they only matter to a
certain extent. Perpetual violators, even those that have benefited from high levels of security
assistance funding, can face partial implementation of the CSPA. Those states that are less
strategically important and those which fund rebel organizations that recruit child soldiers
ultimately become the primary targets of full CSPA implementation.
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CHAPTER TWO: FOLLOWING THE MONEY? CONSIDERING THE
EFFECT OF EXTERNAL STATE SPONSORSHIP ON REBEL CHILD
SOLDIERING

Abstract
Many rebel groups continue to incorporate child soldiers yet the factors impacting these
recruitment decisions remain underexplored. Extant literature has suggested that external
sponsorship can increase rebels’ employment of lethal violence against civilians. However, work
on child soldering has been less conclusive about the effect, if any, exogenous support might
have on rebel recruitment of children. I explore this puzzle and investigate how the
characteristics of external state supporters, namely their domestic political institutions and
strength of human rights lobbies, impact rebels’ recruitment of children. Building on liberal
perspectives that suggest that human rights play a role in foreign policy, I argue that rebels
receiving support from democratic donor groups and donor groups with strong human rights
lobbies are less likely to engage in child soldiering. Examining a sample of 248 unique rebel
groups active in 323 conflict dyads between 1989 and 2010, I find that when only accounting for
the presence or absence of support, rebels with foreign support are no more likely to use child
soldiers. However, when considering the characteristics of supporters, a higher concentration of
democratic states is associated with a decreased likelihood that rebels use child soldiers. The
quantitative analysis is supplemented with two case narratives. A most similar systems design of
the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey and the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) in
Syria illustrates the theoretical mechanism and offers insight on limitations.
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Introduction
Child soldiers have been used across the globe by non-state actors including the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
in Colombia, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and the Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq. Still, rebel
groups such as the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA) in Mali, the Chadian National Front
(FNT) in Chad, Sikh insurgents in India, and Ansar al-Islam in Iraq have refrained from using
child soldiers. What accounts for this variation? To date, literature has detailed a number of
factors shaping the dynamics of rebel recruitment and composition, and while much has been
uncovered, significant limitations remain. This paper focuses specifically on the effects of
external state support. Foreign sponsorship is an important, yet often overlooked factor in the
literature on rebel child soldiering. Those that have investigated the effects of external support on
rebel recruitment of children have found mixed results, suggesting it can increase rebel violence
against children or finding no significant difference when compared to groups without such
support (i.e. Beber and Blattman 2013; Jo 2015). This variance motivates the current study and
leads to the central research questions: 1) how does foreign state sponsorship impact rebel child
soldiering and 2) how do the characteristics of foreign state donors impact the probability that a
group will use child soldiers? In doing so, this paper brings together two strands of literature.
First, it contributes to the literature evaluating how exogenous factors influence civilian
victimization (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014; Weinstein
2006; Wood 2014). Secondly, following precedent of recent scholarship (i.e. Cohen 2013; Cohen
and Nordås 2014), it disaggregates the concept of civilian victimization, focusing exclusively on
rebel child soldiering.
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It is well documented that foreign support can increase the degree of civilian
victimization perpetrated by non-state armed groups as it can eliminate rebels’ dependence on
civilian support (Wood 2014; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014). Resources provided by
external sponsors have ranged from direct assistance in the form of troops, as illustrated by
Rwanda’s support of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in the late 1990s, to the
provision of territorial sanctuary as seen in Sudan’s support of the LRA in Uganda. However,
scholars have primarily relied on Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) measure of violence
against civilians known as ‘one-sided violence’. One-sided violence accounts for the number of
civilians (non-combatants) killed by a rebel group in a given year and findings have consistently
noted that the presence of foreign support can lead to increases in the number of civilian fatalities
at the hands of insurgents.
From here the paper progresses in several parts. First, I briefly review the state of the
literature on child soldiering with specific attention given to the conditions that have influenced
rebels’ inclusion of child soldiers. Second, I discuss the importance of disaggregating various
forms of civilian victimization. I then borrow from theoretical arguments rooted in a principalagent framework to explain how foreign support from autocratic actors is likely to be associated
with rebel child soldiering. Fourth, I discuss the research design and operationalization of key
variables. In the analysis section, I quantitatively assess the theoretical argument with a crossnational sample of 324 conflict-dyad periods from 1989-2010. The results show that foreign state
sponsorship has an inconclusive effect on the likelihood of rebel child soldiering. However,
when one considers the characteristics of foreign state donors, meaningful differences arise.
Those organization’s with a higher percentage of foreign supporters that are democratic appear
less likely to use child soldiers in their rebellions. Following the quantitative assessment I turn to
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a qualitative investigation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or the
PKK) in Turkey and the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD), a Kurdish militant group operating
in Syria. The PKK, which has predominantly received support from more autocratic regimes (the
exception being Greece), has used child soldiers throughout the majority of its existence. The
PYD on the other hand, has benefited significantly from democratic (US) support since 2014 yet
continues to employ child soldiers. At face value, this case appears to run counter to the
theoretical argument, but closer examination suggests the group has been responsive to criticism
of its child soldiering practices. I conclude with a discussion on policy implications and
directions for future research.

Literature Review
Recent years have seen an increase in scholarship on child soldiering with efforts largely aimed
at identifying factors leading to their inclusion in rebel groups and/or the conditions that push
children to join these organizations. These investigations have largely been framed in one of two
theoretical lenses: supply-side (push factors) versus demand-side (pull factors). Supply-side
theories focus on the structural conditions that make children more likely to be associated with
rebel groups. Scholars have argued that states with high orphan rates, limited educational
opportunities, high poverty levels, and large numbers of vulnerable populations in the form of
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are more likely to see rebel groups recruit child
soldiers (Brett et al. 1996; Wessels 2006; Machel 1996; Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994;
Achvarina and Reich 2006). Under these conditions, scholars argue, children become a readily
available resource for rebel groups and are more likely to choose to join a rebellion. While
anecdotal evidence suggests merit in these structural conditions, they fail to account for much of
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the variance in child soldiering across rebel groups and across conflicts. Put differently, such
societal conditions are often ubiquitous in violent conflict settings, but child soldiering is less so
(Haer 2019).
While supply-side arguments focus on the access to and willingness of children to
become members of rebellions, demand-side arguments explore the motives of the recruiters.
Those advancing demand-side explanations contend that rebel groups see some benefit in child
soldiers, often interpreting the process of their incorporation as an exercise in cost-benefit
analysis. These scholars argue that children can augment troop size (particularly for those for
rebellions facing heavy casualties), increase an organizations fighting capacity, and have become
more valuable to rebel groups given the proliferation of small arms and light weapons found in
modern conflict (Woods 1993; Blattman and Annan 2008; Haer and Böhmelt 2016a; Singer
2006). Others suggest that children are desirable given their ease of indoctrination, increased
loyalty and responsiveness to coercive tactics, decreased assessment of risk, and cost of retention
(Beber and Blattman 2013; Gates and Reich 2010; Brett and Specht 2004; Schauer and Elbert
2010).
Building on demand-side explanations, scholars have sought to explain how groups’
goals can assist in explaining variance in rebel child soldiering. These studies contend that
rebellions make intentional calculations about the signals their actions might send to the
international community (Lasley and Thyne 2015; Jo 2015). Lasley and Thyne (2015), for
instance, argue that the need for international legitimacy is likely to constrain rebel child
soldiering for secessionist groups. In contrast, Jo (2015) contends that separatist groups are more
likely to use children given their reliance on popular support, but are often likely to be
switchover compliers (i.e. more likely to stop using child soldiers than other groups). Employing
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different samples, each find support for their arguments, but more importantly show group goals
to be a useful predictor for rebels’ recruitment of children.
Though current literature has advanced scholarly understanding of the conditions leading
to child soldiering, little has been done to fully consider the effect of foreign support on rebel
child soldiering. While previous economic arguments of rebel behavior have often focused on
the role of gemstones, narcotics, and other natural resources, support from foreign governments
“remain an equally (if not more) important source of financing for [many] rebel organizations”
(Salehyan et al. 2014, 636). Foreign funding, while adding value to a rebel group, can also divert
its goals with members becoming more invested in profiteering (Dishman 2001, Weinstein
2007). External sources of funding can also prompt groups to engage in practices that are more
violent towards civilian populations. Eck (2014) showed that economic shocks can impact
groups’ recruitment, as losing funding can stifle an organization’s ability to incentivize
volunteers. Thus, when groups become desperate they appear more likely to engage in
involuntary recruitment practices and accept less committed recruits to meet short term needs.
Relatedly, Beber and Blattman (2013) suggest that foreign support can make rebels more violent
in their recruitment efforts, increasing the rate at which they forcibly recruit children. Similarly,
Faulkner (2016) shows that the LRA’s rate of forcible child recruitment dramatically increased
following its receipt of support from Sudan. However, others have find foreign support has an
inconclusive on the likelihood that rebels use children in the first place (Faulkner et al. 2019;
Haer et al. 2019). In the analysis section, I systematically examine the relationship between
foreign sponsorship and child soldiering by insurgent groups.
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Lessons from the Study of Civilian Victimization
Civilian victimization is broadly defined as a wartime strategy that targets and kills (or attempts
to kill) noncombatants (Downes 2006, 156-157). Academic studies exploring rebel violence
against civilians have traditionally focused on ‘one-sided violence’ to capture the degree of
civilian victimization throughout conflict (Wood 2010; Schneider et al. 2012; Fjelde and
Hultman 2014; Saleyhan et al. 2014).1 While this measure has yielded meaningful insights into
the level of violence perpetrated by rebel groups, focusing exclusively on lethal violence might
fail to capture other important micro-level form of victimization including child soldiering.
Although many recognize child soldiering as a form of civilian victimization, quantitative
literature has focused almost exclusively on lethal violence as an umbrella for all forms of
victimization (Wood 2010; Salehyan et al. 2014; Wood 2014; Wood and Kathman 2015). Data
constraints are often referenced as a major reason for this, but such an operationalization
captures only one form of the various types of civilian abuse that often occur during wartime
(rape, abduction, child soldiering, etc.). Recent scholarship shows that lethal violence is not a
good proxy for the overall patterns of violence employed by rebel groups (Gutierrez-Sanin and
Wood 2017). Thus, re-examining the validity of early studies which relied exclusively on lethal
violence is important given rebels’ repertoire of violence (Hoover Green 2016). For example,
evidence suggests that insurgents can and do engage in high levels of lethal violence against
civilians while also incorporating child soldiers as seen with the LRA across Uganda, the Central
African Republic, and the DRC. However, other insurgents, such as the PKK in Turkey, are less

“One-sided violence is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group
against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths per year” (Eck et al. 2004, 136; Eck and Hultman 2007, 235).
1
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lethal towards civilians, but still use child soldiers (i.e. Tezcür and Besaw 2016). To explore
these patterns more fully, this study extends arguments calling for a more nuanced
conceptualization of civilian victimization by focusing exclusively on rebel child soldiering.
Ultimately, this strategy can improve our understanding of factors that influence rebels’ patterns
of violence in conflict.
Scholars have made valuable contributions in assessing the characteristics and conditions
that lead rebels to perpetrate violence against civilians. A robust finding is the positive
relationship between external support and civilian victimization (Weinstein 2005; Wood 2014;
Salehyan et al. 2014). Theoretically, groups with stable resource streams (i.e. access to natural
resources, foreign support, etc.) are more likely to lose incentives to foster benevolent
relationships with civilians. The access to such resources decreases their reliance on local
support. Others contend that rebel tactics are conditional upon a rebel group’s needs at various
points in a conflict as strategies are often reactive to the dynamics of conflict (Eck 2014). Groups
suffering from heavy resource loses may be more likely to engage in practices that would
otherwise be seen as morally reprehensible such as kidnapping, looting, or killing civilians (Eck
2014; Wood 2014). Though these scholars mention child soldiering in their arguments on
civilian victimization, their focus remains on lethal violence. To address this gap, I consider how
foreign sponsorship, largely recognized to increase levels of lethal violence, effects rebels’
recruitment of child soldiers.

Theoretical Framework
Rebellions receive varying degrees of support from foreign donors. For some rebel
organizations, like the Taliban, foreign state sponsorship may be a significant contributor to the
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organization’s longevity and survival. For others foreign sponsorship may be an inconsistent or
ancillary item that bolsters its resource pool at times, but is unreliable for the long term. Certain
rebel groups such as the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in India, may lack foreign support
entirely. For such groups, collaboration with civilians is likely be essential for their long-term
survival. They have strong incentives to maintain amicable relations with civilians and avoid
practices that may jeopardize these relationships (i.e. child soldiering).
A distinct feature of foreign state support is that it suggests a contract between the foreign
donor and the recipient rebel group and can be thought of in terms of a principal-agent
framework (Salehyan 2010; Salehyan et al. 2014, 657). Principal-agent theory suggests that a
principal provides an agent with some form of assistance, often with the expectation of a payoff
or degree of leverage over the recipient’s behavior. Foreign states engage in this type of
relationship for a variety of reasons including (but not limited to) efforts to fight opposition
groups in foreign states, as seen with US support of the Syrian Democratic Forces, to attempt to
indirectly challenge neighboring governments, unseat ruling parties, or assist groups with
secessionist ambitions, as illustrated by Museveni’s support of the SPLM/A in Sudan and South
Africa’s involvement in Angola, or for other forms of policy advancement. In supporting rebel
groups as proxies, donor states can avoid the costs associated with direct involvement. However,
there are tradeoffs—not the least of which relate to agency loss. Agency loss, or “agency slack,”
occurs when an agent’s actions are inconsistent with the preferences of the principal (Salehyan
2010, 495).
For donor states, this can be particularly worrisome as their rebel recipients might engage
in undesirable behavior, unaligned with expectations. At the same time, foreign support can lead
to the elimination of incentives and/or the need for recipient groups to collect resources from
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local populations as they rely on support from their donors (Weinstein 2007; Salehyan, Siroky,
and Wood 2014). Even with the potential that recipients deviate from agents’ desires, evidence
suggests that many states are willing to accept this risk and support rebel organizations.
In similar fashion to those suggesting the power of natural resources to drive rebels to
commit acts of terror against civilians, I argue that external state sponsorship will have a
comparable effect on child soldier recruitment. Here, insurgencies with access to foreign support
are not solely reliant on local populations for support and this can remove constraints on violence
against uncooperative civilians. However, the repertoire of violence employed can vary
significantly and I suggest that foreign financing, either in the absence of or at low levels of
civilian victimization, can increase the likelihood of rebel child soldiering (i.e. Weinstein 2006;
Haer and Böhmelt 2016a; Faulkner 2016). Even if this foreign support ebbs and flows, it can
assist rebels in overcoming resource problems that plague poor rebellions.
A counterargument is that increased resources can actually help rebels overcome
recruitment problems as they can pay recruits or offer them other tangible benefits. While this
may be a reality for certain groups, individuals join rebellions for many reasons which are often
unrelated to pecuniary benefits (Elster 1985; Cederman et al. 2010; Viterna 2013; Tezcür 2016)
However, even if rebels see a surge in the number of recruits willing to join for economic gain,
incentives still exist to limit ‘payouts’ to members. Particularly if support is monetary, leaders
may want to retain more for themselves or may be more interested in reinvesting in supplies and
equipment. In short, there may be benefits in keeping the number of shareholders low. Children
become an attractive resource in these cases as they are often cheaper and can be kept from
sharing in any tangible benefits more easily than their adult counterparts who may often demand
more (Haer et al. 2019). As a result, I anticipate that rebel groups that have foreign state funding
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will be more likely to employ child soldiers in comparison to those groups that lack any type of
foreign state support:

Hypothesis 1: Rebel groups that receive external state support will be more likely to use child
soldiers than those groups without external sponsorship.

Differing effects of foreign state sponsorship on rebel child soldiering in earlier work might also
be attributed to the lack of exploration of where support comes from. For instance, Beber and
Blattman (2013) showed that having a foreign donor can increase the likelihood of forced child
soldiering, but only consider its presence or absence. Similarly, others have shown that foreign
support has an inconclusive effect for general patterns of rebel child soldiering (i.e. Faulkner et
al. 2019). Central to the principal-agent framework is the expectation that “governments
[principals] contract with rebels [agents] to provide foreign policy services” (Saleyhan et al.
2014, 638). Governments may be selective with the types of rebel organizations they align with
based on demands and policy desires (Saleyhan et al. 2011). This suggests that the characteristics
of donor states can impact their willingness to provide support (or not) to certain rebel groups.
While some states are willing to tolerate the risk of agency slack, others are may be less willing,
particularly when the consequences can impact leaders’ domestic reputation. For instance,
certain states may be less tolerant of human rights abuses even when pursuing policy
goals/objectives and may be less inclined to fund an insurgent group if the behavior of the
organization fails to align with the donor’s standards. Democratic states in particular face the
constraint of balancing domestic perceptions of foreign policy behavior whereas their autocratic
counterparts are less susceptible to meaningful public backlash based on their support for violent
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rebels. Therefore, I consider the level of democracy of donor states and anticipate that when
donors are democratic, rebel groups will be less likely to use child soldiers than when donor
states are autocratic.

Hypothesis 2a: Rebel groups that receive external support from democracies are less likely to
use child soldiers than groups receiving support from autocracies.

An important consideration is the potential of an endogenous relationship between rebel
child soldiering and state sponsorship. While states may choose to refrain from supporting
groups who use child soldiers, rebels’ practices towards civilians may dictate the types of donors
who support them. The causal direction is difficult to capture in the statistical analysis given the
time limitations in the coding of the main dependent variable(s). A process-tracing study of the
PKK and PYD cases pays special attention to temporal dynamics and assists in exploring the
direction of these relationships. These case narratives afford the opportunity to identify when
child soldiering practices began in relation to foreign support and how rebel groups might
respond when their child soldiering practices are exposed.
While I expect a negative association between democratic donors and rebel child
soldiering, historical evidence shows that democracies are willing, at times, to tolerate some
level of human rights abuses (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Using newly compiled data by
Haer and Böhmelt (2016a), which provides an ordinal measure of the level of child soldiering by
rebels, I also consider the effect of donor characteristics on the degree to which rebels engage in
child soldiering. India’s support of the Karen National Union (KNU) and Kashmir insurgents
are cases where a democratic donor chose to provide support even when child soldiers were
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being used by rebel recipients, albeit at lower levels. Thus, though the general expectation is a
negative association between democratic donors and rebel child soldiering, these cases
demonstrate that democracies, at times, will provide support to rebels that recruit child soldiers.
Consequently, I expect in such cases that the level of rebel child soldiering will be lower.
Although democracies have given support to rebels with dismal human rights records, they are
typically far more constrained in who they support both due to domestic accountability human
rights lobbies that are more visible and active when compared to their autocratic counterparts. As
a result, we should expect that autocratic regimes to be less constrained in their support of severe
human rights abusers. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2b: Rebel groups that receive external support from more democratic donor states
are less likely to use children at a high rate (>50%) than groups with support from nondemocracies.2

Research Design
The theory presented suggests that rebels are more likely to use child soldiers when external state
sponsorship exists as they are less dependent upon local populations. However, this expectation
is qualified by suggesting that the characteristics of donor groups—specifically their democratic

2

Scholars have also argued that the democratic effect of donors may largely be attributed to the strength of their
human rights lobbies and that any democratic effect is actually driven by the influence of human rights activism
within the donor states (Salehyan et al. 2014). If accurate, then the strength of human rights lobbies within donor
states “should ‘soak up’ much of the variance in democracy,” while still exerting a “strong effect on its own” (654).
While democracies may, at times, turn a blind eye to rebel groups’ questionable human rights records, the strength
of a state’s human rights lobbies may constrain both their ability and/or decisions to support groups who use child
soldiers. As such, I consider different indicators to consider such an effect.
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institutions and strength of human rights lobbies—can impact rebel child soldiering. I test these
expectations using data from Haer and Böhmelt (2016a) who provide information on non-state
actors’ use of child soldiers. The data cover a sample of 323 conflict dyads active between 19892010 and is an expansion of the original Non-State Actor (NSA) Dataset (Cunningham et al.
2009). The unit of analysis is the conflict-dyad period and focuses specifically on the rebel
organization within each dyad. This differs from most studies on foreign support and rebel
behavior towards civilians which traditionally adopt a conflict-year unit of analysis. Data
limitations, notably a time invariant dependent variable, led me to focus on the conflict-dyad
period. Specifically, although the actual rate of child recruitment likely varies, it is difficult, if
not impossible to determine annual changes across a large sample of groups. As an example, the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) fighting against Uganda from 1988-2001 and the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), active throughout 2003 before dissolving at the end of the
year, are each one observation in the data even though the former was active over a longer period
of time. In total, my cross-sectional approach includes over 200 distinct rebel groups operating at
some point in a civil conflict with the government between 1989 and 2010.

Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable, Child Soldier Use, is operationalized in two distinct ways. First,
given the difficulties in obtaining accurate and reliable data on rebel child soldiering I rely on the
traditional dichotomous measure collected by Haer and Böhmelt (2016a). While this inherently
limits the inferences that can be drawn, it is the most universally employed measure to date in the
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child soldier literature. A 1 indicates a rebel group used child soldiers at some point during the
specified conflict-dyad period and 0 otherwise.3
Secondly, in addition to the binary indicator, I include a measure which captures the rate
of child soldier usage across rebellions (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). This measure has improved
our understanding of the prevalence of child soldiering within rebels’ ranks, illustrating the
gravity of this form of victimization. To test Hypothesis 2b, I employ the ordinal variable for the
level of child soldering within a rebel group. The variable is coded as follows: 0 when there is no
evidence of child soldiers; 1 when less than 50% of the group is comprised of child soldiers; and
2 when a majority (greater than 50%) of the group is child soldiers. Although it would be ideal to
identify when rebels first recruit child soldiers, these two measures provide useful insight and
allow us to capture not only the inclusion/exclusion of child soldiers, but also the extent of their
involvement.

Independent Variables
The central hypotheses in this paper suggest that external state support will increase the
likelihood of rebel child soldiering, while simultaneously arguing that rebels with support from
democratic donors and donors with strong human rights lobbies will be those that are less likely
to use child soldiers. The main variable of interest, External State Sponsorship, comes from the
UCDP External Support Project - Disaggregated/Supporter Dataset which provides annual
information on external support for the primary belligerents during civil conflicts from 1989 to

3

I use the 18 or under threshold as defined in Lasley and Thyne (2015) and Haer and Böhmelt (2016).
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2009 (Högbladh et al. 2011). Previous efforts exploring foreign support and the effect on rebel
child soldiering have predominantly relied on the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset. However, the
data only provides a binary measure for the presence of state support.4 Taking the NSA data as a
useful starting point, the UCDP External Supporter dataset provides annual information on rebel
groups’ external sponsorship, offering specific information on which years rebels received
support and from what source. An additional advantage of the UCDP dataset is the availability of
information on the type of support given to rebels during the course of a conflict.5 Lastly, while
the UCDP dataset only provides information through 2009, it also includes information on nonstate supporters of rebel groups. Although the theoretical dynamics of how support from other
non-state actors might impact rebel behavior need to be studied, information on all sources of
exogenous support can offer a more complete picture of rebel groups’ resources.6
Using the UCDP dataset, I code external state sponsorship in two distinct ways. First, I
use a binary measure (H1) for whether an insurgency received support from any foreign state
during the specified conflict period (1 if state support is present and 0 otherwise). Second,
because data on external support are disaggregated by rebel group/year I am able to investigate

4

Although it provides some information on who the foreign state sponsors of rebels are, the NSA dataset is not
disaggregated by sponsor, there is no temporal variation, and the data are less complete than those of UCDP.
5
For example, the UCDP External Sponsorship dataset provides information on ten types of support including
whether the group received weapons, troops, access to military intelligence infrastructure/joint operations, territory,
material/logistics support, funding/economic support, intelligence material, training/expertise, other forms of
support (i.e. running/harboring/funding a radio station belonging to a rebel group, or support of an unknown type
(for more detailed information see UCDP External Support Project – Disaggregated Supporter Dataset Codebook
pp. 10, 14-17)
6
In total, 301 of the 323 conflict dyads appear in both the NSA and UCDP External Sponsorship datasets. The 22
cases which are not in the UCDP dataset, but are in the NSA dataset provide information on whether a foreign state
provided aid to a rebel group. However, information regarding external rebel support is not available.
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the characteristics of the foreign state donors at any point throughout a group’s rebellion.7 To test
the hypotheses about the impact of regime type of the donor, I include three additional measures
of external sponsorship: the average polity score of the rebel group’s set of donor states; the
percent of a group’s state donors that are categorized as democratic; and the number of human
rights institutions operating in foreign state sponsors (Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014; Ho
2015). I discuss the transformations of these variables below.8
I define a donor group as the set of states that provide support to a specified rebel group
at some point during its respective conflict-dyad period. Next, I generated a count of the number
of unique donors for each rebel group. Distinguishing the number of unique donors is important
as rebel groups may be receiving support in multiple years from the same donor(s) and this
ensures that state/rebel donors are not double-counted. For donor groups’ level of democracy I
opted for the polity2 score attributed to each donor state annually from 1989 to 2009 (Marshall
and Jaggers 2004). I collapsed the data into average polity2 scores for each donor group in each
conflict-dyad year. For instance, if a rebel group received funding from the United States in 2008
(polity2 score=10) and also received funding from Nigeria in 2008 (polity2 score=4), the average
polity2 score for that rebel group conflict year would equal 7. Once averages for each conflictyear were identified, I collapsed the polity2 yearly average to the average polity2 score of all
donors over a rebel’s conflict dyad-period. The measure captures the average polity score of the
entire donor group, offering a snapshot of the character of donor/donor groups’ political

7

Given that the dataset also provides information on non-state foreign supporters, I include a second measure
indicating whether a donor received government support, rebel support, or both.
8
Given the time invariant dependent variables, I chose to truncate the data on donor characteristics to allow for
merging with available data on child soldiering. This results in a loss of variance across explanatory variables, but I
construct measures which attempt to provide an accurate and realistic representation of donor group characteristics
throughout each rebel group’s conflict dyad period.

23

institutions over a rebel group’s years of activity. The resulting variable is a continuous measure
ranging from -10 to 10. I also generated a binary indicator as to whether the donor state in a
given year was democratic or not. Donors with a +6 or higher polity2 score were considered
democratic. Following a similar procedure, I generated a unique count of the number of
democratic donors and number of autocratic donors and transformed this variable to create a
measure for the percent of donor countries that were democratic over each group’s conflict-dyad
period.
To capture the strength of human rights lobbies within a donor group I draw on data
from Murdie and Bhasin (2011) who provide three classifications for human rights lobbies in a
state: 1) the number of Human Rights Organizations (HROs) with permanent offices within a
state; 2) the number of human rights events within a state; and 3) the number of human rights
specific International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) with membership or volunteers
within a state. I opt for Murdie and Bhasin’s (2011) first indicator—a count of the number of
HROs with permanent offices in a donor state. I generate a sum of HROs with offices across all
donor groups for each rebel conflict-dyad period.9 Donor groups with more HROs with a
permanent office are expected to be negatively associated with rebel child soldiering.

Controls

There may be a concern of multicollinearity between the donor group’s democracy average and the HRO
measurement. I test for this accordingly.
9
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To control for other influences on the use of child soldiers, I include a host of control variables
standard in the literature on child soldiering. First, to distinguish between civilian victimization
and child soldering I include the measure—One-sided Violence—which calculates the sum of the
total number of civilians killed by a rebel group in each conflict-dyad period. Data are drawn
from the UCDP one-sided violence dataset.10
Secessionist Conflict is a binary indicator for secessionist goals coded and is drawn from
the NSA dataset ((Cunningham et al. 2009). It receives a value of 1 if the group is considered a
secession movement and 0 otherwise. As discussed above, previous scholarship offers two
competing ideas. First secessionist groups are less likely to use child soldiers as these
movements require international legitimacy in order to achieve their objectives (Lasley and
Thyne 2015). Second, secessionist movements are more likely to benefit from popular support
leading to an increase in the number of underage fighters (Jo 2015).
To capture a structural factors associated with child soldering, I include Youth
Unemployment and GDP per capita. Youth Unemployment is the percentage of the population
ages 15-24 who are unemployed in a state. I calculate the average percentage within each state
from 1989-2010. GDP per capita controls for the influence of poverty on child soldiering, and is
constructed as average of the natural log of GDP per capita within a state from 1989-2010.
Democracy, drawn from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2004), is used to
capture the characteristics of authority of a state in conflict. Grievances against a government
may lead to the mobilization of a population, including children (Andvig and Gates 2010). In

10

Inclusion of this variable is necessary to demonstrate that it fails to capture all the variance in the main dependent
variable (Child Soldier Use). One-sided violence and Child Soldier Use are only weakly correlated; .11 (binary) and
.25 (ordinal).
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autocratic regimes, repression might increase the likelihood that children join insurgency.
Contrarily, more democratic governments may provide higher degrees of support to vulnerable
populations limiting the pool of viable recruits (Lasley and Thyne 2015). Either way, I use the
average polity2 score of the state from 1989-2010.
Access to vulnerable populations may also impact child soldiering. I include the variables
Refugees, IDPs, and Population to account for access. Refugees is captured as the average
number of refugees within a state from 1989-2010. IDPs accounts for the average number of
IDPs per country from 1989-2010. Population considers the average size of the total population
from 1989-2010 within a conflict state. For each of these measures I take the natural log.
Given suggestions that group structures and characteristics can influence their
recruitment decisions, I include measures for group strength and command control. Rebel
strength, an ordinal measure for strength (much weaker, weaker, parity), is included as strong
rebel groups may refrain from child soldiering as it is not a necessary tactic whereas weaker
groups may forage for anyone capable of carrying a weapon to increase their capabilities.
Strength Central is an ordinal measure for the strength of central command of a rebel group
(low, moderate, high) and captures variance in groups’ level of discipline. Internal discipline of a
group has been shown to impact the level of civilian abuse perpetrated by an insurgency
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). Groups lacking strong central command may be more likely
to use child soldiers, which is a variant of civilian abuse. Both variables are drawn from the NSA
dataset.
Lastly, I include controls for conflict characteristics such as Conflict Duration (natural
log of the number of days a conflict-period lasted) and Conflict Intensity, a dichotomous measure
for low-scale conflict (25 to 999 battle deaths) or high intensity conflict (>1000 battle deaths).
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Both the length of conflict and the intensity of conflict control for the desperation argument, i.e.
that groups will employ child soldiers when they are desperate to fill the rank and file.

Methodology
With both a dichotomous and ordinal dependent variable (Child Soldier Use), my statistical
models employ logistic regression and ordered logistic regression. Figure 1 illustrates the
geographic dispersion of child soldier usage rate by rebel groups between 1989 to 2010. Table 1
reports the frequency of usage by rebel groups across the same time period. Of the 323 conflict
dyads, roughly 24 percent saw no child soldiers used. Over 60 percent of conflict dyads involved
rebel groups use child soldiers at a low rate while approximately 15 percent used child soldiers at
a high rate. In total, 246 conflict-dyads saw rebel groups use child soldiers in some capacity
while 77 groups had no evidence of child soldier usage.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Child Soldier Use by Rebel Groups Across Regions

Table 1. Distribution of Child Soldier Usage Rate (Index) by Conflict Dyads
Frequency

Percent

No child soldiers

77

23.84

Use child soldiers at low rate (<50%)

197

60.99

Use of child soldiers at high rate (>50%)

49

15.17

Total

323

100.00

Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of all main explanatory variables, control variables,
and the two forms of the dependent variable.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Child Soldier Dummy

323

0.7616099

0.42676

0

1

Child Soldier Index

323

0.9133127

0.6194888

0

2

Foreign State Donor

301

0.5083056

0.5007635

0

1

Rebel Donor

301

0.2392027

0.4273071

0

1

Donor Group Polity Average

152

-2.403604

5.311043

-10

10

Donor Group-Percent Democratic

152

.1789782

.3342924

0

1

Permanent HRO Offices

153

.7992832

1. 338835

0

5.451038

One-Sided Violence

295

424.0576

2041.084

0

29593

Secessionist Conflict

323

0.2414861

0.4286483

0

1

Youth Unemployment (ln)

322

2.55881

0.7131409

0.9216983

4.072206

GDP Per Capita (ln)

314

7.195277

1.186109

5.516325

10.45193

Democracy (Polity2 Average

323

0.2462935

5.197325

-9

10

Refugees (ln)

319

9.594898

3.44291

0

14.48768

IDPs (ln)

319

7.591692

5.607911

0

13.94447

Population (ln)

322

16.93744

1.551682

13.20957

20.77387

Rebel Strength

323

1.647059

0.6955151

0

3

Strength Central

282

2.074468

0.6240613

1

3

Dependent Variables

Main Independent Variables

Controls
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Results
Results are presented in Table 3 which includes several models accounting for the impact of
external state support and sponsors’ characteristics on rebel child soldiering. Models 1-3 report
results for the binary measure of child soldiering while models 4-6 consider their effects on the
ordinal measure. Across the models, we see mixed results for the proposed hypotheses regarding
the effect of external support and the influence of donor group characteristics on rebel behavior.
First, the coefficient for External State Sponsorship in Models 1 and 4 is negative, but
insignificant. Thus, it appears that simply having an external state backer does not increase the
probability that rebels will employ child soldiers. Turning to the donor groups’ average polity
score (Models 2 and 5), the coefficient is in the anticipated negative direction, suggesting that
rebels receiving support from more democratic donor groups are less likely to use child soldiers,
but fails to reach statistical significance. Thus, this operationalization of the independent variable
presents no support for a ‘democratic’ constraining effect on rebel recruitment of children.11

Table 3. External State Sponsorship and Rebel Child Soldiering
Model 1
(Binary)
External State
Sponsorship (binary)
Donor Group Polity2
Average

Model 2
(Binary)

Model 3
(Binary)

-0.159
(0.470)

Model 4
(Ordinal)

Model 5
(Ordinal)

Model 6
(Ordinal)

-0.126
(0.342)
-0.112
(0.0720)

-0.0330
(0.0452)

Percent Democratic

-2.387*
(1.280)

11

-1.379*
(0.763)

This can be attributed, in part, to the specification of the main explanatory variable (donor group polity2 average)
in Models 2 and 5. Specifically, the mean polity2 average for donor groups in the sample is -2.4. As a result, the
majority of donor groups in the sample align more closely with the autocratic side of the polity scale. Consequently,
there is limited evidence of a constraining effect on rebel child soldiering in these model specifications
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Model 1
(Binary)

Model 2
(Binary)

Model 3
(Binary)

Model 4
(Ordinal)

One-sided Violence

0.0102*
(0.00580)

0.0196*
(0.0109)

0.0172*
(0.0103)

0.000878* 0.000672* 0.000696*
**
(0.000347) (0.000357)
0.000248)

Secessionist Conflict

1.024
(0.623)

0.700
(0.911)

0.581
(0.904)

1.073***
(0.415)

0.889
(0.572)

0.971*
(0.567)

Youth Unemployment
(ln)

-1.912***
(0.503)

-1.606*
(0.974)

-1.603*
(0.966)

-1.306***
(0.313)

-1.470***
(0.495)

-1.500***
(0.494)

GDP per capita (ln)

0.604**
(0.291)

-0.313
(0.581)

-0.247
(0.584)

0.224
(0.185)

0.0232
(0.284)

0.0110
(0.286)

Democracy (Polity2
Average)

0.0130
(0.0556)

0.104
(0.104)

0.0917
(0.107)

0.0485
(0.0367)

0.110**
(0.0534)

0.110**
(0.0538)

Refugees (ln)

0.0830
(0.0738)

0.163
0.145)

0.120
(0.146)

0.116**
(0.0508)

0.207**
(0.0885)

0.163*
(0.0921)

IDPs (ln)

-0.0415
(0.0473)

-0.0764
(0.0844)

-0.103
(0.0883)

0.0335
(0.0329)

0.0562
(0.0464)

0.0490
(0.0457)

Population (ln)

-0.0642
(0.177)

0.0559
(0.369)

0.176
(0.372)

-0.0595
(0.127)

0.0440
(0.204)

0.159
(0.216)

Rebel Strength

-0.313
(0.326)

-0.367
(0.524)

-0.249
(0.538)

-0.0929
(0.244)

0.147
(0.344)

0.156
(0.346)

Strength Central

-1.114***
(0.414)

-0.914
(0.660)

-0.863
(0.662)

-0.652**
(0.276)

-0.666*
(0.377)

-0.696*
(0.383)

Conflict Intensity

1.281**
(0.601)

0.954
(0.827)

1.230
(0.858)

1.239***
(0.401)

1.113**
(0.524)

1.147**
(0.527)

Conflict Duration

0.409***
(0.132)

0.322
(0.326)

0.359
(0.334)

0.390***
(0.103)

0.143
(0.198)

0.133
(0.204)

0.794
(3.923)

4.491
(7.208)

2.472
(7.333)

Constant cut1

-0.0395
(2.961)

-0.427
(4.193)

0.438
(4.270)

Constant cut2

4.348
(2.965)

3.657
(4.204)

4.579
(4.288)

Constant

Observations
Pseudo R2

Model 5
(Ordinal)

Model 6
(Ordinal)

238

128

128

238

128

128

0.396

0.357

0.367

0.277

0.222

0.234

31

Model 1
(Binary)

Model 2
(Binary)

Model 3
(Binary)

Model 4
(Ordinal)

Model 5
(Ordinal)

Model 6
(Ordinal)

LogLik

-73.84

-34.57

-34.03

-156.8

-90.17

-88.71

chi-square

97.01

38.37

39.47

120.4

51.40

54.30

0

0.000252

0.000168

0

1.71e-06

5.36e-07

probchi2
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 3 and 6 consider the percentage of donors within a donor group that are democratic.
Recalling that a donor is counted as democratic if its average polity2 score is +6 or higher, the
sample in each model only considers those rebel groups that received external state support in a
conflict-dyad period.12 Within each model, the coefficient is negative and significant at the .10
level suggesting that the more democratic states within a group of donor states, the less likely
rebel recipients will use child soldiers (Model 3) and the less likely they will be used at high
levels (Model 6) when they are recruited. This lends support to both hypotheses 2a and 2b and
highlights the importance of considering the democratic characteristics of foreign sponsors.
While foreign state support offers little explanation for rebel child soldiering, considering the
percent of democratic states supporting a rebel organization provides some useful insight as to
whether rebels will use children. Addressing a potential endogenous relationship, these findings
might also suggest that rebels who refrain from child soldiering will be more likely to receive
support from democratic donor groups.
Briefly examining the control variables, rebel groups that engage in higher levels of Onesided Violence against civilians are statistically more likely to use children as soldiers with

12

The number of observations drops significantly across these model specifications.
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results robust across all models in Table 3. This is unsurprising as groups that engage in high
levels of lethal violence have already demonstrated a propensity to violate human rights. Still,
this suggests that rebels will often employ a diverse repertoire of violence which scholars would
do well to consider. Turning to group characteristics, the coefficient for Secessionist Conflict is
positive across all models, but significant only in Models 4 and 6. Though Lasley and Thyne
(2015) find that groups vying for independence should be less likely to engage in child soldiering
out of a need for international legitimacy, these findings point to an opposite effect and lend
support to Jo’s (2015) argument that these groups are more likely to benefit from local
volunteers mobilized along ethnic/nationalist lines, increasing the chances that children will be
involved with the group. Rebel Strength has an inconclusive effect on child soldiering. However,
the negative and significant coefficient for strength of a rebel group’s central command in
Models 1 and 4-6 suggests that groups with strong central command structures are less likely to
engage in child soldiering. Two points emerge. First, groups with strong hierarchical control may
be better at internal discipline and can maintain more control over their combatants behavior,
offering support for Weinstein’s (2007) argument that control structures matter for the
employment of violence. Second, this finding suggest that avoiding child soldiering may be a
conscious decision by rebel leaders who can enforce their decision over the sub-commanders.
Regarding supply-side controls (i.e. country-level characteristics), the majority are
insignificant, suggesting that supply-side arguments often fail to fully account for factors leading
to rebel child soldiering. However, Youth Unemployment and Refugees emerge as relevant
indicators for situational factors that lead to rebel child soldiering. In Models 4-6 Refugees
exhibit a positive and significant effect. States hosting a higher number of refugees are in turn,
more likely to see rebel groups employ child soldiers. This lends support to previous findings
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from Achvarina and Reich (2006) who suggest that vulnerable populations such as refugees offer
rebels and easy pool of recruits. Unexpectedly, higher levels of Youth Unemployment are
negatively associated with rebel child soldiering and significant across all models. While the
theoretical expectation suggested that higher levels of unemployment across young populations
would create a readily available supply of child soldiers, the findings suggest otherwise. This can
likely be attributed to the age threshold which considers youth to be anyone between the ages of
15-24. The definition of a child soldier refers to anyone under the age of 18. Thus, in cases with
high levels of youth unemployment, there is a readily available pool of individuals between 18
and 24 who may be preferable for rebel organizations.
Lastly, both conflict intensity and conflict duration exhibit a positive effect on rebel child
soldiering. However, conflict duration is only significant in two models (Models 1 and 4) while
conflict intensity is significant in four of the six models (Models 1 and 4-6). Together, there
appears to be some support for a desperation theory of recruitment—that is in cases where
conflicts are more violent and last longer, rebels are more likely to engage in child soldiering out
of necessity.

Table 4. Human Rights Organizations (HROs) and Rebel Child Soldiering
Model 7
(Binary)

Model 8
(Binary)

Percent Democratic

Model 9
(Ordinal)

-2.914**
(1.430)

Model 10
(Ordinal)
-2.150**
(0.850)

Total HROs (ln)

-0.0267
(0.240)

0.223
(0.278)

0.201
(0.143)

0.350**
(0.162)

One-sided Violence

0.0172
(0.0107)

0.0179*
(0.0104)

0.000532**
(0.000240)

0.000603**
(0.000272)
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Model 7
(Binary)

Model 8
(Binary)

Model 9
(Ordinal)

Model 10
(Ordinal)

Secessionist Conflict

0.405
(0.884)

0.674
(0.913)

0.895
(0.552)

1.164**
(0.577)

Youth Unemployment (ln)

-1.125
(0.900)

-1.530
(0.984)

-1.181***
(0.454)

-1.466***
(0.496)

GDP per capita (ln)

-0.301
(0.583)

-0.247
(0.585)

-0.106
(0.265)

-0.0187
(0.286)

Democracy (Polity2 Average)

0.108
(0.106)

0.0958
(0.107)

0.110**
(0.0540)

0.118**
(0.0549)

Refugees (ln)

0.174
(0.143)

0.0925
(0.147)

0.213**
(0.0851)

0.139
(0.0923)

IDPs (ln)

-0.0818
(0.0818)

-0.103
(0.0887)

0.0446
(0.0451)

0.0480
(0.0462)

Population (ln)

-0.0560
(0.366)

0.184
(0.365)

-0.0865
(0.192)

0.190
(0.217)

Rebel Strength

-0.361
(0.536)

-0.171
(0.545)

0.102
(0.343)

0.142
(0.349)

Strength Central

-0.834
(0.633)

-0.922
(0.671)

-0.618*
(0.373)

-0.781**
(0.392)

Conflict Intensity

0.939
(0.804)

1.211
(0.864)

1.001*
(0.518)

1.085**
(0.536)

Conflict Duration

0.369
(0.303)

0.402
(0.345)

0.199
(0.193)

0.157
(0.210)

Constant

4.823
(7.177)

2.056
(7.364)

Constant cut1

-2.552
(4.057)

0.547
(4.336)

Constant cut2

1.579
(4.044)

4.878
(4.357)

Observations

129

128

129

128

Pseudo R2

0.335

0.374

0.219

0.255

LogLik

-35.84

-33.68

-90.86

-86.34

chi-square

36.15

40.16

50.91

59.05
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probchi2

Model 7
(Binary)

Model 8
(Binary)

Model 9
(Ordinal)

Model 10
(Ordinal)

0.000562

0.000240

2.08e-06

1.72e-07

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4 presents results when considering the effect of human rights lobbies in an attempt
to gauge how the strength of these institutions impact rebel child soldiering and if the density of
these organizations might be driving the small democratic constraining effect seen in previous
models.13 Models 7 and 9 report the effect of the natural logarithm of the total number of human
rights organizations with a permanent office in a donor group on rebel child soldiering (binary
and ordinal measures respectively). Although the coefficient is in the anticipated negative
direction in Model 7, it is statistically insignificant. In Model 9, the coefficient’s sign flips, but
remains insignificant. Taken together, this suggests that the strength/density of HROs within
donor groups offer little explanatory power for rebel child soldiering when considered
independent of other donor characteristics.
Given the insignificant result of HROs influence on rebel child soldiering in Models 7
and 9, Models 8 and 10 explore the effects of HROs and the percent of democratic donors
simultaneously. The coefficient for HROs is positive in both models although only significant in
Model 10. The positive coefficient runs counter to the expectation presented in the theory. One
possible explanation might suggest that even if the density of HROs is high within donor groups,
these organizations exert little influence on foreign policy decision making. However, in both
models, the percent of democracies in a donor group exhibits a negative and significant effect on

13

This strategy follows that of Salehyan et al. (2014).
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rebel child soldiering. This finding refutes arguments that HRO strength across donor groups is
what drives democracies to refrain from supporting groups that use children (or for groups that
receive support from democracies to avoid child soldiers). Rather, having a higher percentage of
democratic donors results in a decreased probability of rebels using child soldiers or vice versa.
Most controls are consistent with previous models, though few reach levels of statistical
significance. One-sided violence, youth unemployment, the host state’s level of democracy,
strength central refugees, and conflict intensity each achieve statistical significance in at least
one model specification, but I focus my discussion on the full models (Models 8 and 10). Rebels
who commit higher rates of lethal violence and those active in more violent conflicts appear to
be more likely to employ child soldiers. High levels of youth unemployment in a state decreases
the chances that children will find themselves involved in rebel organizations which I largely
attribute to the wide age range captured by the measure. Rebels’ central command structure can
also help explain when they will refrain from child soldiering as those with strong central control
are less likely to recruit child soldiers. Lastly, there is some indication that states with higher
polity2 averages are more likely to see child soldiers in rebel groups. However, in nearly 80% of
the states where rebels are receiving external state support, the conflict country is not democratic
(<+6).
Overall, these analyses show that foreign state support by itself is not a useful factor for
rebel child soldiering when only considering its presence or absence. However, when one goes
deeper, considering the characteristics of the donor group, important insights arise. Specifically,
rebels that receive support from donor groups comprised of a higher percentage of democratic
states are less likely to recruit child soldiers, and if using child soldiers, will do so at lower rates.
It is important to note the potential reverse causality highlighted earlier. It may also be that more
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democratic donor groups are less likely to aid rebels who employ child soldiers, and if support is
provided, will select only those rebels who use few child soldiers. The data limitations limit the
ability to statistically test the directional relationship, but the findings point to a general
association between donor state characteristics and rebel behavior. This underscores the
importance of considering not only if rebels have external support, but rather, where the support
is coming from. In addition, the findings show that scholars would do well to continue to
examine rebels’ repertoires of violence and not solely lethal victimization.
Still, there are some inherent limitations within the statistical analyses which deserve
further attention. The time invariant nature of the main dependent variables limits the causal
inferences one can make. As discussed, the final samples across models are severely constrained.
These are unavoidable shortcomings which limit the explanatory power in each model and call
into question the strength of the democratic constraining effect. One cannot say conclusively that
rebels who receive support from more democratic donor groups will always avoid using child
soldiers and historical evidence shows that democracies, at times, will tolerate human rights
abuses including child soldiering.

Case Studies
Owing to these limitations and to concerns related to the quantitative analyses, I briefly explore
two cases to probe the theoretical argument. Lieberman (2005, 435) contends that small-N cases
can be used assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships. Given the inferences
derived from the statistical analyses above, I use process tracing largely drawn from secondary
source materials and probe two cases: the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey and the
Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) in Syria, including its armed wing, the Yekineyen Parastina
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Gel (YPG; also known as the People’s Defense Units) (Clawson 2016). The two cases were
selected under a most similar systems design. Both cases share a number of similarities, yet
differ on the main variable of interest (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 304). The PKK, established
in 1978 and predominantly supported by autocratic regimes, employed child soldiers throughout
its insurgency. The case of the PYD, a group which was established in 2003 and received
substantial support from the United States, altered its behavior following increasing pressure
from the international community over its child soldiering practices. At first glance, the case
appears to be a deviant case given it is “as far as possible from the prediction” borne out in the
statistical analyses (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302). However, the PYD appears to have
changed its practices in response to concerns that the group might lose Western support. The
following analysis helps explain why the group benefited from democratic support and how the
broader theoretical argument of the interaction between donor states and rebel groups can impact
recruitment behavior.

The PKK
Founded in the late 1970s, the PKK launched its official insurgency against the Turkish
government in 1984 with the primary goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state (Roth
and Sever 2007). When the organization was born, it encountered an environment already ripe
with nearly a dozen other Kurdish nationalist organizations each of which was more established
(Tezcür, 2015). These Kurdish nationalist groups engaged in a variety of activities including
publishing journals/newspapers, organizing youth groups and professional organizations,
mobilizing candidates for elections, and so on (Tezcür 2015, 249). Even entering this
competitive organizational environment, the PKK became the dominant Kurdish nationalist
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group within Turkey by 1984 when it initiated guerrilla warfare in southeastern Turkey with the
goal of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Over the course of the next three decades, the
PKK has experienced variability in the reality of achieving its political and nationalist goals.
What has remained relatively constant is the PKK’s employment of child soldiers. Based
on data drawn from the Kurdish Insurgency Militants (KIM), which has demographic
information for more than 9,000 individuals, the PKK had children in their organization (<18) as
early as 1976 (Tezcür 2016). However the numbers of child soldiers spiked drastically between
1990 and 1994 when the conflict was most intense. Estimates claim that upwards of 3,000
children served in the organization (Child Soldiers International 2008; Singer, 2006) with the
KIM dataset reporting a confirmed minimum of over 2,100. Throughout its existence, the PKK
received external support from a variety of non-state actors, including substantial support from
the Kurdish diaspora. Also, from the start of the group’s insurgency in Turkey in 1984 until
Ocalan’s capture in 1999, the PKK received significant support from foreign governments
including Syria and Iran and intermittently from other autocratic states including the
USSR/Russia, and Iraq. Syria supported the PKK with access to territory which assisted the
group in both recruitment efforts and provided training grounds. Iran offered similar forms of
support but also provided the PKK with financing. In 1994, Greece, a democratic state, joined
the list of foreign state donors, also aiding the Kurdish movement largely in the form of
territorial sanctuary until Ocalan’s arrest in 1999. After the group’s leader was captured, the
PKK relied mostly on funding from its large diaspora. It also established the PYD in Syria and
the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran in 2004. While the list of supporters is not
exhaustive given all the various supporters of the PKK during its campaign in Turkey, they
illustrate a dominate theme, the vast majority of donor states (with the exception of Greece) were
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autocratic regimes, particularly during their years as supporters of the PKK. In addition, many
democratic states were hostile to the PKK including Germany and the United States who would
formally designate the PKK a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1993 and 1997,
respectively (Eliaçik 2018; Department of State 1997).
Strategic interests, regime rivalries, and domestic pressures all contributed to foreign
states’ decisions to provide support. Though the PKK appears to have included children prior to
its receipt of foreign state sponsorship, it is clear that the organization faced little pressure from
donors pertaining to human rights practices with no clear condemnation of the group’s child
soldiering practices coming from its main supporters of Syria and Iran. Iran, in particular, had
used child soldiers throughout its conflict with Iraq and its polity2 score ranged from -6 to +3 in
the years it provided support to the PKK. Syria has consistently scored poorly on aggregate
human rights scales such as the Political Terror Scale; for the majority of the time it supported
the PKK, Syria a polity2 score of -9. Given the nature of each regime, neither government was
not concerned with the PKK’s human rights practices. The PKK would not credibly fear a loss of
support as a consequences of its child soldiering practices. Importantly, the height of Turkish
counterinsurgency policies in the early and mid 1990s led to high casualty rates amongst the
PKK, resulting in an increase in the rate of child soldiering. Greece’s support in the early 1990s,
despite the PKK’s use of children offers an illustration of how any democratic constraining effect
might be washed out when autocratic donors are the majority. In addition, and for the case of
Greece, a weakly institutionalized democracy, it appears that human rights abuses were of
secondary importance. In general, the case of the PKK illustrates the plausibility of the theory
that rebels receiving support from autocratic donors are more likely to use child soldiers, either
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because they are unlikely to face retribution, or because donor states lack democratic
characteristics that might otherwise constrain their support for rebels that recruit child soldiers.

The PYD
The PYD was founded in 2003 in Syria as an affiliate of the PKK in Turkey (Gunter 2015). The
group’s connection to the PKK created complications for its ability to garner support from
Western states, most notably those aligned with Turkey (i.e. NATO). However the outbreak of
the Syrian civil war and the rise of the Islamic State ushered in a dramatic shift in how the PYD
would come to be viewed by prominent members of NATO, in particular the United States. The
PYD and as its armed wing, the YPG, has largely been commended for its success as a
formidable adversary to the Islamic State in Syria. As the Syrian conflict continued to escalate,
so too did the question of what the US would do in the Syrian conflict. What eventually
transpired was US support for the YPG in the form of military assistance, first through air
support and later in the distribution of weapons and training.
The US military involvement in Syria began in September 2014 as President Obama
ordered airstrikes and lobbied for Congress to approve support to arm and train rebels fighting
the Islamic State or Iraq and Syria (ISIS). With bipartisan support, the US began its formal aerial
campaign in Syria, conducting half a dozen attacks between September 22nd and September 30th,
2014. Direct support of the PYD/YPG is largely recognized to have commenced in early October
2014 as the US continued to conduct air-strikes in Syria. On October 1st, 2014, the US launched
airstrikes in the Syrian Kurdistan city of Kobani (Kobane) in support of the YPG and Free Syrian
Army.
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While the US continued to provide support to the Syrian Kurds including the PYD,
allegations of human rights abuses from all parties in the Syrian civil war were widespread.
Outside of the severe levels of lethal violence employed against the civilians were continued
allegations of child soldier usage by nearly all non-state actors including ISIS, the Free Syrian
Army, and the PYD/YPG (UN General Assembly Security Council 2016). For instance, in July
2015, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the PYD/YPG, despite early commitments to
demobilize child soldiers within its ranks, continued to recruit and use those under the age of 18
as combatants (HRW 2015). Between 2014 and 2015 HRW documented at least 59 reported
cases of children being recruited by or joining the YPG with 10 of these cases being children
under the age of 15.
The general command of the PYD/YPG responded to these allegations in a letter to HRW
in late July 2015 claiming that the organization had taken significant steps to minimize their use
of children while claiming that ISIS has been heavily indiscriminate in their practices towards
civilians (General Command of the People’s Protection Units 2015). In essence, PYD/YPG
officials noted that the conflict environment, marked by particular brutality, constrained their
ability to direct all attention toward eliminating child soldiering within their rank-and-file. A
similar letter was sent to the PYD/YPG in June 2018, continuing to invoke concerns over the
groups sustained usage of child soldiers and requesting a formal response (HRW 2018). Amidst
this continued pressure, the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (which encompass the
YPG and include ethnic Arab fighters) issued a signed statement claiming that children are
“strictly prohibited from joining the SDF” and that “every member of the SDF forces under the
age of 18 must be transferred directly to concerned civil authorities” (Wilgenburg 2018).
Meanwhile, the US continued to offer support to the PYD, but Turkey’s continued agitation over
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this support along with the trajectory of the Syrian conflict raises many questions about how long
the US will continue to back the Syrian Kurds.
On its surface, US support of the PYD/YPG appears to undermine the democratic
constraining effect identified by the statistical analyses presented earlier However, closer
examination clearly reveals that the group has attempted to respond to critiques related to its
child soldiering behavior, going so far as to formally respond to accusations while issuing
organizational wide orders to refrain from the recruitment of children and to release those who
might remain in the rank and file. Further, the case illuminates how conflict dynamics, coupled
with the shifting behavior of the PYD/YPG (at least in discursive level), might lead democracies
to continue to fund rebels in spite of their child soldiering practices. The fact that the PYD/YPG
formally acknowledged the presence of children and has taken some initiative to eradicate child
soldiers within the organization suggests that rebels might be willing to shift behavior to appease
donors in an effort to ensure continued support. This obviously highlights the endogenous
relationship that might exist via the statistical tests presented, but also shows how both
mechanisms likely have some validity.
At least two alternative explanations are worth noting. First, the PYD/YPG’s role in
battling ISIS in Syria cannot be overlooked in explaining the support by democratic countries.
The group has been lauded as one of the most reliable and effective in combating the Islamic
State. American national security interests have clearly been pivotal, and even prioritized, over
the group’s human rights practices. Still, the group’s recognition and shifting behavior related to
the inclusion of children in its ranks elucidates the probability of a democratic constraining
effect. For instance, reports largely suggest that those child soldiers that remain within the
organization are far away from the frontlines and are often involved in manning checkpoints in
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roles that might better be classified as policing (Hauch 2019). Secondly, the secular nature of the
PYD/YPG and the group’s incorporation of women as seen with the all-female units known as
the YPJ might assist the group in overcoming the critical aspects of its recruitment practices. For
example, its inclusion of women volunteers can be viewed as a more progressive form of
recruitment in comparison to more violent recruitment practices by groups like the RUF in Sierra
Leone. While the United States has not been directly involved in the ‘naming and shaming’ of
the group, the negative press appeared to increase organizational concerns over the continuation
of Western support should their behavior not shift.

Discussion and Implications
Previous scholarship has shown that foreign state support can impact rebels’ levels of lethal
violence towards non-combatants. This study expands on previous work by investigating an
overlooked form of rebel violence against civilians; child soldiering. Building on a principalagent model suggesting that certain principals (states) will be unwilling to tolerate agents’
(rebels’) recruitment of children, the findings point to two probable relationships. First, donor
groups with a higher concentration of democratic states are less likely to support rebels who use
child soldiers. Secondly, rebel groups are likely to consider who their state sponsors are and
behave accordingly to ensure continued support.
These findings also show that the strength (density) of human rights organizations within
donor groups does not drive the negative association between the percent of democratic donor
states and rebel child soldiering. This deviates from previous work which suggested that any
democratic effect constraining rebels’ lethal violence ‘washed out’ when considering the strength
of the donors’ human rights lobbies (Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014). Regardless of the
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density of the human rights network within donor states, democratic states appear more
cognizant of the types of rebels they are willing to support.
While this study contributes to the scholarship on micro-level forms of civilian
victimization, and highlights a need to continue to investigate rebels’ repertoire of violence, it
faces several important limitations. First, as noted, annual data on rebel child soldiering is
currently unavailable, limiting the ability to understand at what point in time a group chooses to
recruit children. Improvements in data will undoubtedly provide more fruitful insight on rebel
child soldiering practices and the mechanisms that lead to this behavior. While the case
explorations presented here do provide some insight on the patterns of recruitment, they also
highlight the challenge in identifying clear start points. Second, the PKK and PYD case studies
provide information on rebels’ dependency on foreign donors, but an examination of dependency
across a larger selection of cases would be useful. This could provide meaningful insight on
donor states’ ability to constrain rebels and influence their behavior towards non-combatants. In
similar fashion, considering the various types of support—provision of weapons, territory,
money, etc.—may also provide more meaningful insight on the interactions amongst donors and
recipients. Rebels relying on foreign state sponsors for critical support such as weapons,
financial backing, territory, etc. may be more likely to behave in line with donors’ expectations
than those groups who only receive minimal support from a foreign backer. The PYD/YPG’s
rhetorical shift is suggestive of such.
Research on civil wars, particularly those studying the relationships amongst rebels and
civilians, should continue to consider how foreign donors affect child recruitment and other
forms of victimization. The long-term consequences of civilian victimization have recently been
highlighted in the literature with the scholars suggesting that child soldiering can lead to
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recurring conflicts (Haer and Böhmelt 2016b) and have detrimental effects on the psyche of
former child combatants. While accountability for rebels that engage in child soldiering should
continue, external state sponsors of violent rebels must also be reprimanded by the international
community if human rights are to be championed.
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CHAPTER THREE: PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION: EXPLORING
THE INTERSECTION OF WOMEN AND CHILD SOLDIERS

Abstract
Why are some rebellions inclusive of both women and children while others are more likely to
use child soldiers, but exclude women? Variance in rebel group composition has become an
increasingly examined aspect of civil conflict literature. Recently, scholars have offered a range
of systematic investigations on the role of women in non-state armed groups, finding that over
half of all rebel organizations incorporate women in some capacity with 30 to 40 percent using
women as combatants. At the same time, scholars examining the recruitment and use of child
soldiers show that upwards of 75 percent of all rebellions use child soldiers. While literature has
explored determinants of women and children in rebel organizations independently, scholars
have yet to examine their intersection in rebel recruitment processes. Using new data on women
and children in armed groups, this project explores patterns across rebellions that are associated
with the presence or absence of certain populations. This descriptive investigation reveals that
the majority of groups include both women and children, and that ethnonationalist organizations
are most likely to align with this pattern. In addition to uncovering patterns through descriptive
insights, the paper engages in theory-building to offer several plausible explanations of the
conditions that might contribute to rebels’ preferences for children over women. Those groups
seeking to avoid patriarchal backlash and organizations operating in societies with higher levels
of gender inequality are expected to be most likely to exclude women while recruiting children.
Whether an insurgency operates in a rural or urban setting also emerges as an important factor in
groups’ preferences for children.
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Introduction
What explains rebel groups’ preferences for different types of combatants? Specifically, while
most rebel groups choose to recruit and rely predominantly on men, why do some diversify to
include certain demographics over others? Along these lines, why might rebels choose to recruit
child soldiers, but exclude women soldiers? Though recent empirical assessments have noted
that well over half of all rebellions include women (Henshaw 2016a) with upwards of 40 percent
where rebels use women as combatants (Wood and Thomas 2017; Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018),
child soldiers appear to be used with even more regularity.14 Scholars have found that upwards of
75 percent of rebellions active in the post-Cold War environment use child soldiers (Lasley and
Thyne 2015; Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). However, while scholars have assessed the participation
of both women and children independently, the literature has yet to examine what factors
contribute to the inclusion of both women and child soldiers and what factors lead to the
exclusion of one over the other.
This is perplexing for at least three reasons. First, much of the literature on intrastate
conflict draws attention to ‘manpower’ shortages within rebel campaigns which increases the
demand for combatants, even leading groups to adopt coercive recruitment tactics (Gates 2002;
Eck 2014; Wood 2014). If this is the case, one should expect less selective practices related to
the types of recruits within rebels’ ranks as the viability of rebellion depends, in part, on its
ability to mobilize participants. While organizations as diverse as the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
(PKK) in Turkey and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda chose to include both
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It should be noted that in this investigation, children means both boys and girls. Until recently, there has been
limited investigation into gender differences amongst child soldiers.
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women and children, albeit often through different recruitment practices, others like the
Committee for Action for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD) in Chad, the Justice and Equality
(JEM) Movement in Sudan, and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines chose
to only include children despite being significantly weaker than the governments they fight.
Secondly, historical accounts clearly demonstrate that women are capable of performing in
conflict both as combatants and in support roles (Goldstein 2001) with recent scholarship even
suggesting the inclusion of women combatants can increase rebels’ likelihood of achieving
victory (Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018). Both the National Resistance Army in Uganda and the
Revolutionary Patriotic Front in Rwanda, for example, included female combatants in their
successful campaigns. Further, the military success of groups like the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel
(YPG), the armed wing of the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) in Syria, illustrates the potential
benefits of women’s inclusion, with early reports noting that one in five of its fighters was
female (Heffez 2013), that eventually led to the creation of a women’s militant wing known as
the YPJ (Simsek and Jongerden 2018). Third, the exclusion of women and inclusion of children
is even more perplexing when one considers the efficacy of child soldiers. While scholarly
arguments have suggested they are more loyal and cheaper to retain, children may lack the
physical and emotional maturity to perform successfully in war (Singer 2005a; Kimmel and
Roby 2007; Beber and Blattman 2013). Although recent scholarship has challenged this notion,
finding that children might actually improve rebels’ fighting capacity (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a),
there remains limited exploration into why women might still be excluded.
The paper proceeds in several parts. First, I offer a review of the literature on child
soldiering focusing on rebels’ decisions to recruit children. Second, I examine the growing
literature on women’s involvement across rebel organizations with particular attention given to
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recent work suggesting political ideology as a main driver of the variance in women’s
participation. Next, the paper explores cross-sectional data on women’s participation in rebel
groups and compares this with data on child soldiering across rebellions. Given that arguments in
the literature contend that groups with progressive ideologies are those most likely to employ
women while those groups that recruit children are often considered norms violators, one should
not expect to see many groups with both women and children fighters. In other words, recruiting
women is seen as a progressive move by rebels while recruiting children is not.15 Employing an
inductive strategy using an examination of data on women and children’s participation in
rebellions active between 1990-2008, I find that a clear majority of groups that included women
also employed child soldiers. My analysis also suggests that nearly one quarter of rebel groups
employed child soldiers while excluding women in any capacity. Building on these descriptive
insights, the paper suggests that the inclusion of both women and children can be attributed, in
large part, to rebel groups’ ideology in two distinct ways: a) ethnic and/or religious nationalist
groups appear less selective in recruitment (gender and age); b) Islamist groups often exclude
women, but when they do recruit women, they also include children. The paper then proceeds to
engage with additional explanations as to why groups exclude women while including children.
Building on prior literature, I posit that societal gender inequalities, groups’ attempts to avoid the
risk of patriarchal backlash, and the type of insurgency (rural vs. urban) can lead rebels to
exclude women while incorporating children. Children, I suggest, can augment group capabilities
without undermining patriarchal structures and this is most likely to occur in rural insurgencies
because these environments are often more conservative. The paper concludes with a brief
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discussion of implications for the study of rebel group composition and directions for future
research.

Determinants of Child Soldiers
Child soldiers continue to be employed by both rebels and governments, remaining a significant
human rights issue in both scale and extremity (O’Neil 2018). The majority of scholarship on
child soldiers depicts the practice as either a consequence of conflict environments or the result
of organizational demands. The former, known as supply-side arguments, focus heavily on the
societal conditions that lead children to join rebel organizations, generally referred to as push
factors. Within these explanations are arguments contending that lack of employment,
insufficient access to basic health care and nutrition, limited opportunities for education, and
high rates of unemployment can increase the likelihood that children are driven towards
participation in rebel groups (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994; Machel 1996; Honwana 2006;
Singer 2005a; Brett and Specht 2004; Becker 2010; UNICEF Nigeria 2017). While poor
economic conditions can increase the supply of children, conflict can also lead to high rates of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps, destitute communities, and increasing
homelessness which only enlarges the pool of potential child recruits for rebel groups (Achvarina
and Reich 2006; Singer 2005a).
While these supply-side arguments have provided insights into the motivations of child
volunteers and conditions increasing rebel access to vulnerable populations, they cannot fully
account for variance in rebels’ employment of children given that they are generally consistent
across conflicts. Demand-side explanations focus explicitly on rebel organizations’ cost-benefit
analyses of employing child soldiers and examine the motivations of the recruiters. Such
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motivations include troop shortages/quotas and whether the intensity of conflict demands
increasing levels of human capital to maintain rebellion (Blattman and Annan 2008; Machel
1996; Tynes 2011; Wood 2014). Others suggest that the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons have made children operationally effective for rebel groups as they were previously
viewed as incapable of operating heavy and cumbersome hardware (Singer 2005a; Turshen
1998, 7).
Children’s inexpensiveness, ease of indoctrination, and increased level of loyalty have
also been identified as useful explanations for their demand (Beber and Blattman 2013).
Similarly, rebels’ pursuit and exploitation of natural resources can increase their demand for
children, both to solidify access to and extraction of valuable natural resources, and because
children are easier to keep from pecuniary benefits (Faulkner et al. 2019; Haer et al. 2019). Some
have even suggested that organizations recruiting children do so to increase their fighting
capacity and effectiveness (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). According to former Force Commander of
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Roméo Dallaire, numerous
groups have employed children for this very reason as they can hinder the effectiveness of
government militaries. Put differently, children can help weak rebel groups as killing a child is
difficult (Dallaire 2018). However, there remains a lack of consensus on their overall efficacy as
fighters (Andvig and Gates 2010; Beber and Blattman 2013).
While child soldiering is widely viewed as a violation of international norms, the
recruitment and use of women in rebellion is often viewed in a positive light (notwithstanding
cases of forced recruitment for purposes of sexual exploitation and/or to be used as suicide
bombers). While a number of the factors identified in the child soldiering literature may be
plausible explanations for women’s participation in rebellion, the predominant themes in
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literature on women’s recruitment and participation in rebellion has emphasized societal norms
(Kampwirth 2002; Coulter 2008; Thomas and Wood 2018), ideological motivations (Wood and
Thomas 2017), bids for external legitimacy and support (Parkinson 2013), and efforts to signal
resolve (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). This is not to say that these factors alone predict when
women will be included or excluded from rebel groups, but the lack of attention given to the
reasons for child soldiering in the presence and/or absence of women is an important oversight as
the same ‘progressive’ explanations for women’s participation might also connect to the
violation of norms against child soldering. The next section looks more closely at the state of the
literature on women’s participation in rebellion.

Women’s Participation in Armed Groups
Until recently, scholarship on civil conflict has either “underrepresented, overlooked, or
completely ignored the experience of women” (Henshaw 2016a, 41). This has largely been
attributed to the perception of violent conflict as an inherently “masculine” concept (Shepherd
2008; Runyan and Peterson 2013; Henshaw 2016b). Further, gendered norms often equate men
with aggression and violence while women are viewed as more pacific and conflict averse
(Fukuyama 1998; Alison 2009) leading to conflict environments which discourages female
participation on the frontlines. However, historical and recent empirical assessments show that
women are often active participants in conflict (Enloe 1990; MacKenzie 2009; Sjoberg and
Gentry 2016; Henshaw 2016a, 2016; Wood and Thomas 2017; Thomas and Wood 2018). In fact,
women have played an active role in the majority of conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Henshaw
2016a, 2016b). Moreover, apart from support roles, Henshaw’s study demonstrated that women
have taken up arms in up to a third of armed groups, by conservative estimates. Regional
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investigations focusing on violent political actors Africa (Thomas and Bond 2015) and a recent
cross-national investigation focused exclusively on female combatants (Wood and Thomas 2017)
have echoed Henshaw’s findings about women’s participation, showing that women served in
combat roles in as many as 40 percent of rebel groups.16
Given women’s degree of visibility across rebel groups it is interesting to explore why a
significant number of organizations choose to exclude women from their movements even as
they recruit and employ children. After all, as Goldstein (2001) notes, adult women often possess
physical traits that make them far superior than children in conflict (i.e. strength, endurance).
Those scholars that have sought to understand where women rebel have often adopted a similar
supply-demand framework to those investigating children’s participation in armed groups.
Thomas and Bond (2015) suggests that much of the literature on women’s participation in
violent organizations has focused heavily on supply-side of the equation with less attention given
to the reasons groups demand women or exclude them altogether. Those focused on the supplyside argue that women are motivated to join rebel groups for myriad reasons including to enact
revenge (Alison 2009), for social and political mobility and empowerment (Bhadra et al. 2007),
and generally, as a way to reorient patriarchal relations within society as participation can
improve prospects for equality during the conflict (Tezcür 2019). Women have also been found
to join rebellions in an effort to redress economic grievances (Henshaw 2016b). Moreover,
increased societal integration of women, chiefly in economic and educational institutions in pre-
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those that exclude women from such roles.
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conflict periods, is a significant determinant of women's participation as combatants in conflict
(Thomas and Wood 2018, 227-228).
While the supply-side focuses on women’s agency in joining rebellion, equally important
is the demand-side of the equation, reemphasizing how group composition is also a function of
rebels’ cost-benefit analysis (Henshaw 2016a). Examining demand factors, Thomas and Bond
(2015) point to organizational characteristics as important predictors of female participation
within violent political organizations active in Africa. Larger rebel groups, those employing
terrorist attacks, and groups adopting positive gender ideologies were statistically more likely to
seek out and allow women into their organizations. Exploring the theoretical explanations,
Thomas and Bond (2015, 490-491) argue first that small groups might be less inclined to use
women out of concern of threats to group cohesion as the incorporation of subgroups within
society can increase the likelihood of internal conflict. At the same time, organizations adopting
terrorist tactics are more likely to use women as they can offer the group a strategic advantage
(Bloom 2007).17 Women can be especially useful in clandestine operations and may even
increase a group’s fighting effectiveness given their ability to conceal themselves (Bloom 2012).
This is particularly true for groups which employ suicide terrorism (Thomas and Wood 2018).
Further, groups espousing positive gender ideologies, whether genuine or strategic, are more
likely to attract women recruits. In addition, they want to do so to ensure their composition aligns
with rhetoric.
Yet another aspect of female participation suggests that intergroup competition can
increase rebels’ demand for women (Thomas and Bond 2015). However, this competition may

17
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be dependent upon competitor groups’ treatment of women. For example, in Eritrea, the EPLF’s
incorporation of women forced their predecessor—the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—to
reconsider their position on female participation, leading the group to increase its use of women
in all facets of the organization (Thomas and Bond 2015, 502-503). In short, environmental
pressure can influence groups’ recruitment of women. In similar fashion Viterna (2013, 11),
argues that including women within rebel organizations can be a strong tool for insurgent groups
as it helps them overcome negative connotations of “radicalness” often attributed to violent
political movements. In short, the inclusion of women can improve rebels’ reputation amongst
certain audiences and in particular, foreign and domestic audiences that see the recruitment of
women as a progressive step. If accurate, it becomes even more perplexing why certain groups
would forego the use of women while still choosing to employ child soldiers. However, this is a
potentially useful explanation for why groups that use women might also see children present.18
Returning to the impact of positive gender ideologies, scholars have argued that Marxist
groups, along with other leftist oriented organizations are most likely to incorporate women, and
in higher numbers (Wood and Thomas 2017). This aligns with the foundations of Marx and
Engles who clearly depicted the need for reformation in society, claiming that “doing away with
the status of women as mere instruments of production” was central to the goal of Communism
(Marx and Engels 1848/1978). Further, Gal and Kligman (2000, 5) noted that socialism,
generally speaking, aimed to “erase gender differences,” although this varied significantly across
regimes and over time. Contrarily, those groups with ideological foundations rooted in the
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group.
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preservation of traditional hierarchical gender structures, often relegating women to subservient
positions in society, were identified as those less likely to have women participants. Even if these
groups are inclusive of women, their roles, more often than not, are in non-combat positions.
This is often done to ensure the hierarchical structures and gendered power imbalances in society
persist during and after conflict (Henshaw 2016a).
However, even when groups do employ women in combatant roles, which positions them
closer to equal with their male counterparts, it does not guarantee the elimination of inequality.
Groups like the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), for instance, utilized
women in a variety of roles including as active combatants in spite of societal constraints
(Viterna 2013, 130). The incorporation of women appeared to challenge traditional gender
hierarchical structures within El Salvador. Nonetheless, women from the FMLN illustrate how
traditional gender identities were not genuinely altered after conflict as pre-war norms were
“easily reestablished,” a concept identified in the literature as patriarchal backlash (Viterna 2013,
195; Kandiyoti 1991). Zimbabwe’s armed struggle against Rhodesia also saw women actively
fight only to see them relegated to roles such as secretaries after the conflict (Seidman 1984).
Lastly, scholars point to rebels’ adoption of forced recruitment strategies as a plausible
indicator for women’s participation in rebellion (Henshaw 2016a,b; Thomas and Bond 2015;
Wood and Thomas 2017). Thomas and Bond (2015) postulate that groups adopt forced
recruitment tactics for a number of reasons, not the least of which is to replace disgruntled
members and for leaders to enjoy less blowback from the membership pertaining to their
decision-making. Their findings show that organizations using forced recruitment techniques are
indeed more likely to use women (Thomas and Bond 2015; Wood and Thomas 2017). Yet
comparing data from a recent investigation by Haer et al. (2019) that explores rebels’ forcible
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recruitment there are a number of rebel groups that forcibly recruit children while excluding
women, suggesting a particular reason for their absence.
Overall, research has yet to examine why groups that exclude women choose to use child
soldiers or consider the intersection between these two populations during conflict periods.
Group ideology has clearly been a robust explanation for women’s exclusion/inclusion, but does
little to explain why children may be recruited. Children’s purported cost, ease of indoctrination,
and increased loyalty (Beber and Blattman 2013; Andvig and Gates 2010) are factors used to
help explain why groups may demand them. However, women can significantly help rebellions
while the efficacy of children and their impact on conflict outcomes remains in question. Thus,
further investigation is warranted.
In the next section, I explore the composition of 72 rebel groups demonstrating how
current explanations in both literatures are not sufficient for fully explaining the variance across
rebel groups. I identify that ethno-religious/nationalist groups, after excluding Islamist
organizations, are those most likely to see both women and children present. I suggest this can be
explained, in part, by their ability to mobilize popular support. In other words, these groups are
most likely to benefit from social endowments (Weinstein 2007). I also offer two additional
theoretical insights.
First, I posit that for groups that include children, the inclusion of women can assist
rebels in overcoming the negative connotations of norm violation that often result from child
soldiering. Secondly, building on recent work on societal conditions as determinants for
women’s inclusion/exclusion as combatants (Thomas and Wood 2018), I contend that gender
inequality in pre-conflict periods can assist in understanding when women will be absent while
children remain a viable option for rebel organizations. Specifically, I develop theoretical
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arguments which suggest the inclusion of children in the absence of women can ensure the
continuation of patriarchal structures given children’s lack of autonomy, status in society, and
the diminished likelihood that groups will suffer internal backlash from their adult members or
from children. This latter argument related to overcoming patriarchal norms may be conditional
upon the type of armed struggle an organization pursues. For instance, patriarchal relations are
likely to be stronger in rural settings in comparison to urban environments. Rural insurgencies
must overcome their patriarchal biases before including women, and even though their inclusion
may help the insurgency, the patriarchal impediments may be non-negotiable. However, in rural
environments, barriers to the incorporation of children are less likely as children’s status in
society is perceived differently than their urban counterparts. In contrast, urbanite groups may
traditionally appeal to women who have, at least in part, altered their position in the patriarchy.
For instance, Tezcür (2019) notes that the although the PKK adopted a recruitment strategy
which targeted a diverse pool of female recruits (rural and urban), the majority of women
recruited in urban centers were college educated, many had a history of political activism, and
their patterns of mobilization into the group were often driven by senses of injustice both by the
state and within their familial relationships. As such, rebel groups must diversify their messages
dependent upon the types of recruits they desire.

Patterns of Rebellion
In this section, I review new cross-sectional data on the use of women by non-state armed groups
(NSAGs) (Henshaw 2016a). Through this review I uncover at least two important points about
group composition. First, though the majority of rebel organizations employ children and
women, at least twenty percent of insurgencies include child soldiers without including women.
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Secondly, in nearly every case that women are present in a rebel group, regardless of position, so
too are children. On its surface this seems unexpected given the importance attached to
progressive ideology in explaining the employment of women. One plausible explanation is that
rebel groups see benefit in less discriminatory recruitment practices which can increase group
size and human resources. This is especially likely for ethnonationalist rebellions which by their
nature attempt to mobilize popular support. A second explanation, as proposed above, is that the
inclusion of women can offset the negative press of including children. The PYD in Syria has
been praised widely by Western audiences for their inclusion of women combatants including
the all-female units known as the YPJ (Gunes and Lowe 2015). Though still facing criticism by
human rights groups and rival states such as Turkey, the inclusion of women and success in the
conflict against ISIS afforded the group assistance from Western governments, most notably the
United States. Put differently, though the PYD’s Kurdish roots and nationalism can help explain
the diverse set of recruits, the inclusion of women offset negative effects from child soldiering.
Further, maternal ties could also lead to the simultaneous presence of women and children,
although the regularity of such instances is questionable for many groups. For instance, the PKK
included both women and children, but preferred unmarried recruits and often attracted female
members that encountered family issues at home such as forced marriage or physical abuse
(Marcus 2009, 42; Özeren 2014, 331).
To begin, I examined Henshaw’s (2016a) random sample of 72 rebel organizations active
between 1990 and 2008. The sample is drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s
(UCDP) Intrastate Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Petterson and Eck
2018). Henshaw’s data are novel in two specific ways. First, her analysis provides a glimpse into
the specific role of women within NSAGs, correcting shortcomings within previous cross-
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national studies that focused solely on male combatants in conflict. Second, her analysis
establishes an empirical basis to more fully consider the conditions that lead to women’s
presence within armed rebellions. Next, I reconciled Henshaw’s data with new information on
women’s participation exclusively in combat roles (Thomas and Wood 2018). In the event that
Henshaw reported the absence of women in any capacity and Thomas and Wood report the
presence of female combatants, I categorized the group as having employed women.19 I then
combined this data with data on rebel child soldiering drawn from Haer and Böhmelt (2016a),
discussed in detail below. In addition to providing information on the presence or absence of
women across rebel groups, Henshaw categorizes women’s participation into four distinct
classifications: combatant, noncombatant, leadership role, and forced participant (2016a, 44).20
Of the 72 groups, 49 saw women participate in some capacity. The remaining 23 groups were
reported as having no women participants. As Henshaw (2016a) notes, this constitutes a clear
majority of rebel groups operating in the post-Cold War world as incorporating women. In
addition, less than a third of the groups with women present appear to have engaged in forced
recruitment, a deviation from the traditional narrative of victimization often used to explain the
incorporation of women in rebel organizations (Mazurana et al. 2002; MacKenzie 2012).21

19

I chose this strategy as Thomas and Wood (2018) only sought to identify if women were present in combat roles.
This is a more restrictive coding approach and should bias against overreporting. In addition, Henshaw (2016a)
notes that her dataset would benefit from efforts aimed at intercoder reliability whereas Thomas and Bond (2018)
used multiple coders in their data gathering efforts. In total, they find evidence for women’s participation as
combatants in six groups for which Henshaw (2016a) found no evidence of women’s participation.
20
Importantly, these categories are not mutually exclusive. In addition, Henshaw (2016a) adopted a conservative
approach in coding, stating that a minimum of three sources had to identify women serving in a particular capacity
before they would receive a coding of 1 for that respective classification.
21
Henshaw notes a minimum of three sources had to indicate that forced participation tactics were being used and
concluded the presence of forced participation techniques regardless of gender.
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Before turning to the intersection between women’s and children’s participation it is
important to clarify issues related to coding of rebel child soldiering and the ability to compare
with data on women’s participation. First is the issue of age delineation as various cross-national
investigations have defined a child soldier as under the age of 18 while others opted for a lower
age threshold set at below 15 (Lasley and Thyne 2015; Tynes and Early 2015). Much of this
debate is a consequence of the various definitions of a child employed over time in international
conventions and treaties such as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of a Child (UN 1989), the
1997 Cape Town Principles (UNICEF 1997), and the 2002 Optional Protocol on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict (UN 2000). The majority of recent quantitative scholarship,
including the Haer and Böhmelt (2016a) sample employed in this study, utilizes the higher age
threshold, defining child soldiers as: “any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been,
recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to
cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family
members.”22
Secondly, data on child soldiering is difficult to obtain and consequently, much of the
literature has relied on dichotomous and ordinal measures (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). In other
words, data on rebel child soldiering can only account for children’s presence or absence within
a rebellion with estimates identifying the scale at which they are used at any point during

22

Influential reports on children in conflict including the 1996 Machel Report, the UN 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Article 1 of the 2000 optional protocol to the convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict have each either identified or used the 18 years of age threshold. Still,
this definition is not without controversy as some suggest we consider a more constrained age threshold of 15 years
of age and below to identify child soldiers (Tynes and Early 2015).
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conflict.23 This limits the ability to draw certain inferences about when children first become
involved with these groups and the specific roles they may occupy after being recruited into an
organization. Data on female participation has, in part, addressed the latter. Though limiting the
ability to compare differences between children’s roles and women’s roles within rebellion,
some interesting patterns still emerge.

Table 5. Comparing Children and Women in NSAGs 1990-2008
Total Groups (N=72)

Groups that use Women (N=49)

Women
Absent

Women Present

Women
Combatants
Only

Women
Both Women
Noncombatants Combatants and
Only
Noncombatants

Women in
Leadership
Roles

No Usage

6
(8.33%)

2
(2.77%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

2
(4.08%)

2
(4.08%)

< 50 percent
of group

14
(19.44%)

36
(50 %)

1
(2.04%)

11
(22.44%)

24
(48.97%)

15
(30.61%)

> 50 percent
of group

3
(4.16%)

11
(15.27%)

0
(0%)

9
(18.36%)

2
(4.08%)

2
(4.08%)

Totals

23 of 72
(31.94%)

49 of 72
(68.05%)

1 of 49
(2.04%)

20 of 49
(40.81%)

28 of 49
(57.14%)

19 of 49
(38.77%)

Child
Soldiers

*Data on female participation is drawn from Henshaw (2016a) and data on child soldiers comes from Haer and Böhmelt (2016a).

23

This ordinal measure accounts for groups that use no child soldiers (0), less than 50 percent of the organization
comprised of children (1), or greater than 50 percent of the organization comprised of children (3).
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Examining first the degree of child soldiering across the 72 rebel groups, 64 used child
soldiers in some capacity with only 8 rebellions refraining from their inclusion (Table 5). Of
these groups, approximately 69 percent saw child soldiers used at low levels (less than 50
percent of the group comprised of child soldiers) while slightly more than 19 percent of the
groups had many child soldiers (more than 50 percent of the group comprised of children).
Although most groups that use child soldiers employ them at lower rates (< 50 percent), certain
groups like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and Joseph Kony’s Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda were well-known for their use of high numbers of children.
When comparing these patterns with Haer and Böhmelt’s (2016a) sample which includes all
rebel drawn from the the number of total groups employing children is slightly overrepresented,
but the patterns between high and low usage are generally consistent.24 Geographic disbursement
of child soldier usage across five regions is reported in Figure 2.

Approximately 75 percent of groups in Haer and Böhmelt’s (2016a) sample used child soldiers. Of the 284
conflict-dyad periods captured, 71 saw rebel groups abstain from using child soldiers (25 percent); 161 saw rebel
groups employ “some” child soldiers (56.69 percent); and 52 saw rebel groups use many child soldiers (18.31
percent).
24
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Figure 2. Distribution of Child Soldier Use by Rebel Groups Across Regions

Although this investigation is more interested in exploring factors which lead to the
inclusion of both women and children or the inclusion of children in the absence of women, a
brief examination of groups excluding both yields some interesting insight. In total, only six
groups refrained from the inclusion of either women or child soldiers, pointing to the rarity of
such occurrences. Four of these six groups were Islamist organizations operating across the
Middle East including the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) located in Algeria,
Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, the Reformation and Jihad Front in Iraq, and the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI/SIIC). Each of these groups promoted authoritarian
interpretations of Islamic law with some even adopting strict policies that excluded women from
educational and employment opportunities (Mapping Militant Organizations 2016). Thus, the
absence of women can, in part, be attributed to the hardline principles of their Islamic ideology.

71

The remaining two are the Committee for Action for Peace and Democracy in Chad (Comité de
Sursaut National pour la Paix et la Démocratie or CSNPD) and the Movement of Democratic
Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). The CSNPD was a participant group in a failed coup attempt
in 1992 with the goal of hindering the government’s exploitation of oil in southern Chad (Gould
and Winters 2012) while the MFDC was a separatist movement which operated in southern
Senegal, and relied solely on adult males.25 Taken together, a clear majority of rebellions
included women and children in some capacity.
Regarding women’s participation and child soldiering, of the 49 groups identified as
having women present, 47 also included child soldiers. The two organizations identified as
incorporating women while excluding child soldiers were Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), a
Marxist-Leninist organization operating in Turkey, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA), a nationalist movement active in the United Kingdom since the early 1970s. In both
groups, women undertook roles in combat and noncombat activities and even occupied
leadership positions, illustrating their full incorporation into each respective movement.
Interestingly, although quantitative data indicates that the PIRA refrained from child soldiering,
anecdotal evidence suggests that children may have been involved with the group in an auxiliary
capacity (i.e. smuggling of supplies). Specifically, children were identified as providing an
operational advantage to the group as vehicles with children were more successful at passing
through checkpoints without scrutiny (Bloom, Gill, and Horgan 2012; Collins 1998). Dev Sol, on
the other hand, explicitly refrained from child soldiering because they were viewed as unfit to
carry out the group’s terrorist activities, highlighting the debate surrounding children’s efficacy

25

New data suggests that the MFDC may have in fact included children within their rebellion.
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for conflict (Jo 2015, 160). Rebranding itself Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C)
in the mid 1990s, the group’s aims were to overthrow the Turkish regime. However, as explored
in chapter four, the saturation of rebel groups in Turkey and the groups exclusion of children
opened avenues for rival organizations like the PKK that were willing to recruit children, to
dominant the rebel space.
Still, the PIRA and Dev Sol allude to the potential importance of where insurgents
operate. The urban environments in which they existed, provides some insight on the types of
groups that will exclude children while including women. Further, both chose to employ terrorist
tactics in their campaigns, which possibly points to strategic decisions about the efficacy of
children for such operations. However, given the rarity of such groups, the generalizability of
such claims is cautious.
A few additional patterns of women’s recruitment are noteworthy. First, of the 47 groups
which employed both women and children, only one definitively incorporated women solely as
combatants.26 This suggests that when present, women rarely occupy an exclusive role as a
traditional fighter. Further, the one group identified as employing women solely in combat roles,
the Islamist organization known as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, primarily employed them as
suicide bombers (Bloom 2012). Second, 20 of these 47 groups employed women only in
positions of non-combat (support). According to Henshaw, groups such as the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF) in Uganda and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru
included female participants, but excluded them from combat roles. The ADF enticed women

26

Though Thomas and Wood (2018) only report the presence of female combats, it is not possible to definitively
rule out that women may have also taken on other roles.
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and children to join with the promise of jobs and money to start small businesses (Scorgie-Porter
2015, 10) while the MRTA, a Marxist-Leninist group, attracted women with their promises to
end social inequality (McCormick 1993). Others like the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) used women as prostitutes in fund raising efforts
and, at times, even strategically for the purposes of kidnapping and assassination schemes
(Henshaw 2016a; Thomas 2018, 509). These cases also highlight differences in the mechanism
of rebel recruitment as the ADF, ATTF, and NLFT each engaged in forcible recruitment while
the MRTA largely refrained from this strategy. Thus, women may often be coerced into
organizations even when the roles they occupy are likely confined to positions outside those of a
traditional combatant. Third, the remaining 26 groups which used both child soldiers and women
employed women as both combatants and in non-combat roles. Such organizations included
Fatah in Israel, the PKK in Turkey, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) in the Philippines. Lastly, of the 47 groups employing both women and children,
women were observed in leadership roles in at least 36 percent of cases (17 groups). In general,
these patterns suggest that rarely are women used solely as combatants, roughly 40 percent of
groups use women exclusively in a non-combat capacity, and over half (~53 percent) do not
discriminate in the types of roles women occupy during rebellion. In addition, the variance in
rebel groups’ geographic location, ideology, stated goals, and mechanism of recruitment
illustrate that a diverse set of actors choose to employ both women and child soldiers.
As Table 5 above demonstrates, in spite of their frequent participation in rebellion,
women were excluded in nearly a quarter of the groups that employed child soldiers (17
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groups).27 Eight of these groups can be classified as Islamist organizations and given the
consensus in the literature such groups are most likely to exclude women this is not surprising
(Lahoud 2014; Davis 2013; Henshaw 2016a, 2016b; Wood and Thomas 2017, 2018). After
excluding Islamist groups, over 10 percent of rebellions (n=9) recruited and used child soldiers,
but did not incorporate women in any capacity.28
This discussion raises an important point about the effects of group ideology as a
contributing factor for women and children’s presence in rebellion. Table 6 reports a breakdown
of rebel group by ideology. The patterns indicate that ethnonationalist/religious groups (nonIslamist) are most likely to see both women and children present. These groups are often
identified as those most likely to receive and/or rely on popular support/social endowments
(Weinstein 2007) and as such, are less selective regarding gender and age in their recruitment
practices. The PKK’s inclusion of women and children can largely be attributed to such
dynamics, although myriad factors led to the group’s diverse pool of recruits. First, the groups
appeal to ethnic Kurds and nationalist goals upon its formation in the late 1970s established its
foundation for recruitment across a broad spectrum. A competitive environment which saw the
organization pitted against rival Kurdish groups necessitated the incorporation of willing recruits
irrespective of age and gender. Groups like Dev Sol, though espousing a similar ideology and
facing a similarly competitive marketplace, allowed women to participate, but excluded children
based on a strategic decision related to their efficacy for the group’s chosen tactics (terrorism).

27
28

Table 7 reports a list of these groups.
This refers to 9 of the groups in Table 7 or roughly 14 percent of the 64 groups that used child soldiers.
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For the PKK, a protracted rebellion and the escalation of Turkey’s violent counterinsurgency
practices would see the group reduce remaining barriers to entry, recruiting children and women
at higher levels.29 While the development of “a discourse of gender emancipation” can help
explain the presence of women (Tezcür 2019), ideology alone does not really explain the
inclusion of children. In short, a coalescence of factors generated both the desire and need to
include women and children in addition to adult males.30

Table 6. Rebel Composition by Ideology

Total

CS no
Women

CS and
Women

Women
only

No CS or
Women

Redistributive
ideology

18

2

16

0

0

Pro-women’s rights
ideology

4

0

4

0

0

Ethnoreligious
Islamist

19

8

7

1

3

Ethnoreligious
Non-Islamist

32

5

25

1

1

Ideology

An in-depth exploration of the factors which contributed to the PKK’s recruitment patterns can be found in
chapter four.
30
Table 6 also uncovers that leftist/redistributive insurgents were likely to see both women and children recruits.
Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood (2014), for instance, note that leftist insurgencies such as the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (UNRG) were reliant, almost exclusively, on popular support for organizational longevity and
recruited both women and children. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), a Marxist group, specifically
split from its predecessor, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), as it wanted to “drastically alter society” (Thomas
and Bond 2015, 501) and saw women’s roles as imperative for this outcome (Bernal 2000). The Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-Leninist insurgency, were highly dependent upon local
populations for support and cooperation (Mazurana 2013, 155).
29
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Ideology
Other (unclear)

Total

CS no
Women

CS and
Women

Women
only

No CS or
Women

11

4

6

0

1

*Rebel movements can be classified under more than one ideological category

Patterns Across Groups Employing Children Exclusively
To this point, this paper has examined the patterns that help to explain why groups might prefer
women and children, or at least see both present. But, why might groups as diverse as the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Yugoslavia, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in
Chad (MDJT), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (BRA) in Papua New Guinea each choose to include child soldiers while
excluding women in any capacity? Generally, these groups have few similarities except for their
patterns of recruitment. The typology presented in Figure 3 suggests that these groups generally
espouse more conservative ideologies, diminishing the likelihood of women’s participation.
Further, their inclusion of children illustrates they are less likely to be compliant with
international norms against child soldiering. Their exclusion of women can possibly be a signal
of an even more egregious violation of and apathy towards international, and specifically,
western standards.31
More importantly, the child soldier literature would indicate that something about
children made them more desirable than women for these groups and/or women were not viewed

31

Of course, this assumes that the inclusion of women sees them occupy positions in the organization, not merely in
roles as combat wives, camp followers, sexual slaves, etc. Given that Henshaw’s (2016a) coding requires their
incorporation in roles outside of these classifications, this assumption likely has some validity (although these roles
are not mutually exclusive).
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as viable options for membership. Eck (2014, 372), for instance, notes that recruitment strategies
often involve some cost to a rebel group so rebels must make calculations about how they recruit.
Although her analysis focuses on conditions leading to the adoption of coercive recruitment
practices, I suggest that a similar logic is applicable when considering who rebels are willing to
recruit. In other words, rebel groups’ exclusion of women and inclusion of children is, in part, a
strategic calculation.

Compliance

No women or child
soldiers

Women soldiers and no
children

Child soldiers no
women

Both women and child
soldiers

Norms
Violation

Ideology

Conservative

Progressive

Figure 3. Expectations

These decisions on which actors to include and exclude becomes an exercise in costbenefit analysis and are impacted at the intersection of internal group dynamics and external
societal conditions that promote the continuation of gender inequality. Generally, all actors
should inherently benefit from a larger pool of recruits which can augment the group’s size and
increase its capacity to compete with the opposition (government). However, it is evident that not
all organizations choose to adopt such an unrestrictive recruitment strategy. Given the patterns
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identified, more groups appear willing to violate norms against child soldiering than are willing
to include women.
First, internal group dynamics can constrain the recruitment of women as their inclusion
may jeopardize existing societal relations and result in internal backlash. Male members in
particular may challenge the integration of women and reject their participation in the group
based on these pre-existing norms. This is especially likely in more conservative societies and in
ideologically conservative groups where the inclusion of women could inadvertently lead to
women’s increased demands for liberation and empowerment both during and after conflict.
Mazurana (2013, 163) even notes that for some rebel groups, “the masculinist identity of its male
fighters is so central to the group that it cannot withstand the presence of females on any equal
level.” Even those groups that espouse redistributive and ethno-nationalist ideologies must
consider the potential for backlash from its membership and supporters and may actively work to
ensure that women are not genuinely empowered. Although not excluding women entirely, the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) believed the presence of women in combat roles
would undermine the ‘machista’ of the group and threaten the power of men in the organization
(Schmidt 2007; Mazurana 2013, 166). Even if rhetorically promoting the elimination of gender
inequality, rebels may avoid recruitment of women to avoid patriarchal backlash. For example,
although far from achieving true societal gender equality, the PKK’s inclusion of women was the
result of strategic decisions by leadership through a series of compromises which specifically
considered how the conservative Kurdish society would perceive female combatants. Their
inclusion ultimately led to a gradual liberalization of society in which women were able to
occupy more positions and spaces in public life that were originally unachievable (Tezcür 2019).
For groups that want to avoid this potential outcome, the exclusion of women might become an
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important consideration in their recruitment decisions to ensure patriarchal norms are not
eroded.32
Secondly, the traditional hierarchical norm that women’s roles in society should primarily
be dedicated to domestic work (i.e. childbearing and caregiving), can inhibit their inclusion in
rebellion and the roles they may take on even if participating (Thomas and Wood 2018, 217218). As the PKK discussion suggests, rebel groups are often “savvy” about the societies within
which they operate within and the communities from which they seek support(Mazurana 2013,
154). This can include their attentiveness to gender divisions within society and these societal
norms both directly and inadvertently subjugate women to positions that limit their opportunities
for advancement and empowerment. According to Thomas and Wood (2018, 224) high fertility
rates “reflects lower societal gender equality” which contributes to societal perceptions of
women’s roles. Similarly, limited female participation in the labor force and/or lack of
educational opportunities for women have been shown to constrain women’s participation in
rebellion during times of conflict (Caprioli 2005; Thomas and Wood 2018). Schaftenaar (2017,
765-766), for instance, suggests that these gender norms can essentially limit broader
mobilization into rebellion, especially in states where women face legal or social restrictions on
access to public spaces without male accompaniment. This underscores how societal gender
barriers can erode opportunities for participation even if women wish to join or groups wish to
recruit.

Mazurana’s (2013) discussion of the AUC points to the plausibility of such an argument. The case of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) discussed later in this chapter also alludes to this point.
32
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An alternative perspective suggests that under such conditions (i.e. when women are
excluded from certain sectors of society), lower class women would be more likely to join
rebellions given their diminished opportunities in society in comparison to well-educated, upperclass women. The cost of joining rebel movements for these women is comparatively low and
membership in rebel groups may often be seen as an opportunity to vacate positions of domestic
confinement and a means to alter their future prospects increasing the likelihood of their
involvement (Henshaw 2016b; Tezcür 2019). However, such a perspective also assumes that
rebel groups will openly welcome women into an organization. While this is undoubtedly true
for certain rebellions, not all are willing to remove gendered barriers to entry, especially those
groups operating in a rural setting that, more often than not, are associated with conservative
viewpoints.
For these groups, I suggest that children can fill an important void with limited cost. It is
largely recognized that children are cheaper in terms of cost and control (Beber and Blattman
2013). They do not require the pecuniary benefits that adults may demand during conflict and
can be more easily manipulated and indoctrinated in comparison to adults. Further, rural
communities are often categorized not only by strong patriarchal relations where women marry
at a younger age and give birth to more children. They also tend to be associated with higher
levels of poverty and lower levels of education. In these settings, children are typically engaged
in a variety of adult economic activities (Andvig and Gates 2010). Analyzing child labor rates in
the 1990s across Peru, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, for instance, Ersado (2004) discovered that
children in rural areas showed lower rates of school attendance and higher rates of employment
compared to children in urban areas. Thus, children in rural areas might then be equated as viable
recruits for rural insurgents. Given their involvement in the adult economy, they can provide
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bodies to fill the rank-and-file yet are unlikely to detract from the payoffs available to senior
officials within the group, both during and after conflict. While women, all else equal, can meet
similar criteria, their inclusion can increase the risk of patriarchal backlash from the membership.
Clearly, many groups appear willing to include children given the opportunity to do so
and can overcome the participation constraint by using child soldiers (Gates 2017). More
specifically, children can be viewed as a lower threat to those groups that, while potentially
propagating the need for societal change rhetorically, may want to mitigate the risk of openly
challenging societal gender norms. Here, the maintenance of the patriarchy ensures men continue
to benefit during conflict and in the post-conflict environment. As Mazurana (2013) notes, male
members may be more skeptical, threatened, or vehement about the participation of women than
they are about the inclusion of children.
Table 7 reports the full list of groups that included child soldiers in the absence of
women. The list shows that a diverse set of non-state armed groups were willing to recruit
children and decided that women should not be afforded opportunities to participate (and/or
women were not willing to join). Over one-third of these groups were Islamist organizations.
Consistent with previous literature, such organizations are unlikely to see women present given
their ideological foundations which promote maintenance of patriarchal relations often based on
religious doctrine (Henshaw 2016a; Wood and Thomas 2017). Children, however, become viable
options for these groups. As Table 6 illustrated, nearly 80 percent of those groups identified as
Islamist organizations included child soldiers.
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Table 7. Groups Employing Children Exclusively (Henshaw data)
Group Name

Founded

Years Active

State

Ideology

Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi
Afghanistan

1973

1990-1992, 2006

Afghanistan

Islamist

Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami

1991

1992-1995

Afghanistan

Islamist

Khmer People's National
Liberation Front

1979

1990-1991

Cambodia

Redistributive

Movement for Democracy
and Justice in Chad

1998

1999-2002

Chad

Other

Union of Forces for
Democracy and
Development

2006

2006-2007

Chad

Other

Front for the Restoration of
Unity and Democracy

1991

1991-1994

Djibouti

Ethno- Nationalist
(non-Islamist)

Rally for Congolese
Democracy-ML

1999

1999-2001

Democratic Republic
of the Congo

Other

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya

1977

1993-1998

Egypt

Islamist

Al-Ittahad al-Islamiyya

1984

1995-1996, 1999

Ethiopia

Islamist

India

Ethno- Nationalist
(non-Islamist) &
Redistributive

National Democratic Front
of Bodoland

1986

1993-2004

Bougainville
Revolutionary Army

1988

1990, 1992-1996

Papua New Guinea

Ethno- Nationalist
(non-Islamist) &
Redistributive

Moro Islamic Liberation
Front

1978

1990, 1994,
1996-2008

Philippines

Islamist

Islamic Courts Union

2006

2006-2008

Somalia

Islamist
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Group Name

Founded

Years Active

State

Ideology

Justice and Equality
Movement

2001

2003-2004, 20072008

Sudan

Islamist

Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army

2002

2003-2006, 2008

Sudan

Ethno-Nationalist
(non-Islamist)

United Tajik Opposition

1993

1992-1996, 1998

Tajikistan

Islamist

Kosovo Liberation Army

1992

1998-1999, 2001

Yugoslavia

Ethno- Nationalist
(non-Islamist)

*Data on women’s participation and years of group activity is drawn from Henshaw (2016a) and reconciled with
data from Thomas and Wood (2018). Data on child soldiers comes from Haer and Böhmelt (2016a).

Three factors have been identified as likely contributors to rebels’ exclusion of women in
spite of their inclusion of children: a) the risk of patriarchal backlash form its internal
membership; b) pre-conflict societal gender norms that create barriers for women’s mobilization;
and c) rural settings which are often more conservative. To examine the plausibility of these
three explanations/contributors I use brief illustrative case studies which allow me to more fully
consider how each factor can effect rebels’ recruitment. I adopt a most different case method for
my case selection strategy (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Inherently, the small sample from
which I am able to select limits my choices in case selection strategy so there are some
constraints.33 The most different strategy requires the researcher to identify cases in which only
the main independent variable of interest and the dependent variable covary, with all other
plausible independent (or a majority) variables are different (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 306).
With this in mind, I chose two groups; the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad

33

As such, the selected cases might also be classified as cases of convenience.
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(MDJT) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Although significantly different in terms of
group goals and geographic location, both originated and operated primarily in rural settings and
in patriarchal environments that saw high levels of gender inequality, and both included child
soldiers while excluding women.

The Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)
The MDJT launched its campaign to overthrow the Déby government in 1998 (US Department
of State 2001). Led by Youssouf Togoïmi who had previously served as President Déby’s
Minister of Defense, the MDJT insurgency arose largely due to questions of electoral fraud in the
1996 presidential and 1997 legislative elections (US Department of State 1998). Early in its
rebellion, the group was suspected of benefiting from Libyan support which helped the group
carry out successful campaigns through 1999. However, the MDJT never seriously challenged
the regime (Africa Confidential 2001; ICG 2006). Togoïmi’s death in 2002 led to the
organization’s fracture and, after multiple failed ceasefire agreements, a peace agreement was
formally signed in late 2003 although certain factions within the MDJT refused to comply
(Amnesty International 2003). Although a relatively short-lived insurgency, no clear evidence
suggests that the group incorporated women, but reports point to a “number of child soldiers
within its ranks” (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004).
The case of the MDJT in Chad highlights not only the importance of considering pre-war
gender norms in explaining the reported absence of women, but it can also help in understanding
why children were present. Looking at those indicators identified by Thomas and Wood (2018)
as relevant to female participation in non-state armed groups, at the start of the rebellion
(1998/1999), Chad’s female fertility rate sat at approximately 7.38, the percentage of total
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females in the labor force was reported at over 40 percent, and the secondary education ratio of
girls to boys was roughly 25 percent (World Bank 2019). In other words, women on average
gave birth to over 7 children, comprised less than half the workforce, and only about one-quarter
of girls were granted access to secondary education. Lacking access to education and
employment, and given the high birth rate, one might expect women to be more likely to join
rebellion as a means out of patriarchy. This was indeed the case for groups like the PKK where
women saw participation in the organization as a pathway out of patriarchal relations (Tezcür
2019). However, for the MDJT, women were excluded in the insurgency.
These societal factors might also help account for the group’s inclusion of child soldiers.
For the MDJT, their goal targeting regime overthrow did not harness significant popular
mobilization and its ideological foundations suggested no genuine attempt to appeal to a broader
coalition in society. Further, the MDJT, although attempting to mobilize support along ethnic
lines, appeared to be a relatively small organization, at its peak never amounting to more than
2,000 members with some estimates suggesting it was actually much smaller (OECD 2002). In
an interview with Jeune Afrique, Togoïmi rejected the idea that the MDJT rebellion was solely
an ethnic struggle claiming, “I can even give you the names of several officers who are not
Toubous (Togoïmi’s ethnic group) .... All these men have joined us for one and only one reason:
they do not accept injustice" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). By most
accounts, Togoïmi’s attempt to overthrow the regime appeared to be an attempt to unseat a
government that had taken a “dictatorial drift” under Déby’s leadership (Agence France Press
2002).
The rural nature of the insurgency offers an additional perspective on its inclusion of
children and absence of women. Togoïmi, an ethnic Toubou, operated in the Tibesti Mountains,
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a vastly rural region in which inhabitants are largely herders. In 2000, the Understanding
Children’s Work (UCW) project, a collaboration between the International Labor Organization
(ILO), UNICEF, and the World Bank, noted that over 55 percent of children ages 5-14 were
involved in the labor force of which upwards of 60 percent lived in a rural environment (UCW
2019). Well over half of these children were boys suggesting their systematic involvement in
adult economic activities during the midst of the MDJT’s insurgency. The regularity with which
young boys were already entwined in the labor force, particularly in rural areas, suggests that
they were viable recruits for the MDJT.
Three inductive insights also arise when examining the Chad/MDJT conflict. First,
historical reports indicated that the Chadian government was engaged in the forcible recruitment
of children, largely from the Zaghawa ethnic group, the same ethnic group of President Déby
(Child Soldiers International 2001a). The government’s direct incorporation of children during
this time, often through coercive practices with some children as young as 12, speak to the
normalcy of such practices in Chad during this time (Child Soldiers International 2001a). For
instance, evidence suggested that parents were required to either provide one of their children to
the army or pay some monetary fee. For the MDJT, an organization that included a number of
former members of the Chadian National Armed Forces (ANT), the inclusion of children may
have been viewed as typical practice. Even before the conflict started, children were regularly
incorporated into the ANT. As a result, with the clear lack of delineation in the age of a soldier,
even within the national army, it is not surprising that the MDJT included them in their
campaign. Interestingly though, there was no evidence to suggest that the MDJT engaged in
forcible recruitment (Haer et al. 2019).
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Second, scholars have suggested that reciprocal child recruitment practices are
commonplace. When adversaries employ child soldiers it increases the likelihood that all actors
in conflict will engage in the practice as a means of survival and of tactical innovation (Tynes
and Early 2015; Tynes 2018). Déby’s violent recruitment tactics that directly targeted children
may have increased the willingness of the MDJT to recruit children who would have potentially
been recruited by the government. Third, the Chadian government adopted an extreme
counterinsurgency campaign against the MDJT and these scorched earth policies marked by the
indiscriminate nature of government violence in the Tibesti region could have contributed to the
incorporation of children, a point to which I return in chapter four. However, one should expect
that such policies would increase the likelihood that women would be recruited into the
organization. The exclusion of women in the MDJT under such conditions suggests a particular
reason for their exclusion, pointing to the plausibility of arguments about societal gendered
barriers to entry.34
Overall, the case of the MDJT underscores the complexities of rebel recruitment. Societal
gender norms both pre-conflict and during the conflict suggest extreme levels of inequality that
diminished the viability of female participation. This is reinforced by the rural nature of the
insurgency. Though no definitive evidence was identified to suggest that children were included
because of concerns over patriarchal backlash, it appears that children were a more viable option
because of their roles in society (particularly in the rural setting). Lastly, the inductive insights in
this case suggest that child soldiering was a common practice within the ANT and was carried
over by members of the MDJT once launching their insurgency. This emphasizes the normalcy

34

Interestingly, no other Chadian rebel organization in the sample explored in this project included women
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of child soldiering in certain societies while also illustrating the reciprocal nature of child
recruitment amongst belligerents.

The Kosovo Liberation Army
The case of the KLA provides a second illustration of how societal factors and internal group
dynamics might contribute to variation in group composition. The KLA was a nationalist
insurgency comprised chiefly of ethnic Albanians that fought for independence from Yugoslavia
in the late 1990s. The group officially formed in December 1993, but operated largely in the
shadows until 1996 when it launched a series of coordinated attacks against Serbian forces. By
1998 the KLA had gained control of up to 40 percent of the Kosovo territory (Mulaj 2008). In
1999, after a series of failed negotiations, NATO bombing efforts eventually forced Serbian
leader Slobodan Milošević to agree to an end to the conflict.
By traditional metrics, the case of the KLA seems to be somewhat of a deviation from the
general societal patterns one might expect in a group that excludes women. Low fertility rates
(2.75) and a high female secondary education ratio (~ 103.5) suggests that the group, all things
equal, should have been more likely to include women in their movement (World Development
Indicators 2019). However, as in the Chadian case above, women were quite active in the labor
force at the group’s start in 1996 (~ 42 percent). Nevertheless, Henshaw’s (2016a) evaluation
shows no women were present in the group’s campaign for autonomy and independence.35
Although a nationalist movement, the KLA was largely identified as an outlet for men to perform

35

Some accounts suggest women did join the KLA, although the degree of their incorporation within the movement
is less clear (see Özerdem 2003a). Others have pointed to women’s involvement in Kosovo in mine-clearing
operations and question the degree of true ‘incorporation’(Corrin 2000).
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their ‘patriotic’ duty and if men of fighting age attempted to defy what was largely viewed as
their civic responsibility, they were ostracized by society and even family members (Munn
2008). An individual who fled the conflict stated, “my mother was unhappy with my decision to
run and not fight with my brother and father in the KLA,” leading to their estrangement (Munn
2008, 446). Another account suggests that a mother committed suicide after learning her son
deserted the KLA as she could “not live with the disgrace of knowing her son was a coward”
(Munn 2008, 446). In fact, many women encouraged the men in their families to participate with
the KLA.
Despite the fact that traditional indicators would suggest the KLA operated in an
environment that, although appearing less patriarchal in relative terms, the Kosovar Albanian
community was patriarchal in other ways. This implies the need for a more expansive
investigation of societal gender inequality. For the KLA, while women were seen as important to
the nationalist movement, their participation as soldiers was not viewed as vital to the viability of
the rebellion. In fact, leaders within the KLA “exhibited little desire to give up any of the
privileges of patriarchy” (Enloe 2000, 151), and showed resistance to the empowerment of
women in roles outside of their perceived places in society (Munn 2008, 451). For example, the
KLA largely saw women as “childbearing…icons of national survival” that would better serve
the group from a distance (Munn 2008, 440). This suggests that there were legitimate concerns
of patriarchal backlash within the KLA as the dominant perspective in Kosovar society promoted
traditional patriarchal roles. In addition, the masculine perceptions of war, which suggested men
were those fit for conflict, assists in explaining women’s absence in the KLA.
Although excluding women, the KLA benefited significantly from popular support. Still,
during the height of conflict the group chose to require all men of fighting age (18 to 50) to join
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the movement (Child Soldiers International 2001b). Children under 18 were often absorbed in
this process. The majority of these children were between the ages of 16 and 17 and were seen as
useful resources by the KLA in comparison to adult women with many young teens fighting with
the group (Singer 2005b). Although precise information on the number of children used by the
KLA is difficult to obtain, estimates suggest that at its peak, up to 10 percent of the over 16,000
fighters in the KLA were under the age of 18.36 Some accounts even point to the presence of
girls who were identified as primarily taking on roles as cooks for soldiers (Child Soldiers
International 2001b). Others point to their participation in actual conflict (Mazurana and McKay
2001).37 Regardless, the inclusion of those under 18 fits within the notion of societal gender
norms which saw women subjugated to positions outside of the group—and even if in the
group—subjugated to domestic work rather than actual fighting. Boys over the age 16 appear to
have been majority of child soldiers within the group which points to their perception in society
as those responsible for fulfilling the role of a soldier and illustrate how children can fill a void
when groups choose to exclude women participants. In addition, the strength of the KLA
originally resided in its success in rural areas where it was able to mobilize organization support
(Perritt 2008, 51). Serbian onslaughts eventually led to growing KLA support in urban centers
(Kifner 1999), but the organization’s roots in rural Kosovo, where patriarchal conditions were
strongest, contributed to the absence of women in the group and inclusion of teenage boys.
At least one additional inductive insight arises from the KLA investigation and concerns
the nature of sexual violence employed by Bosnian Serbs in the conflict. The conflict in Kosovo

36

Less than 2 percent were reportedly below the age of 16.
This highlights an important, albeit overlooked distinction in the child soldier literature—the variation in the
experiences of girls and boys.
37
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was particularly brutal and included a vast array of human rights violations. One in particular
was the regularity of sexual violence. Serbian tactics, for instance, included widespread rape
(Özerdem 2003b) which was largely identified as an effort at ethnic cleansing. Consequently, the
inclusion of women in the KLA could be seen as an organizational vulnerability. Women were
prime targets for sexual violence by opposition forces and given the KLA’s perception of women
as “childbearing…icons of national survival,” this may have further deterred the group’s
willingness to incorporate women.
As with the case of the MDJT, the KLA’s organizational composition clearly illustrates
the complexities of rebel recruitment and exclusion. Though societal gender norms appeared to
be less discriminatory towards women, a strong patriarchal structure was apparent in other ways
within Kosovo society. In addition, concerns over patriarchal backlash amongst KLA
membership and the group’s rural foundations contributed to the exclusion of women with the
acceptance of child recruits. The masculine perceptions of war, the sense of national duty
espoused by Kosovar Albanians, and the requirement that all men age 18-50 participate
increased the chances that boys under 18 would be included. However, as discussed, the vast
majority of child soldiers were at least 16 years of age. Overall, this case accentuates the need for
scholarship to continue to explore the factors and conditions which can influence group
composition.

Conclusions
Despite the growing body of literature that has investigated women’s participation across nonstate armed groups, scholars had yet to investigate why some rebel groups diversify their
recruitment patterns to be more inclusive of a wider spectrum of demographics while others
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recruitment is more constricted. This paper offers such an attempt, exploring probable conditions
that lead groups to recruit child soldiers, women soldiers, both, or neither. This investigation
demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive understanding of rebel composition and
emphasizing the intricacies of rebels’ recruitment of children and women members. The patterns
identified suggest that women are rarely active in rebel movements in the absence of children,
but at least 10 percent of rebellions may see child soldiers present when women are excluded.
This is an interesting discovery. For those groups which included both populations, the majority
were classified as ethnonationalist organizations which are most likely to benefit from social
endowments. In addition, some preliminary evidence suggests that the inclusion of women can
help groups that use child soldiers mitigate reputational consequences. In those cases where
children were used, but women excluded, the theoretical insights revealed societal gender
inequalities such as high fertility rates and limited access to education/employment can hinder
women’s participation. These conditions can lead groups to pursue child soldiers who are
unlikely to exacerbate concerns of patriarchal backlash. Children can, in short, offer groups an
opportunity to fill vacancies without igniting internal backlash from members who see value in
the preservation of the patriarchy. Further, the case illustrations demonstrate how rural
insurgencies may target children before women as these groups must overcome gender barriers
that are often stronger in rural communities whereas their urban counterparts may find layers of
the patriarchy already being peeled back. Future work would do well to more fully consider these
complex interactions within rebel membership in spite of the challenges in clearly identifying
rebels’ internal motivations.
The current investigation only speaks to the general presence or absence of women and
children within rebel groups, thereby neglecting to consider their respective roles within an
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insurgency. For those groups that include both participants, it would be interesting to consider
how women and children’s roles might vary across specific rebel groups. Future comparative
perspectives can explore these internal dynamics as women’s roles as noncombatants might
mean they are subjugated to positions as combat wives or are used in more strategically
important positions such as intelligence gathering, fundraising, and so on. Of course, these roles
might not be mutually exclusive, but a more holistic understanding of their employment in
rebellion will undoubtedly be fruitful. This same principle applies to the literature on child
soldiering as operational definitions cast a wide net and do little to distinguish their roles in
rebellion. For instance, it would be interesting to see if groups that employ women in more
traditional military roles are more likely to keep children away from the front line, or vice versa.
Understanding these details can be crucial for the policy community as it aims to deploy the
correct resources in post-conflict settings.
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CHAPTER FOUR: INNOCENCE TO VIOLENCE: INVESTIGATING THE
CASE OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE PIKK

Abstract
When and why do violent non-state actors use child soldiers? Using case study evidence and new
data on deceased PKK fighters, I show that the employment of those under the age of 18 has
been a regular occurrence in the PKK since its onset. I suggest that the inclusion of child soldiers
can be explained largely by inter-organizational rivalries which necessitated wide recruitment
practices and in part by the organization’s goals, ideological foundations, and ethnic nationalism
which appealed to many young people. Further, I argue that once a group begins recruiting
children, it is unlikely to stop doing so. I also explore patterns of recruitment throughout the
duration of the PKK’s struggle and illustrate how after launching its insurgency against the
Turkish government, the organization’s recruitment of children began to increase first, in the
ratio of children to adults and later in the actual numbers of child soldiers. Extending theoretical
arguments which suggest that government’s level of violence against civilians and rational rebel
responses, I show that the PKK appeared to become less selective in its recruitment patterns at
the height of its insurgency against the Turkish government (1990-1999). Lastly, I explore the
patterns of recruitment after its leader’s capture in 1999 and show that the recruitment of
children continued even during less hostile periods of time with some evidence suggesting that
the group’s use of children as direct combatants has significantly decreased. I qualify this
conclusion by showing how the PKK’s rate of reporting recruits’ ages has dramatically declined
in recent periods suggesting that the group recognizes the importance of concealing its negative
recruitment practices for international legitimacy.
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Introduction
The success of Kurdish militants in the fight against ISIS has ushered in renewed attention to the
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) and its Syrian affiliate, the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat
(PYD). While much of the recent attention has highlighted the success of these groups against
the Islamic State (Solomon and Dombey 2014), reports as recent as 2018 continue to condemn
both groups for their recruitment and use of child soldiers (HRW 2018a). Understanding why
non-state armed groups like the PKK use child soldiers remains a complex task. Extant
scholarship on rebel child soldiering has identified several explanations about the practice at a
cross-organizational level. Yet, missing in the literature are studies which examine the dynamic
nature of rebels’ recruitment. First, few studies have engaged with the question of when rebel
groups first recruit child soldiers and why they might do so? Second, though academic
investigations have largely explored the presence/absence of children at some point during a
group’s rebellion, we still lack a clear understanding of factors that impact their patterns of child
recruitment over time. This paper engages with both questions, fitting into the broader literature
concerning rebel groups’ incentives for civilian victimization, focusing exclusively on their
recruitment and use of those under the age of 18 as combatants. In doing so, it highlights the
complexities that often surround insurgents’ child recruitment practices and, more specifically,
discusses the factors and incentives that drive groups to employ children as soldiers in conflict
despite international condemnation.
This is not the first time that scholars have recognized the importance of within case
investigations in elucidating patterns of rebel behavior. Still, micro-level analyses of the
“mechanisms responsible for changes in actors’ tactics…remain poorly understood” across
academic studies (Wood 2014). Specifically, though large-N studies on child soldiering have
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provided important insights on those factors and conditions that might contribute to the
recruitment of children by non-state actors, they are not always helpful in specifying causal
mechanisms that first lead to the practice let alone in explaining fluctuations in the rate of child
recruitment. In the case of the PKK, a dynamic set of factors have contributed both to the
group’s initial use of child soldiers dating back to its formation in 1984 and the subsequent
variation in their recruitment of children.
From here, the paper proceeds in several parts. First, I briefly discuss the extant literature
on child soldiering, highlighting theoretical and empirical foundations used to explain why rebels
choose to use child soldiers. Second, I lay out a number of theoretical arguments which can help
explain the PKK’s use of child soldiers. I suggest that the PKK’s initial employment of child
soldiers can largely be explained by the competitiveness of the rebel marketplace within which
the organization emerged. Coupled with the lack of domestic and international norms against the
practice at its formation, I emphasize how the PKK first became involved in the recruitment of
children. Next, I argue that once an organization begins to include children, there are few reasons
it will abandon the practice, but periods of intense conflict can increase the rate of child
recruitment. To explain variation in the levels of recruitment across time periods, I unpack two
broad theoretical arguments. I borrow from theories of rebel violence at the nexus between rebelcivilian bargaining (Wood 2014) and the importance of international signaling and perception for
rebel legitimacy (Lasley and Thyne 2015). These theories assist in explaining why the PKK
continued to employ child soldiers at relatively high rates during times of intense conflict, how
this shifted in times of relative peace, and why it ultimately decided to sign on to a commitment
to stop using those under the age of 18 as fighters in 2013. Specifically, I illustrate that changing
norms in the post-1999 era likely contributed to a shift in the way the organization used children
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and ultimately in how it recorded demographic information on recruits. In section three, I offer
general background information on the PKK insurgency in Turkey before proceeding with an indepth investigation of the PKK’s patterns of recruitment from its formation through 2016. In
addition to the qualitative evidence, I use the Kurdish Insurgency Militants dataset (KIM) which
affords the opportunity to explore individual level demographic data on deceased PKK fighters
between 1984 and 2016 (Tezcür, 2016). The paper concludes with a discussion of key findings,
avenues for future research, and practical implications.

Review of the Literature
Despite international condemnation and nearly a dozen UN resolutions aimed to curtail the
practice, both rebels and governments alike have continued to employ children in their armies.
Recent empirical assessments point to upwards of 80 percent of all rebellions active in the postCold War era as having used child soldiers (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a). Given the frequency of
the practice, scholars have devoted increasing attention in recent to identifying the determinants
of child recruitment by non-state actors. Generally, these studies can be distinguished according
to theoretical approach. First are supply-side approaches which largely concern the systemic
factors that have contributed to child soldiering during periods of conflict. In other words, these
arguments often contend that societal/structural factors can increase the likelihood of children
joining insurgencies and often address the question of child soldiering through an opportunity
structure lens (Lasley and Thyne 2015). For instance, scholars have argued that globalization has
resulted in an increase in global inequality which has eroded societal norms surrounding the
protection of children (Honwana 2011). Others posit that children might find membership within
rebellion to be financially preferable to their status quo or safer than remaining outside of a
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group. For instance, children may join rebellions when opportunities for employment and
education are low (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994; Wessells 2006; Tynes 2011). Soldiering, thus,
is a potential path out of poverty. Additionally, in instances where vulnerable populations exist,
such as in states where there are high numbers of internally displaced persons or refugees,
children can become a readily available resource for insurgents (Achvarina and Reich 2006).
These locations may lack the security, both physical and social, to keep rebel groups from
recruiting children and can even push children to seek refuge in rebellion. Generally, these
explanations provide useful starting points for the conditions that might push children to rebel
organizations, but they only focus on one side of the equation.
The other side of the equation can be found in demand-side explanations which seek to
identify the characteristics unique to children that incentivize rebel groups to recruit them for
their insurgencies. Framed as an exercise in cost-benefit analysis during times of conflict, earlier
work suggested that children were simply a means to an end in instances where rebels needed
bodies to continue rebellion or meet quotas (Woods 1993). This, scholars suggest, is especially
likely in prolonged and bloody conflicts which can constrain rebel (and government) resources,
human and material, resulting in the adoption of practices that might otherwise be avoided
(Machel 1996; Tynes and Early 2015). The modernization of weaponry and the prevalence of
small arms which are easier to operate and lighter to carry, have also been identified as factors
making children more useful to rebel groups (Singer 2006). However, though plausible, the
validity of such arguments assumes that children are effective as soldiers and ignores the fact
that many light and easy to operate weapons have been around for long periods of time (Andvig
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and Gates 2010; Beber and Blattman 2013).38 Nonetheless, Haer and Böhmelt (2016a) suggest
that rebel groups who employ child soldiers might do so because of their military effectiveness.
Specifically arguing that the malleability of children, their ease of indoctrination and loyalty,
their lack of risk assessment, and the fact that even if they are not directly engaged in combat
operations, the logistical support they provide can sway the power asymmetry, they find that
rebels with child soldiers are “more likely to be associated with higher fighting capacities of
rebel groups” (Haer and Böhmelt (2016a, 167). Other scholars have also argued that children are
more easily coerced, manipulated, and indoctrinated than their adult counterparts and are more
loyal and committed to the group’s cause (Blattman and Annan 2008; Gates and Reich 2010:
Beber and Blattman 2013).
Extending demand-side explanations, scholars have also underscored the importance of
organizational goals in identifying which rebellions are likely to exclude or include children
(Lasley and Thyne 2015; Jo 2015). First, debate exists over the effect of secessionist goals on
recruitment decisions. Lasley and Thyne (2015) argue that those organizations with ambitions of
secession should be less likely to use child soldiers out of a need for international legitimacy to
achieve their ultimate ambition of statehood (Lasley and Thyne 2015). However, Jo (2015)
argues that separatist organizations are far more reliant on local support, often mobilized along
ethnic and nationalist lines, and consequently are more inclusive in their recruitment practices.
As such, they are more likely to have children in their rank and file. Though these studies
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Further, weapons like the Ak-47 have been in production since 1949 and weigh just over six pounds suggesting
that children would have been desirable in previous time periods.
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employ different samples, both emphasize the importance of considering organizational goals
and ambitions in explaining variation in child recruitment.
Lastly, recent work speaks to the importance of rebels’ pursuit and exploitation of natural
resources in explaining their demand for children (Beber and Blattman 2013; Haer et al. 2019;
Faulkner et al. 2019). Though few rebellions can be thought of as solely existing for the purpose
of profiteering, those groups operating in environments ripe with valuable natural resources may
see children as useful tools in their pursuit to exploit them. Further, for those groups that are
successfully able to exploit the illicit economy, children can serve functional roles in the
acquisition or distribution of a resource which becomes especially likely for those groups that
exploit lootable resources such as alluvial diamonds.
Overall, the majority of recent scholarship has failed to disentangle the complexities and
myriad factors that likely work in unison and contribute to a group’s adoption and continuation
in recruiting children. For instance, quantitative academic studies assume (often due to data
limitations) that child recruitment is constant throughout conflict. Largely a consequence of data
limitations, child soldiering has only been captured as a binary indicator and ordinal measure
used to estimate the prevalence of child recruits within rebel ranks (Haer and Böhmelt 2016a).
Relatedly, scholars have struggled to identify when rebel groups are likely to first begin
recruiting children and what conditions may increase the likelihood that they abandon the
practice. Specifically, demand-side explanations generally treat armed groups as unitary actors
with a fixed set of interests and supply-side arguments often fail to acknowledge the consistency
of societal conditions across conflict areas and do not consider rebels’ calculations in the
process. This paper builds on the literature to evaluate how the environments under which rebel
groups operate affect their levels of civilian victimization (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006;
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Weinstein, 2006; Salehyan et al. 2014; Wood, 2014). However, diverging form past scholarship
which disproportionately reflects on the factors contributing to rebels’ employment of lethal
violence, I examine how the pre-, during, and post-conflict environments can impact rebels’
recruitment of child soldiers.

Theoretical Considerations
Though current literature offers a number of compelling insights into the reasons why an
organization like the PKK may choose to use child soldiers, no singular theory can fully account
for variations over time in the group’s employment of child combatants. Thus, a theoretical
framework to explain the organization’s decision to recruit children, particularly prior to the start
of conflict, must consider a number of factors identified as relevant in the child recruitment
literature. I develop three broad theoretical umbrellas which help to explain recruitment
throughout the PKK’s insurgency. First, to better understand an organization’s initial decision to
recruit children, it is imperative to consider the environment in which the group emerges in
addition to its goals and ideological roots. Second, to explain variations in child recruitment
throughout conflict, one must take into account not only organizational behavior in a previous
time period but also consider the series of dynamic factors that can shift organizational demands
for new recruits. Specifically, an increase in rebels’ demand for new recruits given the intensity
of warfare can lower the barriers to entry into an organization leading to an increase, not only in
the number of members across a population, but also in the number of child soldiers within the
ranks. At the same time, periods marked by lower hostilities may decrease the rate of general
recruitment, and in turn, child recruitment. Third, I suggest that changing international norms
and changes in conflict dynamics can alter a group’s apparent commitment to addressing issues
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related to child soldering, and as such, can influence their behavior. Specifically, I suggest that
the PKK in more recent times has an incentive to forgo child recruitment practices as it seeks
some degree of international legitimacy. In short, the negative press and criticism surrounding
rebels’ recruitment practices can influence and possibly even constrain rebels’ behavior.
Insurgent popular mobilization, even for the most noble of causes, can be a challenge
(Moore 1995). A lengthy scholarly debate exists related to who joins rebellion and why (e.g.
Gates 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Weinstein 2006; Tezcür 2018), but few scholars explicitly
investigate the variation in the age of recruits. Relatedly, a debate exist within the literature on
rebel child recruitment related to the effect of goals. For secessionist movements in particular,
appearing legitimate and norm-abiding might be critical for goal attainment, decreasing the
likelihood they will recruit children (Lasley and Thyne 2015). However, as Jo (2015) illustrates,
these groups are also more likely to seek out and benefit from local support. This availability and
reliance on local support can, in turn, increase the likelihood that a group incorporates child
solders.39 Still, the mechanism here generally speaks to the importance of a group’s ideological
foundations as critical determinants of child recruitment. As such, groups that mobilize around
ethnic and nationalist goals are often more reliant on popular support than those that otherwise
may lack such a unifying principle. In this context, and particularly during the formation of an
organization, it is important that insurgents establish not only a base of localized popular support,
but also a membership cohort that can ensure organizational longevity and viability. The
competitiveness of the environment in which a rebel group forms can also necessitate the need
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It is worth noting that more research is needed to understand the mode of recruitment into secession movements.
This might aid in clarifying the differences in findings in previous studies.
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for less discriminatory recruitment practices. For the PKK, the group’s ethno-nationalist goals
which first promoted the establishment of an independent Kurdish state can help explain why it
began recruiting children during its formation, but the heavily saturated ‘rebel marketplace’
likely influenced the group’s initial recruitment behavior.
A robust literature exists that examines the effects of rebel rivalries on groups’
recruitment strategies, employment of violence against civilians, and conflict and organizational
duration (Metelits 2009a, 2009b; Balcells 2010; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Wood and Kathman
2015; Nygård and Weintraub 2015; Phillips 2015). Recent work by Fjelde and Nilsson (2018)
suggests that nascent rebel groups face severe challenges and barriers to entry from incumbent
groups, particularly during times civil war. In order to achieve a viable rebellion, these groups
must mobilize a sufficient portion of a population and leverage resources in an effort to
challenge not only state authority, but also competing organizations. Metelits (2009a) further
claims that rebellions which face active rivalry are incentivized to pursue violent relationships
with civilians in comparison to groups operating in environments marked by low levels of rebel
competition. She suggests that “rivals play a crucial role because competition threatens
resources, and the lack of resources in turn threatens survival” (Metelits 2009a, 161). Borrowing
from these theories, I propose that when barriers to entry into the rebel marketplace are high,
emerging groups are willing to recruit children as they increase an organization’s opportunity for
both survival and longevity.
At the same time, it is important to consider the prevailing international norms during the
time period in which the PKK formed. A robust literature on the evolution of international norms
exists, but the power of norms to influence actor’s behavior has been heavily contested (Florini
1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1998). This is perhaps no more evident than in the
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debate surrounding the evolution of international human rights norms (Donnelly 1986; Hawkins
2004; Hafner-Burton 2014) and is more complicated when one considers how non-state actors
choose to comply with or reject these norms (Clapham 2006; Jo 2015; Huang 2016). Recent
work suggests that rebel compliance to international human rights treaties such as the ban against
the use of landmines are best understood by first recognizing that non-state actors and states’
decisions are not independent of one another (Gleditsch et al. 2018). Put differently, it may
matter what your adversary does in terms of committing to international treaties aimed at
curtailing certain human rights abuses. However, I argue that the timing of norms is of particular
importance as they often take substantial periods of time to diffuse and even longer when the
target of diffusion is a non-state armed group (Pegram 2010; Greenhill 2010; Towns 2012). In
the case of the PKK at its onset, a true norm against child soldiering was inconsequential at best
and only beginning to take shape. The lack of an established norms suggests that the PKK had no
genuine reason to avoid recruiting children.

H1: The competitiveness of the environment in which rebel groups emerge increases the
likelihood that the group will include children.

The first hypothesis speaks specifically to the determinants of the PKK’s initial decision
to use child soldiers and how these decisions might have impacted the organization’s behavior in
later time periods. However, the dynamics of conflict can also play a crucial role in insurgent’s
behavior. Scholars have shown how conflict duration and intensity can make previously
unacceptable practices (i.e. child soldiering) more likely (Tynes 2018). For the PKK, an
organization that used children before conflict had begun, duration and intensity are poor
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predictors of the organization’s initial decisions to recruit children. However, conflict intensity
and duration likely influenced that patterns of recruitment in the PKK.
Building on recent literature on the logic of violence against civilians in war (Zhukov
2014; Wood 2014; Schwartz and Straus 2018) I argue that for the PKK, the Turkish
government’s counterinsurgency campaigns—characterized by heightened levels of violence and
human rights abuses against the Kurdish population in Turkey—contributed to the PKK’s
increase recruitment and use of child soldiers. More specifically, I build on the work of Zhukov
(2014) and Scwhartz and Straus (2018) and suggest that the causal mechanism at work is one
where government violence against civilians can function in two distinct ways which, in turn,
affect rebels’ recruitment and civilian support. First, violence that is indiscriminate in nature can
make remaining neutral more costly for civilians, pushing them to join rebel groups and
increasing the diversity of recruits willing to join (Zhukov 2014). Secondly, increasing levels of
civilian violence can lead to significant rebel losses which can affect not only recruitment
behavior over the course of a conflict, but civilians’ support of rebels. Scwhartz and Straus
(2018) suggest that the logic of violence against civilians during wartime is best understood by
considering a perpetrator’s calculations about civilians’ loyalty to the opposition. If civilians are
believed to be ‘salvageable,’ that is convinced not to support an insurgency, then violence can be
used as a means to “impose costs to break bonds of loyalty with insurgents” (Schwartz and
Straus 2018, 230).
Such an argument complements Wood (2014) who argued that rebels’ diminishing
material capabilities due to government violence can negatively impact the prospects for the
group to garner support for their movement. Simply put, their decrease in material capabilities
can adversely affect civilians’ calculations about the cost of supporting a rebel movement (i.e.
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supporting a losing a cause). However, I contend that for the PKK, increasing levels of violence,
specifically group-selective violence which directly affected and marginalized large portions of
the Kurdish population in Turkey, ultimately benefited the PKK terms of recruitment.
Though the logic of indiscriminate violence has been widely discussed in extant literature
it has been met with mixed conclusions about its effectiveness as a counterinsurgency strategy
(e.g. Mason and Krane 1989; Kalyvas 2006; Downes 2007; Lyall 2009; Machain et al. 2011;
Souleimanov and Siroky 2016). Kalyvas’ (2006) seminal piece on the logic of violence during
civil conflict argued that indiscriminate violence would only/mostly occur when government and
rebel forces operated in equilibrium. Put differently, where one’s opponent was too weak to
protect the civilian population, but a combatant’s control over such a territory was deficient,
indiscriminate tactics can make noncooperation increasingly costly for civilians (Kalyvas 90-91).
When control is clearly maintained and intelligence is robust and accurate, combatants can more
selectively employ violence to weed out opposition forces/sympathizers. Under such conditions
the gathering of information through the use of selective violence is viewed as an effective and
reliable approach whereas indiscriminate violence can be counterproductive as it runs the risk of
alienating a population and potentially prompting defections to the opposition—rendering such a
strategy ineffective.
However, Zhukov (2014), while agreeing with the logic of indiscriminate violence
outlined by Kalyvas, suggests that such a classification fails to accurately reflect the reality of
armed conflict. Specifically, while indiscriminate violence can often be categorized as an
inefficient strategy for punishing an enemy and may be counterproductive for those relying on
such tactics, there is a threshold effect (Zhukov 2014, 249). That is, severe levels of
indiscriminate violence can make “supporting the indiscriminate side” more beneficial for
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civilians as it “maximizes their own chances of survival.” While selective violence is often the
preferred choice, indiscriminate punishment at high levels can, in effect, kill enough of the
opposition along with innocent civilians to successful counter the opposition forces and deter
would-be supporters from joining in rebellion.
Still, scholars have identified a fundamental flaw in the labeling of violence as
‘indiscriminate’ and ‘selective’ (Schwartz and Straus 2018). Indiscriminate violence often
denotes random killing while selective implies violence targets specific individuals within a
larger population. In the case of the PKK against the Turkish government, Turkish
counterinsurgency efforts might better be classified as group-selective violence (Schwartz and
Straus 2018). Group-selective violence is best defined as large-scale violence that targets a
specific category of the population (Schwartz and Straus 2018, 223). The distinguishing
characteristic of this form of violence is that it clarifies ambiguities in both indiscriminate and
selective violence by acknowledging that violence can be both random (indiscriminate) and
selective. However, the selective nature of this form of violence is focused on the group level as
opposed to the individual. In response to growing Kurdish support for the PKK, the Turkish
government’s counterinsurgency strategy against the PKK beginning in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s became especially brutal. As the PKK was able to successfully mobilize a
larger portion of the Kurdish population, the government increased its level of group-selective
violence against the Kurds.
The degree of government violence, particularly the escalation of group-selective
violence, can alter rebel groups’ calculations about recruitment. Specifically, it can encourage a
group to open its doors to a more diverse set of civilian supporters. Though groups may still have
concerns about recruit loyalty and allegiance, as a rebel group incurs significant losses, their
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“time horizon(s) often shrinks” (Wood 2014, 982), forcing them to make decisions that may
otherwise have been avoided. Put differently, when facing heavy losses, rebels’ must “prioritize
short-term strategic objectives” over long term goals and ambitions (Wood 2014, 982). As a
result, a rebel group must do what is necessary to keep the organization afloat, even if this means
increasing micro-level forms of violence against civilians. For the PKK, a group with the
enduring goal of the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, organizational survival
became the short-term objective in the face of violent repression. Seeking to maintain rebellion
and avoid organizational failure I offer the following hypothesis:

H2: Increasing levels of group-selective violence will increase the rate at which rebel groups
recruit child soldiers.

Returning to the discussion of norms against child soldiering, it is clear that many
changes have occurred since the PKK first launched its insurgency. Consequently, it is important
to revisit the effect that norms may have had on the group’s behavior over time. Specifically, as
the norm against child soldiering has become more universally accepted and entrenched, has it
impacted the group’s recruitment and use of child soldiers? Inherent in this discussion is the role
of humanitarian organizations and state actors in the reinforcement norms as they evolve. For
protections against child soldiering, two major international human rights conventions were
adopted after the PKK’s formation and onset of subsequent rebellion. The first, the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), established the age of a child soldier as below 15,
but charged states with prioritizing the eldest when considering those between the ages of 15 and
18. In 2002, the first optional protocol to the CRC defined a child as any person below the age of
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18 (UN 2000). Turkey, the PKK’s primary opponent, ratified the former in 1995 and the latter in
2004.
In 2000, a non-governmental organization (NGO) known as the Geneva Call officially
launched with the goal of engaging armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in an effort to promote their
compliance with international humanitarian norms (Geneva Call 2019). Among other efforts, in
2010 the group launched the “Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the
Effects of Armed Conflict” (Sjoeberg, 2013). The primary intent of this deed was to ensure
children were not used as soldiers and to protect them during times of conflict. In 2013, the PKK
signed the aforementioned “Deed of Commitment,” leading to the question of why the
organization chose to commit to the discontinuation of child recruitment (or at least signaled
some interest in doing so). This shift in organizational behavior suggests that some rebel groups
may be motivated to abandon strategies from the past in an effort to improve reputation and
legitimacy.
The factors and conditions that may lead to such behavioral shifts are complex. However,
I argue that two inter-related features are particularly salient for rebel compliance: a)
opportunities for peace and b) perceived opportunities for goal attainment. Both factors can
increase the likelihood that rebels comply with international norms—particularly when these
groups seek political autonomy. First, opportunities for peaceful negotiation which, by their
nature, encourage belligerents to lay down their arms, can also increase the likelihood that
groups refrain from other practices that would exacerbate peace and extend the conflict,
including continued child recruitment. There are a number of instances where a genuine
commitment to peace was uncertain and belligerents’ continued to recruit children (i.e. the
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone); however, I suggest that the abandonment of child
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recruitment (or at least the signaling to do so) is more likely as the norm has become more
entrenched in the social fabric of the international community.
Secondly, when rebels’ goals are perceived to be more attainable, their behavior may
shift in ways which see increased compliance with international norms. This is more probable
when considering the specific goals of various rebel groups, distinguishing between those with
separatist ambitions and those which seek regime overthrow. Although debate exists in the child
soldier literature as to the affect rebels’ goals may have on decisions to recruit children in the
first place, there is at least some overlap in their theoretical arguments which suggests these
specific groups are more likely to desire and/or need domestic and international legitimacy (Jo
2015; Lasley and Thyne 2015). Jo (2015, 164) specifically argues that separatist groups are those
most likely to be “switchover compliers.” She contends that secessionist rebellions are more
likely to recognize the value and importance in building legitimacy over time for goal
attainment. Her theory of seeking legitimacy suggests that even though rebels with secessionist
goals may be more likely to recruit children, largely due to their increased levels of popular
support, over time these groups’ behavior can shift as they find merit in compliance with
international norms as they seek to transition from violent struggle to the political realm. I build
on this foundation, suggesting that while rivalry and conflict dynamics may necessitate the use of
child soldiers, inching closer to successful goal attainment can increase the likelihood that these
groups move in the direction of compliance with international norms. This leads to the final
hypothesis:
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H3: Opportunities for peace and prospects for goal attainment will impact secessionist rebel
groups’ recruitment of children especially as the international norm against child soldiering has
become more established.

Research Design
To investigate these theoretical arguments and explore new insights on the conditions that lead to
rebels’ decisions to recruit child soldiers and the conditions that lead to variations in the levels of
recruitment I examine the PKK’s behavior since its inception in 1978. Generally, I examine three
distinct time periods. First, I consider the PKK’s onset and the factors leading to their inclusion
of children as the organization formed. Next I turn to the period of its first (and main) insurgency
which began in 1984. During this period, I am able to examine how the characteristics of a
conflict can influence child recruitment patterns (H2). Lastly, I examine the period from 20002016. This period began with a cessation of hostilities before the conflict recurred in 2004. I
focus especially on the group’s decision to sign the Geneva Call’s “Deed of Commitment” in
2013 and the subsequent effect on child recruitment (H3).
In terms of data collection, I rely on a) qualitative evidence from secondary source
materials in the case analysis; and b) a unique dataset which provides demographic information
on over 9,000 deceased PKK fighters who were killed at some point during the PKK conflict
between 1984 and 2016. The Kurdish Insurgency Militants (KIM) dataset affords the ability to
identify recruitment information including age of recruitment, period of recruitment, years in the
ranks, and so on (Tezcür 2016). As a result, I can, with more accuracy than most, identify when
child recruitment was initiated, how it likely evolved over the course of the conflict, and how the
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PKK’s own commitment to stop recruiting children has transpired. I discuss the details of the
KIM dataset below.

Kurdish Insurgent Militants Dataset
Before turning to the examination of the PKK, some discussion on the details of the KIM dataset
is warranted. First, given that all individuals coded in the dataset are deceased, there are a
number of potential biases that qualify the inferences one can make.40 Most importantly is the
question of whether the demographics of those killed are representative of the entire group. In
total, the KIM dataset contains information on 9,196 PKK militants. Directly relevant to this
project, recruitment age information is available for 6,157 of these individuals and death age
reported in 6,614 of the cases. When a recruit’s death age is 17 or below I am able to clearly
identify that the individual in question was recruited before the age of 18 and subsequently count
such instances as a child soldier recruit. After accounting for this, I am left with 6,202
individuals who can be identified as either a child soldier or not during some point in the
insurgency.41 Though age information for all 9,196 militants would be ideal, having age
information for over two-thirds of the sample affords the opportunity to leverage important
insights about group recruitment behavior and increases the validity of inferences we can make
about the patterns of child recruitment specifically, across different periods of time throughout
the insurgency.

40

For a robust discussion on potential biases see Tezcür (2016, 250).
In total, 45 individuals were identified as child soldiers by their death date, but not information on their
recruitment year is available.
41
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The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)
Founded in 1974 by Abdullah Öcalan, and officially established in 1978, the PKK launched its
insurgency against the Turkish government in 1984 with the call for a creation of an independent
state of Kurdistan (Tezcür 2010). At its onset, the organization encountered an environment ripe
with competition as nearly a dozen other Kurdish nationalist organizations were already in
existence, each more established and embedded in Kurdish society. These Kurdish nationalist
groups engaged in all aspects of civil and social life. They “published journals and newspapers,
established youth associations, were influential in unions and professional associations” (Tezcür
2015, 249). Yet, though nearly all political organizations demanded Kurdish liberation,
significant differences over the most appropriate and effective strategy to achieve such a goal
remained (Gunes 2013). For the PKK, and Öcalan specifically, the political struggle for
liberation would best be achieved through military contestation that would lead to a wider
popular rebellion. In short, violence was seen as the most effective way for the achievement of
true national liberation (Gunes 2013, 256). For these reasons, amongst others, the PKK became
the hegemonic Kurdish Nationalist group within Turkey by 1984. In August 1984, the group
launched its insurgency against the Turkish regime in a series of coordinated attacks on military
stations in Eruh and Semdinli, two small towns in southeastern Turkey (Bacik and Coskun 2011,
251). Over the course of the next three decades, the PKK would experience significant ebbs and
flows in terms of its military success and in the pursuit of both its political and nationalist goals.
In the context of their recruitment practices, the PKK employed large numbers of
children within their rank and file throughout the duration of its insurgency, continuing to use
combatants under the age of 18 today (US Department of State 2018). Though the majority of
global reports and literature investigating the PKK’s child soldiering argue that the systematic
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nature of recruitment began around 1994 (Singer 2006; Child Soldiers International 2008),
patterns of recruitment across the KIM dataset suggest that children were regularly involved in
the organization since its onset. This alludes to the importance of considering when rebel child
soldiering begins to better understand the dynamics that influence the behavior.

Tracing Patterns of Recruitment
It is clear from an evaluation of previous literature that many factors contribute to rebel child
soldiering. Yet, for the PKK, the available explanations are not sufficient to fully understand
child recruitment patterns. I contend that the organization’s decision to recruit children cannot be
understood without exploring the patterns of recruitment during its formation. First, the five
years preceding the PKK’s formation—the “existential period”—was a time of growing
competition amongst Kurdish organizations. Prior to the 1971 coup, the Turkish military had
initiated operations against Kurds in the southeast in what they identified as a pre-emptive action
against the rise of Kurdish identity and nationalism (Jongerden 2017, 139). During this time and
throughout the early 1970s, state repression reached a pinnacle and public organization became
not only impractical, but illegal. Leadership of central Kurdish organizations were either arrested
or executed in an effort to deter Kurdish activism (Jongerden and Akkaya 2011, 126-127). It was
under such conditions and in response to growing Turkish repression that the PKK began to take
root.
The gradual de-securitization of public spaces after elections in 1973 saw the
establishment of a number of rival Kurdish organizations. By 1977, there were at least nine
illegal Kurdish organizations within Turkey and this number would continue to rise (Marcus
2009, 39). The core membership of the PKK, with Öcalan at its helm, took shape in small
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meetings held in apartments and homes within and around Ankara where strategy for revolution
was discussed and recruitment/vetting of new members took place (Jongerden and Akkaya 2011,
128). In such a crowded political space, Kurdish groups struggled to differentiate themselves as
they competed for support. For the Kurdish nationalist population, the vast majority of which
supported the unifying goal of an independent Kurdish state, selecting which group to support
and/or affiliate oneself with became challenging.
For the PKK, turning away members during the group’s formation in such a competitive
environment would have been imprudent, particularly given its status as a latecomer to the
marketplace of Kurdish nationalist organizations. This suggests that the inclusion of children,
particularly for nationalist movements, might be a strategic calculation, one which aims to ensure
both organizational dominance and longevity. Put differently, excluding recruits based on age
would decrease the pool of available recruits, limiting not only the size of the organization’s
membership, but also threatening the sustainability of the movement. The inclusion of young
individuals could augment the group and would assist in ensuring the durability of its mission.
The exclusion of such a population would directly jeopardize its ambitions. For the PKK, this
may have been a more likely problem given the crowded atmosphere in which the group formed.
The presence of rival ethno-nationalist organizations, largely identified as overlooking key
divisions of Kurdish society, appears to be an important factor in the organization’s composition
across multiple cleavages. The political landscape, coupled with its ethno-nationalist foundations
likely meant that the PKK’s door for recruitment, regardless of age, was open. Overall, this
generally suggests that a political environment that is saturated with rival groups can impact an
organization’s recruitment practices, potentially leading to the incorporation of child soldiers
(H1). Further, this appears especially likely when groups’ ideological roots are situated in ethno-
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nationalist aspirations that attempt to mobilize large portions of a population leading to an influx
in voluntary recruits.
Specifically, the PKK’s ethno-nationalist foundations which encouraged violence as a
means to achieve liberation, first against rival Kurdish organizations and then later against the
Turkish state (Tezcür 2010; 2015) was an attractive message for young persons and highlights
how rivalry can encourage rebel child soldiering. By the time the organization officially formed
in 1978, there were already a number of individuals below the age of 18. As seen in Figure 4, of
the 117 deceased fighters recruited between 1975 and the year of the PKK’s official founding
(1978), 32 were recruited under the age of 18 and 16 of these recruits were age 15 and below.

Figure 4. PKK Recruits by Age 1975-1978
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As Figure 4 illustrates, the PKK enlisted children, recruiting at least two 13 year old boys
during this time period.42 Though all Kurdish groups espoused nationalist ideologies which
criticized colonizing states for their historical ill-treatment of the Kurds, Öcalan and the PKK
were arguably the most adamant about the importance of armed struggle for liberation and
argued that violence was critical for the emancipation of the Kurds (Tezcür 2015). Further, as
Tezcür (2015, 253) claims, none of the PKK’s competitors made sufficient attempts to appeal to
the peasant class and this was problematic as they were “the overwhelming majority of Kurdish
society.” This call to action, particularly amongst students and peasants was an intentional
calculation by Öcalan to mobilize marginalized sects of Kurdish society in an effort to compete
against opposition Kurdish groups. The strategy not only paid off, but increased the likelihood of
young individuals in the organization. In particular, many of the early members came from
relatively poor backgrounds and were young students, peasants, or laborers (Tezcür 2015, 256257).
Though a key limitation in this study is the inability to compare the exact ages of
individuals across a large sample of rival Kurdish groups operating in Turkey before 1980, a
limited sample of individual level demographic information is available for one such rival—the
Kurdistan National Liberators (KUK).43 The KUK was the Kurdish nationalist group that most
paralleled the PKK. The organization drew support from Kurds in the border regions between
Iraq and Syria and had close ties to the Bazani movement, an Kurdish insurrection in Iraq
(Tezcür 2015). Originating in 1978, the KUK, in spite of its similarities, violently clashed with
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Interestingly, both would achieve commander status in the PKK prior to being killed in the 1990s.
Demographic data on militants in the KUK was made available through personal communication with Güneş
Murat Tezcür.
43
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the PKK and would ultimately succumb to this violent competition following the 1980 Turkish
coup (Gunes 2013, 252).
Demographic information of over 60 deceased KUK militants reveals that this group also
recruited child soldiers. Of the 49 deceased militants for which some age information exist (birth
or death age), there are seven instances where an individual under the age of 18 participated in
the KUK (~ 14 percent of cases).44 The PKK and KUK cases highlight both how interorganizational competition amongst ethno-nationalist organizations can increase the likelihood
of child soldier recruitment especially for those organizations that emerge late in the rebel
marketplace. For these groups specifically, child recruitment can offer access to a broader and
more diverse collection of the general population while also possibly contributing to
organizational longevity.
The timing of the organization’s founding in relation to international norms against child
soldiering can also help account for its recruitment of children as it prepared for insurgency. In
particular, the inclusion of children at the early stages in the group’s existence was unsurprising
given the lack of international and domestic safeguards against the practice. For instance,
although the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 established that no
one under the age of 15 should be conscripted into the armed forces, those over the age of 15
could sign on voluntarily (ICRC 2019). For a new organization looking to establish its
membership base, this international treaty held little influence over its recruitment behavior.
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In only one case did an individual die while under the age of 18 suggesting that the way the KUK employed
children differed from the PKK.
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Moreover, the Turkish state refrained from signing the optional protocol, suggesting that an age
delineation for military service, even at the state level, was undesirable.
Although this explanation seems apparent, scholarly investigations on rebel child
soldiering often fail to consider the lack of and/or evolution of norms in explaining group
behavior. For the PKK, an organization that formed during the first genuine international attempt
to establish a norm against child soldiering, it is unsurprising that the group would end up using
children in their insurgency. Moreover, rebel compliance with international human rights norms
is more the exception than the rule (Jo 2015; 2018). Overall, rebel groups do not operate in static
environments and for the PKK, the establishment and viability of the organization were central
to goal attainment. Compliance with an evolving human rights norm would be, at best, a second
order concern for the PKK, challenging the argument that secessionist movements by their very
nature are more likely to comply with the norm against child soldiering especially early in their
struggle (Lasley and Then 2015)..
The remainder of the 1970s until the year prior to onset of its insurgency in 1984 saw the
PKK actively continue its recruitment of child soldiers. Of the 112 members recruited from
1978-1983, at least 27 were under the age of 18.45 The youngest recruit reported during this
phase was a 10-year-old girl who would serve in the insurgency for 15 years before being killed
at the age of 25. As these patterns suggest, child recruitment was a regular occurrence in the
PKK even before it initiated guerilla warfare and the group even included young girls into the
movement.

45

Age information is only available for 83 of these 112 individuals. Of the 27 recruits under the age of 18 during
this period, at least 11 were under the age of 15.
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The Onset of Insurgency (1984-1989)
The regularity with which the PKK recruited those under 18 as it prepared for insurgency
suggests that the group saw no issue with child soldiering and arguably saw their inclusion as
potentially useful for organizational longevity. Other competitive leftist and Kurdish movements,
like the KUK, had crumbled in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention. Meanwhile, the
success of the PKK in becoming the hegemonic Kurdish nationalist movement demonstrated that
the pursuit of violence and the strategic decision to adopt more inclusive recruitment practices
were pivotal in mobilizing marginalized portions of the Kurdish population which helped ensure
its durability. The growing popularity of the group also meant it was primed for Öcalan’s
ultimate plan of launching a violent insurgency that would lead to a “long-term people’s war”
(Tezcür, 2015).
Owing to the promise of revolution, the PKK launched its first attacks roughly six years
from its inception. In response to these attacks, 1985 saw the Turkish government reconstitute an
offensive counterinsurgency tactic known as the village guard system (Belge, 2011). The village
guard system was an attempt by the Turkish government at community policing to counter the
PKK’s growing influence in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. The system was relatively
straightforward. Kurdish individuals were recruited by Turkish authorities within various rural
villages and those appointed were charged with defending their communities from the PKK. In
addition, villagers were typically required to fulfill certain ultimatums in assisting Turkish forces
in eliminating PKK members, supporters, and sympathizers (Belge 2011, 106; Abbas and Yigit
2016). Many of the village guard were paid salaries to meet the demands set forth by the Turkish
authorities and this increased tension across Kurdish communities (Criss 1995). The
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implementation of this system demonstrated a clear attempt by the Turkish government to
overcome the information problem in detecting the PKK threat in the southeast.
The village guard system draws parallels to Kalyvas’ (2006) argument that the logic of
violence, whether selective or indiscriminate, is conditional upon the control exerted over
territory. The system signaled an attempt by the Turkish regime to extend its control over
Kurdish villages by enabling the Turkish army to gain more accurate intelligence and
information about those specific individuals who were against the regime and sympathetic to the
PKK’s plight. This would, in theory, improve the government’s deployment of violence,
allowing them to selectively target PKK members and sympathizers to eradicate the PKK’s
influence village by village. When villages refused to partake in the village guard system, the
government interpreted these villages as pro-PKK and, in turn, engaged in higher degrees of
group-selective violence. As Belge (2016) argues, this informant strategy was deficient and
problematic from its onset as the Turkish government did not have an accurate sense of which
villages/provinces were majority Kurdish. Instead, the supposed attempt to develop a selective
violence strategy was ineffective and actually arbitrary, leading to increasing levels of groupselective violence by the government and questionable loyalty amongst the village guard.
The consequences of such policies undoubtedly increased tension within the region as
civilians were caught in the middle of brutal policies by both sides. The PKK’s response to the
implementation of the village guard system was the establishment of its own policy of civilian
targeting, and specifically members of the village guard and their families. As village guard
members were identified, the PKK would selectively target these individuals, murdering them
and their families in an effort at deterring cooperation with the Turkish government (Romano
2006, 86-87). From 1987-1989, the PKK was especially violent against village guard members,

130

deliberately wiping out “village guard and agha families, men, women, and children, without
compunction, in Mardin, Siirt, and Hakkari provinces” (McDowall 2004, 425). This precarious
situation undermined the sustainability of the village guard system for the government. In short,
those individuals that did sign on to help the Turkish government became prime targets of the
PKK and those not joining the system became targets of the Turkish army. Civilians were left
with limited options in terms of security. Given the government’s policy of violence when
villagers refused to cooperate, the deficiencies in the design of the system which largely relied on
arbitrary classification of Kurdish provinces, and the PKK’s selective targeting of government
collaborators, the choice to flee or seek shelter with the PKK increased the opportunity for child
recruitment.
As a result, the period between 1984 and 1989 saw increased rates of child recruitment.
Figure 5 clearly illustrates that this period had the highest ratio of child recruits to adults.
Following the initial attacks in 1984, the PKK benefited from a marginal increase in the degree
of popular mobilization which likely contributed to the spike in recruits. However, evidence
suggests that the rate of recruitment necessary to seriously challenge the regime was not
sufficient for the group’s ambitious goals (Gunes 2013). As a result, by October 1986 at its Third
Congress, the PKK discussed and implemented a conscription system which was viewed as a
means to augment military capabilities (Gunes 2013; Schoon 2017). Though the specifics of the
conscription policy are ambiguous, in particular if there was an age requirement, the coercive
nature of such a strategy was a likely contributor to the increase in the ratio of child soldiers.
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Figure 5. Ratio of Child Soldiers Across Recruitment Periods

Although individual level data identifying whether a recruit was conscripted is elusive,
the available data suggests that the conscription of children was highest during the late 1980s
(Table 8).46 Though the conscription policy was successful at increasing membership numbers,
the consequences of such a policy also threatened the PKK’s reputation amongst the Kurdish
population, even jeopardizing their ability to mobilize popular support in the face of violent
government repression. Fear over a declining support base, coupled with the aggressive nature of
the government’s village-guard system led the group to formally abandon the policy of
conscription in 1990 although available evidence suggests the practice continued into later time
periods.

46

Information on whether an individual was conscripted is only available for 78 individuals, but anecdotal evidence
points to the prevalence of forced recruitment. Thus, caution should be taken in considering how generalizable these
patterns were across recruitment periods.
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Table 8. Conscription by the PKK
Recruitment period

Frequency

Pre-1984

1

1984-1989

67 (31 child soldiers)

1990-1994

9 (5 child soldiers)

1995-1999

1

Post-2000

No data/missing

Total

78

The Height of Conflict (1990-1999)
Militarily, the PKK had some success prior to 1990. However, Turkish policy shifted
dramatically in the 1990s (Bacik and Coskun 2011). Compared to the previous decade, the PKK
incurred significant losses at the hands of the Turkish government and its crippling
counterinsurgency campaign especially after 1993. During this time, the organization was
flooded with recruits from the southeastern portions of Turkey gaining a number of new recruits
from urban centers. This increase in recruits demonstrated the PKK’s willingness to remove
many barriers to entry and unsurprisingly saw an influx in the number of recruits under the age
of 18 (Marcus 2009, 170). While the organization had traditionally been skeptical of allowing
members into the group out of fear that they were government agents sent to infiltrate the group
and/or that they would be uncommitted during harsh times (Romano 2006; Marcus 2009), the
brutal policies enacted by Turkish forces resulted in the erosion of strict selective criteria for
membership. For instance, as Figure 6 shows, the PKK saw a significant increase in the rate of
girl soldiers from 1990-1999. Between 1984 and 1989, of the 232 child recruits only 19 were
girls (roughly 8 percent of child recruits). However, of the over 1,600 child soldiers recruited
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between 1990-1999, over 25 percent were girls. This demonstrates the shifting nature of
inclusive recruitment that occurred during the height of violence. At the same time, the high
levels of casualties also suggests that, in order to maintain fighters, the PKK needed to allow
many Kurds (i.e. children and women) to join (Marcus 2009, 170). However, many youth were
inexperienced on the battlefield and were either more likely to die in battle or more likely to run
off than their adult counterparts (Marcus 2009).

Figure 6. Boy and Girl Recruits in the PKK

Despite this swell in recruitment, the PKK was unable to translate increased manpower
into sustained military success. The brutality of the PKK’s fight against Turkey was highlighted
by the struggle the organization faced in not only getting and retaining recruits, but in keeping
them alive. Huseyin Topgider, a prominent PKK commander, alleged that getting recruits back
to PKK strongholds was challenging, “as you are returning to a village with a new member, there

134

would be an attack and they would die even before getting a chance to change their clothes”
(Marcus 2009, 290). In mid-1993, government dialogue with the PKK led to a brief cessation of
hostilities. At the time, Turkish president Özal had encouraged Öcallan to pursue a ceasefire
agreement as the chronic Kurdish issue remained a significant obstacle for Turkey’s EU
aspirations (Ozkahraman 2017). Although the ceasefire had initially been brokered by the PKK,
the group violated the ceasefire by launching an ambush against the Turkish military, killing 33
unarmed soldiers (Marcus 2009, 221). Numerous questions surrounded the attack which was
largely seen as the PKK’s response to uncertainty of the Turkish government’s commitment to
peace following the untimely death of President Özal. Regardless, the attack signaled the start of
an even more brutal government campaign to defeat the PKK. The government’s policy became
more direct, Turkish forces would infiltrate Kurdish villages, force everyone to the center of the
village and then burn houses, business, etc. Villagers were forced to flee and with the looming
threat of this policy, and entire villages evacuated to avoid facing a similar fate (Marcus 2009,
222). One survivor recalled the Turkish military accusing his village of supporting the PKK,
claiming that “you are giving bread to the PKK…either evacuate your village or we will burn
down your houses with you inside of them” (Abbas and Yigit 2016, 303). Estimates suggest that
upwards of 3,000 villages were evacuated during the 1990s (Yegen 2009).
The intensity of the conflict and degree of civilian violence also ballooned. To put in
context, between 1984 and 1994 roughly 13,000 civilians and soldiers had been killed, but
approximately half of these fatalities occurred between the years 1992 and 1994 (HRW, 1995).
Such levels of coercive group-selective violence became counterproductive for the government
as it encouraged Kurdish individuals to seek refuge and security with the opposition (i.e. Kalyvas
and Kocher 2007). While Zhukov (2014) argued that indiscriminate counterinsurgency policies
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at the extreme end can coerce civilians to side with the government, it is clear that such a policy
was ineffective. It is clear that the Turkish government’s policy, reflective of a group-selective
violence strategy, was designed to coerce the Kurdish population to refrain from support of the
PKK. Yet, the nature of such violence was self-defeating. The PKK, who had been more
selective in their use of violence (targeting village guard members and other Kurdish
collaborators), were able to augment their base of support.
The period between 1990-1994 saw a significantly higher number of child soldiers
recruited into the ranks of the PKK (See Figure 5). However, as a ratio of the group’s total
recruits during this time, there was a slight decrease from the earlier time period. This does not
necessarily suggest that the PKK decreased their rate of child recruitment, but more likely points
to an increase in the number of adults willing to join the organization in the face of severe levels
of group-selective violence targeting large sects of the Kurdish population. This is an interesting
point as it speaks to literature which argues child soldiers will be more likely to be used when
conflicts are more violent. Undoubtedly, more children were used to help fill the rank and file,
but the patterns of their use were not markedly different from general recruitment patterns during
early times in the insurgency.
The Turkish government’s aggressive counterinsurgency policies severely crippled the
PKK by the late 1990s. Interviews with a female PKK commander illustrated the struggles in
adapting to Turkish force’s tactics. “You would attack a military outpost and another one was
built in its place…in 1993 we had been very successful, but in 1994, we lost a lot” (Marcus,
2009, p. 223). Figure 7 demonstrates the PKK’s struggles throughout the early and mid 1990s,
reporting the death rates of recruits since 1984. As shown, the number of PKK fighters killed
throughout the 1990s spiked in 1992 and again in 1997 with general period between 1990-1999
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accounting for well over 50 percent of all fatalities identified in the KIM dataset. It also shows
how children were regular participants in combat with at least 505 children (<=17) killed
between 1990 and 1999. This lends some degree of support to H2, suggesting that child
recruitment can increase in periods of increasing violence and hostility. At the same time, this
finding clarifies work in previous studies that contends increased child recruitment is most likely
when conflict intensity is at its peak (e.g. Tynes and Early 2015). Still, though the ratio of child
to adults declined from 1984 to 1989, the numbers of children recruited spiked when conflict was
most explosive.

Figure 7. Comparing Child and Adult PKK Militants 1984-2016

By 1995, the Turkish government was investing heavily in its war against the PKK,
spending upwards of $11 billion a year and employing some 220,000 troops (Marcus, 2009, pp.
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248-249). With roughly 6,000 members, the PKK struggled in its campaign against the
government. The drastic losses the organization faced not only in terms of membership numbers,
but also as a result of Turkish policies aimed to drive potential supporters and sympathizer out of
the region, crippled the PKK’s chances at even achieving Kurdish autonomy (let alone
statehood) and jeopardized the group’s very survival.
By 1999 the PKK appeared to be militarily defeated and the organization was on the
verge of experiencing a significant change to its leadership. At the end of a brutal decade,
Turkish officials captured Abdullah Öcalan while he was in Kenya, with the help of the U.S.
who provided intelligence on Öcalan’s whereabouts in addition to diplomatic pressure on Kenya
to help turn him over to Turkish authorities (Weiner 1999). With his capture, the PKK agreed to
withdraw from Turkey and to a permanent ceasefire (Bacik and Coskun 2011). However, the
organization continued to maintain a healthy presence in Turkey and northern Iraq where it
would continue to recruit new members, including children.

After Öcalan (2000-2016)
The intensity of the PKK/Turkish conflict waned in the midst of Öcalan’s capture and a ceasefire
would hold from 2000-2004. During this time of relative peace the PKK continued to recruit new
members including child soldiers, never truly conceding. The conflict would resume in 2005.
Tezcür (2010) in particular argued that the reconstitution of conflict was a largely a consequence
of the PKK rejecting changes to the political environment that directly challenged its hegemonic
status as the principal Kurdish organization in the region. The threat to their very existence by a
rival political organization would thus incentivize the PKK to “derail” its competitors, and the de
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facto Kurdish state that would form following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 would embolden
the group, leading to the return of violent conflict (Tezcür 2010).
However, the number of child recruits since 2000 declined from previous time periods,
dropping from well over 30 percent of recruits from 1995-1999 to slightly over 20 percent from
2000-2004 (Figure 5). Although this ratio appears to have gradually risen since 2005, the
reported number of child soldiers that have been killed since 2000, particularly in comparison to
the period from 1990-1999 has dramatically declined (Figure 5).47 This is an interesting point as
it suggests that children, used more regularly as fighters during the height of the PKK’s
insurgency throughout the 1990s, have been less visible on the ‘battlefield’ since 2000. For
instance, between 2005-2012, over 1600 PKK members were killed in conflict. Of these, a
minimum of 15 were below the age of 17 at the time they were killed. This represents less than 1
percent of the PKK militants from 2005-2012. In context, of the over 5,000 PKK members killed
from 1990-1999, at least 9.2 percent were under the age of 18 when they were killed.

47

The rise in ratio of child soldiers should be interpreted with caution for at least two reasons. First, the number of
recruits in the post-2000 appears to have declined as a general trend. Secondly, this ‘observable’ decline may be the
result of a decrease in the intensity of conflict between 2000 and 2011 which was substantially lower than previous
time periods.
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Figure 8. PKK Militants and Child Soldiers 2000-2016

Related to the evolution of norms, 2002 saw a number of states in the international
community sign on to the optional protocol to the CRC with respect to children in armed
conflict, raising the age of a child to anyone below the age of 18 (UN 2000). Though the PKK
was obviously not party to such a treaty, Turkey signed (2000) and ratified (2004) the treaty. At
the same time, the PKK began to alter its reporting practices on the age of recruits (Table 9). For
instance, between 2000 and 2004, of the 509 militants recruited during this time period, only 4.5
percent lacked information on their age at recruitment. However, between 2005 and 2012, this
number nearly quintupled (19.8 percent) alluding to some potential change in organizational
behavior related to their willingness to actively report the recruitment of children.
This argument is even more probable when one considers the change in reporting in the
2013-2016 period. In early 2013, the Turkish government and PKK agreed to a ceasefire
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following what was the deadliest year in the conflict since 1999 (Tezcür 2013). Though the
increase in intensity was not the sole reason for the shift towards negotiated agreement, it was
almost certainly a contributing factor. Erdogan’s attempt to consolidate and enhance his own
power opened opportunities for a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question and although the
PKK’s opportunity for an independent Kurdish state was an unlikely prospect at this time, there
was a growing sense of opportunities for Kurdish autonomy both within and outside of Turkey.
This was underscored by the general developments across the Middle East including the Arab
Spring uprisings which generated conditions of instability and uncertainty. In Syria for instance,
the onset of civil war led to an alliance between the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD)
and PKK that greatly concerned Turkey. At the same time, such an alliance, given the PYDs
autonomy and territorial control in Northern Syria, along with Erdogan’s softening of relations
with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq were encouraging prospects for the
PKK and the broader Kurdish population (Larrabee 2016; Ünal 2016). By early 2013, an
incarcerated Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down their arms and withdraw from Turkey,
claiming that the time was “ripe for resolution” (Ünal 2016, 107).
Following the ceasefire, with growing prospects for peace and the perception that the
PKK’s goals were closer to attainable than they had been in recent years, the PKK took what
appeared to be a progressive step in signing onto the Geneva Call’s “Deed of Commitment” to
cease its recruitment and use of child soldiers. This offers supporting evidence for H3. On its
surface, the commitment may have appeared genuine as Figure 5 illustrates that the number of
child soldiers actually recruited (a minimum of 20 out of 193) was significantly less than in
earlier time periods. However, as Table 9 shows, of these 193 recruits, age information for over
60 percent of them is unknown. Put differently, of the 70 PKK recruits for which recruitment age
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information exists, 20 were below 18 during this time period. Irrespective of the group’s
authentic commitment, what remains is an apparent strategic decision to omit recruit information
in more than half of the cases. Retrospectively, though the organization’s commitment to refrain
from recruiting children appears more rhetorical than substantive given that children were still
recruited and died in conflict between 2013 and 2016, the omission of age information suggests
that the group was cognizant of the international perception surrounding their child recruitment
practices. This may very well coincide with increased international support of the Kurds that was
seen during this time period given their relative success in battling the Islamic State.
Consequently, the PKK’s commitment to end child soldering illustrates the group’s
acknowledgement of an international norm against the practice and possibly demonstrates its
attempt of legitimacy seeking at best, and at worst, a way to mitigate negative press related to its
behavior.

Table 9. Percentage of PKK Recruits with Unknown Age by Recruitment Period
Recruitment period

Total PKK Recruits

Recruitment Age Unknown

Pre-1984

256

85 (33.2 percent)

1984-1989

781

221 (28.3 percent)

1990-1994

3,654

600 (16.4 percent)

1995-1999

1,568

169 (10.8 percent)

2000-2004

509

23 (4.5 percent)

2005-2012

519

103 (19.8 percent)

2013-2016

193

123 (63.7 percent)

Unknown

1,716

1,715 (99.9 percent)

Total

9,196

3,039 (33.04 percent)
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Regardless, the PKK’s willingness to sign the Geneva Call’s deed of commitment and the
organization’s apparent change in record keeping illustrate some support for H3. The
authenticity of their commitment notwithstanding, the PKK has clearly responded to the
evolving international norm against child recruitment and use in combat, particularly in
comparison to early time periods. Though still including child soldiers, their roles appear to have
changed with less children killed in action as a ratio to all deceased fighters.
Recent events further highlight how the PKK has evolved in its recruitment of child
soldiers and response to international condemnation. In January 2019, Turkish President Tayyip
Erdogan vocally condemned the PYD for its recruitment of children in New York Times op-ed
(Erdogan 2019). Referencing an August 2018 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, Erdogan
suggested the PYD’s armed wing, the YPG, has violated international law by recruiting children
while emphasizing the group’s connection to the PKK. Responding to the 2018 HRW report, the
Syrian Defense Forces, and the YPG explicitly, issued a statement emphasizing the group’s
commitment to international protocols against child recruitment and willingness to hold violators
within their organization accountable (HRW 2018b). This response signaled the group’s
recognition of and commitment to international laws illustrating how rebel organizations,
especially those with ambitions of autonomy, may shift towards compliance with international
norms.

Conclusion
Existing studies on insurgents’ recruitment of child soldiers in armed conflict have primarily
been concerned with the determinants of the practice. Yet, while contributing meaningful
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insights on the conditions that push rebels to recruit children, little has been done to explore
when the practice first begins and how child recruitment varies within a group over the course of
a conflict. This paper illustrates the importance of such an investigation, offering an in-depth
exploration of the PKK’s child recruitment practices and overcoming limitations in extant studies
that fail to consider temporal variation. Though conflict dynamics can often push rebels to
engage in practices that might otherwise be off-limits (Tynes 2018), for some groups, the
recruitment and use of children occurs far before conflict conditions may necessitate their
demand. For the PKK, competition amongst rival organizations and the lack of international
norms at its onset, coupled with its ideological roots, contributed to its initial decision to include
children. Additionally, once the group incorporated child soldiers it was unlikely that they would
abandon the practice, especially given its trajectory to engage in violent armed conflict.
This paper also illustrates how rebel child recruitment patterns might vary over the course
of insurgency. For the PKK, though their initial inclusion of children might better be explained
by the aforementioned factors, both conflict intensity and duration likely contributed to the
continuation of the organization’s recruitment of children at high levels. More specifically, the
Turkish government’s deployment of increasing levels of group-selective violence which aimed
to eradicate the PKK and its sympathizers was counterproductive and led to increases, first in the
ratio of child soldiers in the organization (1984-1989) and then in the overall numbers of active
child soldiers (1990s). The logic of group-selective violence to coerce civilian cooperation and
suppress dissent (Schwartz and Straus 2018) and rebels’ rationality in responding to changing
conflict conditions (Wood 2014) assist in explaining how the PKK became an outlet for
numerous Kurds while decreasing their barriers to entry in order to meet short term
organizational goals (i.e. survival). The findings are echoed by Tezcür (2010, 785) who
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concluded that insurgent groups “are primarily concerned with their survival, even if this
contradicts their declared political goals and the interests of the ethnic constituency.”
Lastly, the paper underscores the effect of the establishment and evolution of
international norms against child soldiering and how the entrenchment of such norms in the
fabric of the international system might make rebels more responsive to changing their behavior,
especially for those groups that desire and/or require international legitimacy for goal attainment.
For the PKK, an organization seeking to first achieve statehood and later regressing to demands
for increased autonomy, continued negative press related to their inclusion of child soldiers only
hampered the organization’s prospects for success. Coupled with the peace process in 2013, the
group formally committed to refrain from using child soldiers. However, as this paper highlights,
the authenticity of commitment was dubious as the PKK appeared to simply change their
recording habits related to the demographic information of new recruits. This suggests that rebel
organizations might pay attention to the international community’s perception of their behavior
and may attempt to signal their legitimacy through their commitment to abide by international
norms.
Taken together, this paper emphasizes the importance of considering when rebel groups
first begin to recruit child soldiers and in doing so, clarifies a number of theoretical arguments
advanced in previous work. Importantly, the project illustrates that the competitiveness of the
rebel marketplace (i.e. how many competing organizations are operating) might help explain
why groups are more likely to include child soldiers. For the PKK, arriving to the ‘game’ late
meant that it would need to actively compete with and recruit from rival Kurdish organizations.
This contributed to the organization’s willingness to accept those under 18 early in its existence
and also ensured the group’s durability. While this project highlights the complexities

145

surrounding rebel child soldiering, future research should work to expand efforts aimed at
identifying when rebels first start recruiting children across a larger sample of non-state actors.
Doing so can offer a more accurate assessment of the conditions that lead to the practice. Further,
understanding when the practice first begins can also help clarify the mechanisms of recruitment
and how conflict dynamics might influence rebel recruitment over time.
There are also a number of practical implications that arise from this study. First is the
importance of paying attention to the environment in which rebel organizations form. Nascent
groups that enter a competitive environment can become more likely to recruit non-traditional
combatants in order to compete against rivals and to increase their chances at survival. The
ideological foundations of such rebel organizations are also an important consideration. For the
PKK and other non-state groups that mobilize along ethnic lines with aspirational nationalist
goals, the inclusion of non-traditional recruits may be more likely (Jo 2015). As this study
suggests, these groups may see benefit in the inclusion of children not only for the short-term
goal of augmenting membership numbers, but also for the long-term viability of an organization.
This speaks to those who argue that child soldiering is a logical/strategical decision because of
their ease of indoctrination (i.e. Beber and Blattman 2013), adding that the inclusion of children
can assist in long-term survival of the group as it embeds revolution into the social fabric of a
young population. This can even lead to an increased length of a conflict (Haer and Böhmelt
2017). Second, governments facing violent insurgencies should carefully consider their tactics in
combating rebels. In Turkey, oppressive policies against the Kurds, increasingly brutal
counterinsurgency campaigns beginning in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, and an
unwillingness to negotiate with the group, each contributed the PKK’s continued recruitment and
use of child soldiers. While decisions on how to combat rebels are undoubtedly complex,
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governments must weigh the human rights costs of their policies and the consequences for
vulnerable populations. Put differently, repressive tactics can actually increase rebel child
soldiering and with it, the sustainability of an insurgency and possibly even the likelihood of
conflict recurrence (Haer and Böhmelt 2016b). Lastly, efforts at monitoring once non-state actors
commit to refrain from child recruitment are in need of improvement. Though monitoring is
inherently challenging, governments and NGOs alike should work to develop guidelines and
mechanisms for monitoring when non-state actors sign on to commitments to cease child
recruitment.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CHILD SOLDIERS AND US SECURITY ASSISTANCE:
EXPLORING THE CONDITIONALITY OF THE CHILD SOLDIER
PREVENTION ACT

Abstract
Does the United States punish states found in violation of the Child Soldier Prevention Act
(CSPA)? This paper investigates the conditions that lead to restrictions in US security assistance
to states that use child soldiers. Employing a qualitative strategy using case studies of bilateral
security assistance between the United States and four African countries, along with semistructured interviews, this paper shows that although the US frequently claims human rights
records impact the ability to provide certain forms of security assistance, full restrictions are
inherently rare. However, the findings show that lethal forms of US security assistance are more
likely to be restricted under three specific conditions: when states receive low levels of security
assistance in the previous year(s); when child soldiering is a systemic problem within a state’s
national army; and when states are supporting non-state actors who employ child soldiers. The
implications speak to the tension between US interests and norms promotion in foreign policy
decision making.
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Introduction
In 2013, the United States announced it would cut military aid to Rwanda due to is violation of
the Child Soldier Prevention Act (CSPA), a law which restricts the distribution of certain forms
of security assistance to governments that use child soldiers or support non-state actors who
employ children. Specifically, the Rwandan government was cited for its military support of the
M23 rebels, a non-state armed group engaged in the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). That same year, the US provided the government of
South Sudan with over $26 million in security assistance and the government of Chad nearly $8
million despite each government’s direct use of child soldiers.48 On its surface, the answer to
why states like South Sudan and Chad continue to receive military assistance appears simple: the
US provides these states with specific forms of security assistance because it is in the national
interest of the United States to do so. This underscores an inherent clash between foreign policy
imperatives and attempts to advance human rights norms, with geopolitical concerns over
security and investment often prevailing. Still, the variance in implementation49 of the CSPA
suggests that the US is willing, under certain conditions, to sanction recipient governments.
While the international community has made progressive steps in an effort to eliminate
child soldiering as evidenced by the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and 2002
Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the issue continues to persist
across states. The 2016 UN Secretary General’s (UNSG) report on children and armed conflict,

48

These totals are aggregate figures of the seven forms of security assistance/aid falling under the purview of the
CSPA guidelines.
49
Implementation is used throughout to refer to status of the CSPA. Implementation suggests a state saw security
assistance restrictions due to their violations.
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for example, implicated 59 parties (8 states and 51 non-state actors) active in conflict during
2015 as using child soldiers (UNSG 2016a). Although the UN list of state violators appears
small, human rights advocacy groups such as Child Soldiers International point to at least 46
states who still recruit children into their armed forces (Child Soldiers International 2018).50
Whether directly incorporating children or supporting non-state groups who conscript
children, few states have appeared to suffer tangible consequences for these actions. Most remain
unaffected in terms of security assistance from foreign donors, challenging arguments that
foreign aid can be a tool for policy advancement (Sullivan, Tessman, Li 2011; Boutton 2014;
Swedlund 2016). While empirical assessments have shown that democracies are less likely to
provide aid to human rights abusing non-state actors (Salehyan et al. 2014), strategic interests,
national security, and historical ties have each influenced US security aid allocations. More
recently, the global war on terror (GWOT) ushered in the premise that human rights abuses were
often inconsequential if states offered their assistance in combating terrorist threats (Mertus
2008; Sandholtz 2016). This is increasingly evident when examining US security aid
disbursements to states such as Egypt and Bahrain despite their poor human rights records. As
Neumayer (2003) notes, while states often make verbal commitments to punish human rights
abusers, rhetoric rarely corresponds with action.
This paper aims to specify the conditions under which the United States may sanction
governments for their human rights practices, but does so by looking specifically at recipient
states’ child soldiering practices after the adoption of the CSPA.51 In doing so, the paper adopts a

50

A number of these discrepancies can be attributed to those states which allow individuals between the ages of 16
and 17 to join voluntarily, often with parental consent.
51
Although passed in 2008, the CSPA did not enter into force until 2010. The period under investigation in this
study covers 2010-2017.
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qualitative approach, using case studies, process-tracing, and semi-structured interviews to
explore the dynamics of US security assistance disbursements. This approach offers a unique
advantage over quantitative investigations on child soldiering as case studies assist in identifying
temporal shifts in states’ child soldiering practices between 2010 and 2017.
From here the paper proceeds in several parts. First, I discuss the CSPA and review past
literature on the intersection between human rights and US security aid. I then advance a
theoretical argument contending that states’ strategic importance and the character of child
soldiering each contribute to the implementation of the CSPA or lack thereof. Extending
previous arguments that suggest military aid can be an indicator of strategic importance, I
suggest that states that receive higher levels of military support in previous years are less likely
to have security aid restricted if in violation of the CSPA. However, although strategic
importance is a robust explanation for the continuation of security assistance, I contend that the
character of child soldiering can also be an influential factor for decisions to implement the
CSPA. This is an important distinction as much of the literature on child soldiers only considers
their presence or absence within groups, but fails to consider whether the practice is systemic or
unintentional. In the research design section, I introduce the qualitative strategy involving indepth interviews with policy and human rights experts along with government officials and
discuss case selection and the interview procedures. In the analysis section evidence is generally
supportive of the central arguments. Strategic importance and the character of child soldiering
both impact decisions to implement the conditions of the CSPA. However, I also discover that
the location of child soldiers—whether in a state’s national military or within non-state armed
groups that receive support from a state—contributes to variation in implementation of the
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CSPA. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between states’ human rights violations
and security assistance, policy implications, and directions for continued research.

Background on the Child Soldier Prevention Act
The December 2008 signing of the CSPA aimed to “condemn the conscription, forced
recruitment, or use of children by governments, paramilitaries, or other organizations” (Public
law 110-457). The CSPA can largely be thought of as an attempt to expand the provisions of the
Leahy amendment/law—legislation passed in 1997 prohibiting security assistance from both the
Departments of State and Defense to foreign governments responsible for “Gross Violations of
Human Rights” (GVHR). The Leahy law covered four specific human rights violations: torture,
extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and rape. However, the law, while an attempt to
increase accountability of recipient states, excluded certain human rights violations including
child soldiering (US Department of State 2018a). The CSPA accounted for this omission,
formally criminalizing the recruitment or use of child soldiers with section 404 of the CSPA
stating the US would not provide certain categories of foreign military assistance to any group in
violation of its guidelines. The passing (2008) and full adoption (2010) of the CSPA was a
formal signal of acknowledgement that state child soldiering remains an issue and one which the
US would no longer tolerate.
States are considered to be in violation of the CSPA under one of four conditions: 1) A
state uses anyone under 18 in direct hostilities; 2) A state engages in the compulsory recruitment
of anyone under 18 into governmental armed forces; 3) Any instance where of a person under the
age of 15 has voluntarily joined the governmental armed forces; 4) Any instance where a person
under the age of 18 has been recruited (voluntarily or involuntarily) or used in hostilities by

159

armed forces distinct from the armed forces of a state. The listing process is often portrayed as
both a legal and political exercise. “When decisions are made about the listing of violators, legal
counsel is always present” to assist in the process and ensure accuracy/legality of determinations
(Interview VII). Others, contend the list is a political exercise, questioning the consistency as
governments such as Myanmar have been removed while and states like Afghanistan were never
listed. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) official indicated, “While there are certainly legal
considerations, the removal of Myanmar from the list in 2017 by the Trump administration and
the persistent absence of Afghanistan signal that political considerations are part of the
discussion [for listing]” (Interview XI).52
Given the CSPA’s goal to disincentivize ‘bad behavior’ by recipient governments,
several forms of security assistance are eligible for restriction. The original list included:
International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) also known as the Train and
Equip Authority.53 In 2013, amidst concerns that certain violators were still benefiting from

52

The composition of the CSPA list and the timing of its formation is also important. The CSPA list is published
each June/July in the trafficking in persons (TIP) report. The reporting period covers April 1st through March 31st of
the previous year. For example, a government violating the terms of the CSPA in December of 2010 would be listed
on the 2011 CSPA list of violators with any aid restrictions applying to the following fiscal year (2012). The list
draws heavily form the information in the TIP report which covers the same time period for each respective year.
However, other sources are used as are external annual reports. Most notably, the UN Secretary General’s (UNSG)
annual report on children in armed conflict is consulted. The major limitation here is that this document covers the
calendar year (January 1st – December 31st). Thus, while overlap certainly exists, the variation in time periods
covered can invariably lead to discrepancies in the CSPA’s list of violators when compared to the UNSG’s list of
states employing child soldiers. Still, there have been cases where the US has designated a state to be in violation of
using child soldiers where the UN has left the country off (e.g. 2011 Yemen).
53
Train and Equip Authority gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to train and arm foreign military and
security forces for two specified purposes: “1) to enable foreign military/security forces to perform counterterrorism
(CT) operations and 2) to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military/stability operations in
which US armed forces are participating” (Serafino 2014, 4).
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security assistance, the CSPA was amended under section 1208 of the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act to include the prohibition of peacekeeping support (Public Law 113-4).
Consequently, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) (military aid to fund multilateral
peacekeeping/support efforts) and the Peacekeeping Operations-Overseas Contingency
Operations (PKO-OCO) (aimed to support US counterterrorism efforts) were added to the list of
sanctionable security assistance (Stohl and Dick 2015).
While the CSPA illustrated a positive shift in efforts to combat government child
soldiering, it has faced heavy criticism for a series of loopholes which undermine its’ intent
(Becker 2017; Stohl and Dick 2016). The most important and widely cited, the national interest
waiver, enables the President of the US to waive the prohibition of military aid to states/groups
who use child soldiers if a government is “taking measures to comply” and it is in the best
interest of the US (Public Law 110-457). The President signs off on any/all waivers, although
official decision-making power has been often been devolved to the Secretary of State (most
recently in 2015 and 2016 pertaining to Yemen) (Rosen 2017, 20). The national interest waiver
has been used in partial form, although this language is not directly written into the CSPA.
Partial waivers were heavily employed under the Obama administration and were designed to
give exemptions to states for peacekeeping missions or to states attempting to professionalize
their military. In particular, partial waivers enabled specific forms of military aid (i.e. IMET and
other non-lethal forms of assistance) when the US deemed that reasonable steps were being taken
by recipient governments to demobilize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate former child soldiers
(Public Law 100-457).
Though the presence of the presidential national interest waiver assisted in passage of the
CSPA, these waivers can undermine its intent (State Department – Interview I ). From 2010 to
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2017, the use/support of child soldiers by governments has been reported in 76 country-years
across 14 unique states. In a number of cases, including Myanmar, and Syria, the US had either
no obligations to provide and/or the country was ineligible for military assistance. During the
same period, 38 cases saw the national interest waiver invoked in part (15 times) or in full (23
times) (Stohl and Dick 2015; Rosen 2017). Countries such as Chad, South Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and until recently, Yemen, have each benefited from
continued military assistance despite multiple years of listing. Few cases—Rwanda (2013), the
Central African Republic (2013), and Somalia (2010, 2011, and 2012)—saw the US fully
implement the CSPA (see Table 10). Thus, restrictions on security assistance is more exception
than rule. In 2010, of the six governments listed only one faced full implementation. By 2017 the
list grew to eight states, still with only one facing full implementation of the CSPA. At its peak
(2013, 2016), the CSPA list has included ten governments with two states facing full
implementation .

Table 10. Violators of the CSPA and Subsequent Waivers and Aid Restrictions 2010-2017
Listing Year
(Fiscal Year)

Full Waiver

2010
(2011)

Chad
Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC)
Sudan
Yemen

2011
(2012)

Yemen
Chad

Partial Waiver

DRC
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Aid Restricted

Ineligible

Somalia

Myanmar

Somalia
Sudan

Myanmar

Listing Year
(Fiscal Year)

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

2012
(2013)

Libya
South Sudan
Yemen

DRC

2013
(2014)

Chad
South Sudan
Yemen

DRC
Somalia

2014
(2015)

Rwanda
Somalia
Yemen

CAR
DRC
South Sudan

Myanmar
Sudan
Syria

2015
(2016)

DRC
Nigeria
Somalia

South Sudan

Yemen

Myanmar
Sudan
Syria

2016
(2017)

Myanmar
Iraq
Nigeria

DRC
Rwanda
Somalia
South Sudan

Yemen

Sudan
Syria

2017
(2018)

Mali
Nigeria

DRC
Somalia
South Sudan

Yemen

Sudan
Syria

Aid Restricted

Ineligible

Myanmar
Sudan
Central African Republic
(CAR)
Rwanda

Myanmar
Syria
Sudan

Looking closer at Table 11, it is clear that many states still received some form of US
security assistance irrespective of their use of child soldiers. For example, South Sudan has
appeared on the CSPA list every year since its independence in 2011 yet has received a full
(2012, 2013) or partial (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) waiver in each year despite its recruitment and
use of child soldiers. In 2016 alone, UN reports noted that at least 650 children were recruited
into the ongoing civil conflict in the country with estimates suggesting as many as 19,000
children having been recruited by both government and rebel forces since fighting began in 2013
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(UNICEF 2018). However, one can also see significant variance in the types of implementation
with states shifting from full waivers to partial and vice versa.

Military/Security Assistance and Human Rights
The literature assessing the impact of human rights abuses on the flow of military aid has offered
a mixed picture. Early work by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found a positive relationship
between human rights practices and the flow of military aid, suggesting that respect for human
rights would be rewarded with military assistance, a conclusion later refuted by Carleton and
Stohl (1987). Poe et al. (1994) argued that human rights, while appearing to be important
determinants in economic and military aid levels, appeared to be secondary considerations for
decisions on aid. Ultimately, they concluded that strategic, political, and economic factors were
more heavily weighted by donor states, and particularly important for decisions on military aid.
This aligns with a Machiavellian approach, “it might be in one’s interest to act morally, but the
act should be abandoned when more important interests are at stake” (Poe et al., 2014: 558).
Recent scholarship has painted an increasingly stark picture. Sullivan, Tessman, and Li
(2011, 275) for instance, showed that “increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduced
cooperative foreign policy behavior.” Their findings suggest uncooperative recipients were more
likely to benefit from an increase in US military aid while states who complied/cooperated with
US policy objectives were more susceptible to a decrease in military support. Put differently, if a
state corrected the problems that military aid was sent to address it could result in the loss of
such support. This moral hazard can be seen in the case of the US and Pakistan. Pakistan, a
country that has received large amounts of US military aid to combat terrorism, rarely achieves
its objectives and may even be incentivized to exaggerate the threat to ensure continued
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investment. Thus, it is unsurprising that states continue to violate the terms of the CSPA,
particularly if a state sees itself as valuable to the US and recognizes it will not face punishment.
This speaks directly to the conditionality of foreign aid and specifically military aid.
Scholars suggest that when it comes to military assistance packages, donor states often attach
conditions which require recipients to meet certain expectations to ensure continued support
(Boutton 2014). However, recipients must believe the threat of security aid cuts to be credible.
Failure to convey credibility can lead to the ineffectiveness of contingencies. In certain cases, the
willingness of donors to actually sanction recipient states may be dependent on their strategic
importance. Sandholtz (2016) showed that, as a general rule, the US rarely cuts military
assistance, and is even less inclined to do so if it has received military aid in the past. Echoing
findings from Blanton (2000), this speaks to a ‘gatekeeping’ effect as the probability that at state
will continue to receive military support in a subsequent year is over 90 percent. Thus, once a
state crosses the hurdle of receiving military aid, it is unlikely such aid will stop.
Sandholtz’s (2016) findings echo earlier work which demonstrated a state’s respect for
human rights (or lack thereof) rarely influenced bilateral military aid (Neumayer 2003).
However, these studies relied on aggregate measures of respect for human rights such as the
political terror scale (PTS) or CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Wood and Gibney, 2010;
Cingranelli et al. 2014). While useful for identifying general patterns in military aid
disbursements as a consequence of human rights abuses, they may often miss important microlevel forms of abuse like child soldiering that can directly impact security aid decisions. For
instance, as Table 11 demonstrates, the US has restricted security assistance, in whole or in part,
due to a state’s use of child soldiers. Ultimately, the willingness of a donor state to sanction a
recipient state who has committed some form of political transgression is, at least in part, a
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product of strategic interests of the donor (Swedlund 2016). Extending this argument, I contend
that the strategic interest of a donor can be loosely captured by analyzing the historical trends in
security aid disbursement to recipients. Those receiving higher levels of military aid in a
previous time period—captured by the US dollar amount annually—can, in theory, be considered
more strategically important. In other words, a state’s strategic value is likely to influence the
provision of waivers to, or implementation of the CSPA. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: States which receive higher levels of military aid in the previous year(s) will be more likely
to receive a waiver for subsequent year(s).

Given the robustness of findings in the literature which contend that human rights abuses
are unlikely to impact security assistance flows particularly after states have already begun to
receive aid (i.e. Blanton 2000; Sandholtz 2016), it is surprising that some states have faced
reductions because of their use of child soldiers. I argue that this can largely be explained by the
character of child soldiering within a state’s national army. To capture the character of child
soldiering, I explore two dimensions: whether the practice is indicative of a systemic problem
with professionalization and the roles in which children take on within the military.
Although data on child soldiering is inherently limited and often underreported (Haer and
Böhmelt 2016; Lasley and Thyne 2015), reports which are available often offer some estimation
on the numbers of children active within national militaries and non-state actors. Put differently,
I explore whether child soldiering is a systemic issue within the military or if cases are rare, even
inadvertent. I do this in large part based on the specific types of military aid that are eligible for
sanctions. For example, IMET funding aims to professionalize states’ military leaders. Thus,
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states which have severe institutional issues related to professionalization may be less likely to
face full implementation of the CSPA in an attempt to influence institutional change. The process
of breaking the cycle of a government’s direct use of child soldiers can be challenging and time
consuming. Further, the process of demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of former
child soldiers can take years to achieve (Betancourt et al. 2010). In other words, cutting these
non-lethal forms of aid might actually aggravate the issue.
Secondly, I consider the roles undertaken by child soldiers. The definition of a child
soldier casts a wide net, including any person under 18 “who is serving in any capacity,
including in a support role such as a cook, porter, messenger, medic, guard, or sex slave” (Public
Law 110-457). While all forms of child soldiering are problematic and, by definition illegal, it is
clear that children’s roles within organizations can vary significantly. Consequently, donors’
perception of the atrocity may also vary. For example, children serving in combat roles is often
thought of as a more egregious violation of human rights than instances where children serve in
supporting roles and/or never see active combat. To capture variation in child soldiers’ activities,
I rely on anecdotal information reported in various human rights reports. My expectation
suggests that the cost of supporting a state where children serve as combatants will yield
different effects on the decision to restrict security assistance than cases where children are
predominantly used in support roles.
Together, these assumptions suggests that the gravity of human rights violations can
constrain US’ disbursement of security assistance. The Mexican government’s continuous use of
torture and extrajudicial killings in 2015, for example, resulted in a proposed 15% decrease in
US security assistance for the 2016 fiscal year (Siddiqui 2015). Although just a ‘drop in the
bucket’ for the Mexican budget, this decision illustrates that under certain conditions the US will
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not (fully) tolerate GVHRs. While child soldiering remains outside the scope of the Leahy law,
and as such is not classified as a GVHR, the passing of the CSPA clearly demonstrated a shift
towards expansion of its guiding principles. Thus, I contend that security assistance restrictions
are more likely, as a general rule, where there are higher numbers of child soldiers, indicative of
a more systemic/institutional problem, and when children take on roles in active combat.

H2: States are more likely to face restrictions to security assistance when the child soldiering is
a systemic issue (institutionalized and/or used as traditional soldier in combat roles).

Research Design
To test the hypotheses and uncover new theoretical insights, I adopt a qualitative approach. Case
studies allow me to trace the flow of the specific forms of US security assistance covered under
the CSPA. This strategy also assists in fleshing out the theoretical mechanism that cannot be
captured by large-N analyses. Specifically, I can consider temporal variation in child soldiering
practices by recipient government. I supplement these case narratives with primary source
material drawn from in-depth interviews conducted with representatives from the US State
Department, Department of Homeland Security, congressional aides, researchers at various
think-tanks, current and former military personnel, and representatives from Human Rights
Watch.
Given the aim to identify conditions which lead to the presence or absence of waivers, I
focused my investigation only on states that were eligible for security assistance in each year that
they were designated as in violation of the CSPA. The resulting list leaves a relatively small
sample from which to select (see Table 11). However, those states remaining offered the distinct
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advantage of employing a most similar systems design. In total, four cases were selected: Central
African Republic (CAR), Chad, Rwanda and South Sudan (Table 12).
Within each case, I investigated the seven forms of security assistance outlined in the
CSPA to capture a rough estimate of each state’s strategic importance (H1). I considered the
aggregate dollar amount in the year(s) preceding a state’s designation on the CSPA list beginning
roughly in 2008 and through 2017, with countries receiving higher levels of security assistance
expected to be those most likely to receive a waiver. However, because the US has provided
waivers more often than not, suggesting that most of the states hold some degree of strategic
value, I focus on the specific types of waivers provided (full vs. partial).
Investigating a reduced set of cases increases my ability to gather more in depth and
reliable estimates on the character of child soldiering (and numbers of child soldiers) and the
ways they are utilized by states (H2). The qualitative strategy also allows me to leverage a
temporal dimension as I investigate ‘snapshots’ within each case to assess fluctuations in
security assistance. Through process tracing I am able to examine observable implications of the
hypothesized mechanisms which can lead to variations in security aid disbursements (Bennet and
Checkel 2014, 8). First, the case of South Sudan covers 2012-2017 with specific focus on the
period between 2012-2014. The analysis centers on the US decision to support the Sudanese
Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army in spite of their use of child soldiers. Second, I examine
the case of Chad, a country which received full waivers in each of the three years it appeared on
the list (2010, 2011, and 2013). Both cases provide geographic and temporal similarities along
with analogous outcomes on aid restrictions. However, South Sudan’s listing on the CSPA began
as the newly established state descended into civil war. Meanwhile, Chad had just seen its fiveyear civil war come to an end in during its first appearance on the CSPA list in 2010. I compare
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the outcomes in these states with two cases in which the US did not provide a waiver (in at least
one year of the state’s listing). I first probe the case of the Central African Republic, which
received no waiver in 2013 (its first appearance on the CSPA list) and then received a partial
waiver in 2014 before being removed from the list. I conclude with Rwanda, examining the US
decision to restrict security aid the government in 2013, remove it from the list in 2014, then
grant a partial waiver when Rwanda was relisted in 2015. This case is particularly interesting as
the US had enjoyed a relatively positive relationship with Kagame’s regime following his
accession to power in the aftermath of 1994 genocide. In addition, Rwanda was not experiencing
a civil war when it was sanctioned while the Central African Republic had slipped into conflict
the year before its first listing. Together, these four case explorations yield insight into the
intricacies of US security assistance decisions and human rights and highlights the conditions
which increase the probability that the US credibly commits to implementation of the CSPA.
I address alternative explanations throughout the case analyses including how the global
war on terror has influenced the implementation of the CSPA and how state fragility (i.e. civil
conflict) may impact the disbursement of security aid. Through process tracing I am better able
to systematically identify and consider these alternative explanations and move in the direction
of causal inference related to the outcome of interest (Lyall 2014, 186). Relatedly, this strategy
also allows for inductive theoretical insights which can increase confidence in causal
explanations through within case analyses and clarifies deductive expectations (Collier 2011;
Bennet and Checkel 2014, 13). I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews with various members
of the US State Department, the policymaking community, think-tanks, and human rights
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NGOs.54 In selecting potential interviewees, I adopted a strategy that would offer multiple lenses
through which to assess the CSPA and US implementation (or lack thereof). Policy practitioners
within the Department of State provide useful insight on listing procedures, and given the
Secretary of State’s role in final determinations 55 on waivers, this provides important information
about justifications. Human rights advocates/professionals assist in providing insight on child
soldiering practices within each state, but also offer a critical eye pertaining to US security
assistance decisions.
These interviews significantly improve the inferences that can be drawn regarding the US
decision-making process with respect to states in violation of the CSPA. First, the diversity of
interviewees offers significant leverage for addressing alternative explanations for why certain
states are granted waivers and while others are held accountable. It also enables me to pit rival
arguments (i.e. government officials vs. human rights advocates) against one another in an effort
to offer a more complete picture of security assistance decisions and perceptions. In particular,
conversations with those active in government offer stark contrast with members of humanitarian
NGOs. This dichotomy provides additional information regarding the pressure (or lack thereof)
when it comes to child soldiering and the enforcement of the CSPA.

54
55

Interviews were conducted in Washington D.C. and Orlando, FL. See Table 17, Appendix C for list of interviews.
The US President ultimately makes the decision, but power is often devolved to the Secretary of State.
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Table 11. Overview of Theoretical Expectations

Country

Year
(Bold indicates
CSPA listing)

Security
Assistance
Monitor
(t-1)

H1
Expectation

Character of
H2
Child Soldiering Expectation

Outcome

Central
African
Republic

2012

507,523

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Central
African
Republic

2013

115,000

No Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Aid
Restricted

Central
African
Republic

2014

23,400,000*

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Partial
Waiver

Central
African
Republic

2015

Removed from list

Chad

2009

627,000

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Chad

2010

1,208,500

Partial
Waiver

Not Systemic

Full Waiver

Full
Waiver

Chad

2011

875,000

Partial
Waiver

Not Systemic

Full Waiver

Full
Waiver

Chad

2012

Removed from List

Chad

2013

2,346,466

Partial
Waiver

Not Systemic

Full Waiver

Full
Waiver

Chad

2014

Removed from list

Rwanda

2012

859,000

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Rwanda

2013

731,000

Partial
Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Aid
Restricted

Rwanda

2014

282,000

No Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Full
Waiver

Rwanda

2015

Removed from list

Rwanda

2016

659,000

Partial
Waiver

Not Systemic

Full Waiver

Partial
Waiver

Rwanda

2017

Removed from list
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Country

Year
(Bold indicates
CSPA listing)

Security
Assistance
Monitor
(t-1)

H1
Expectation

Character of
H2
Child Soldiering Expectation

Outcome

South Sudan

2011

39,742,000

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

South Sudan

2012

42,633,000

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Full
Waiver

South Sudan

2013

52,186,913

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Full
Waiver

South Sudan

2014

28,179,000

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Partial
Waiver

South Sudan

2015

42,714,000

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Partial
Waiver

South Sudan

2016

21,000,000

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Partial
Waiver

South Sudan

2017

31,700,000

Full Waiver

Systemic

Partial
Waiver

Partial
Waiver

* The entire amount dispersed was to train foreign troops deploying for peacekeeping missions (Security
Assistance Monitor – CAR 2018)

Independent Variable(s)
The main explanatory variable is captured by examining child soldier usage by recipient
governments. I rely primarily on the US Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons
(TIP) report which provides country specific information on the use of child soldiers by
governments and non-state actors (US Department of State 2018b). Following the adoption of
the CSPA, the Department of State began to consistently record instances of child soldier usage
by governments due to the requirement that it annually report a list of violators. However,
potential bias exists when comparing with the UN Secretary General’s annual report on children
in conflict (UNSG 2016a). As a result, I cross reference the TIP reports with annual reports from
various organizations including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Child Soldiers
International, and the United Nations.
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I also use these sources to obtain estimates on the numbers of child soldiers being used
and the systemic nature of the issue. While accurate data on the raw numbers of child soldiers
employed by a state are unavailable, I rely on estimates as reported by humanitarian watchdogs
(i.e. Child Soldiers International) to determine the level at which a government employs child
soldiers.56 To capture the role of child soldiers in a recipient state’s military I draw from similar
reports and determine if children are being used as active combatants or are utilized in solely in
support roles. I anticipate an increase in the probability that US restricts security assistance if the
practice is more indicative of an institutional problem.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, US restrictions on security assistance, considers whether the CSPA was
fully implemented (aid restricted), partially implemented (partial waiver), or not implemented
(full waiver). Data on US security aid allocation (US dollars) are drawn from Security Assistance
Monitor (Security Assistance Monitor 2018).57 By law, any country which receives over
$500,000 in cumulative military or economic assistance in a given year is required to have its
own annual reporting (USAID 2013). While all forms of military assistance can be tracked, I
focus specifically on the seven forms of security assistance that fall under the scope of the

56

To capture the level of child soldering by non-state actors I rely on a similar procedure and also use data from
Haer and Böhmelt (2015) who offer an ordinal measure of rebel child soldiering (none/low/high).
57
For this study I elected to rely solely on US security assistance to capture strategic value as opposed to all forms
of aid. For the cases examined, the variation is security aid is generally reflective of the variation in total aid. In
other words, the difference in US investment through security aid disbursements is similar to the difference in
investment via all forms of assistance.
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CSPA.58 I cross referenced data from Security Assistance Monitor with USAID’s Foreign Aid
Explorer.59
Before moving to case explorations, it is important to offer at least a brief discussion on
limitations in the construction of the list of violators to the CSPA. After reviewing the list of
states that have fallen on the list of violators of the CSPA, there are notable omissions (i.e.
Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia). Reports in 2016 indicated that the Afghan government along
with the Afghan national and local police have employed child soldiers in their units (UNSG
2017). In short, the list of child soldier violators demonstrates potential bias that undoubtedly
merits further investigation. However, exploration of the list’s construction and development is
beyond the scope of the current project’s goals. Further, and as noted previously, interviews with
US State Department Officials reveal that the determinations of violators are conducted with
legal counsel present in an effort to ensure those states listed are, in fact, in violation.

The Cases
South Sudan
South Sudan’s first appearance on the CSPA list in October 2012, a year after it gained
independence. Following its listing, South Sudan was granted full waivers for both FY 2013 and
2014. However, having remained on the list of violators since, the country has received only
partial waivers in each subsequent year (FY 2015-2018). Fifteen years prior to independence
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As noted, PKO and PKO-OCO were not under the original CSPA of 2008, but were later added under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013.
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Roughly a two-year lag exists for reporting from USAID. Numbers were cross-referenced with Security
Assistance Monitor, but evidence suggests that there is significant underreporting from USAID (see Security
Assistance Monitor 2018).
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(1996), secessionist movements within southern Sudan began receiving significant US military
support. In backing the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and more specifically,
providing military support for its armed wing (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-SPLA), the
US played a significant role in the trajectory of the Sudanese civil war which ended with a
comprehensive peace agreement in 2005 and the creation of an independent South Sudan six
years later (LeRichie and Arnold 2013).
While it is well documented that the SPLM/A used child soldiers throughout the
Sudanese civil war, the movement benefited both directly and indirectly from US military
support (McCormick 2015; Lynch et al. 2016). Estimates suggest that the US provided upwards
of $20 million to neighboring states including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, in an effort to
bolster the SPLM/A’s strength against al-Bashir (Dagne 2011a, 9). In the years preceding the
peace agreement, support was largely driven by the SPLM/A’s commitment to stop recruiting
children and to demobilize those child soldiers currently within the organization. In short, the
group attempted to comply with internationally recognized norms to achieve its goal of
independence (Jo 2015; Lasley and Thyne 2015). For instance, in 2001, the SPLM/A held a
demobilization ceremony for some 3,500 child soldiers in its effort to garner international
support (UNICEF 2001). Only later was it revealed that many were not demobilized, with
upwards of 10,000 children assumed to be still active within the group (Singer 2004, 572).
However, by 2010, the SPLM/A appeared to have made drastic improvements with regards to
child soldiers within its ranks. Estimates of 20,000 children being demobilized illustrated a
significant shift in the organization’s tactics (BBC 2010).
While South Sudan’s independence and its reported commitment to eliminate child
soldiering appeared promising, the country quickly spiraled into civil war. Since this time, both
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the government and rebels have used child soldiers at dramatic rates with UN estimates in
December 2017 suggesting upwards of 19,000 children having been recruited by both sides since
2013 (UNICEF 2017, 2). Throughout this period South Sudan has received substantial security
support from the US and upon achieving statehood, although listed in violation of the CSPA, was
granted a full waiver. Meanwhile, Sudan, originally receiving a full waiver in 2010 (FY 2011),
has since seen security aid fully restricted in each year that it was an eligible recipient (Stohl and
Dick 2015).60 While the US-Sudanese relations have seen ebbs and flows since the establishment
of diplomatic relations in 1956, a military coup in 1989, Sudan’s offer of safe haven to
international terrorists, and the genocidal campaign by the Janjaweed in Darfur further strained
the relationship and dramatically altered the provision of US military assistance (Brown 2003;
Zissis 2006).
Examining the approximate dollar amounts for those categories of security assistance
covered by the CSPA, South Sudan received over $60 million between 2010 and 2011, the years
preceding its listing (Security Assistance Monitor-Sudan 2018).61 For comparison, Chad received
just over $800,000 in 2010, while Central African Republic saw roughly $100,000 ($60,000
earmarked for IMET). Comparatively, South Sudan received a disproportionate amount of
security aid, suggesting strategic importance can overshadow a state’s violation of the CSPA
(H1). However, the onset of civil conflict in late 2013 and the continued use of child soldiers
have seen South Sudan’s waiver status change from full to partial.
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This full waiver was largely in support of stabilization and peacekeeping operations (Dagne 2011b).
Recall that PKOs and PKO-OCO were only added in 2013.
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The incorporation of children within the South Sudanese military is unequivocally a
systemic issue (H2). Although accounting for only a small fraction of the total military,
estimated to be around 200,000 (World Bank 2018), child recruitment has been an institutional
problem since independence (HRW 2015). Further, children have undoubtedly been active
participants in combat within the SPLA since the start of civil war. Interviews with 41 former
child soldiers associated with government forces show that children joined the army for safety,
lack of educational opportunities, even for pay (HRW 2015, 31). Within the military, children’s
roles varied from cooking and washing clothes to fighting on the front lines (HRW 2015, 25). H2
suggests that children’s roles in direct hostilities should temper the willingness to grant full
waivers, but South Sudan was provided full waivers for FY 2013 and 2014.62 However, fiscal
years 2015-2018 saw only partial waivers granted. This suggests interplay between the strategic
value of a state (H1) and the character of child soldiering (H2).
This interplay becomes apparent when examining the specific line items of support.
Although the US stopped providing IMET funding to South Sudan between 2015-2017, the
majority of security assistance provided was allocated for Peacekeeping Operations that targeted
security sector reform (amounting to over $60 million between 2015-2016). Defined as “the set
of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it
provides safety, security, and justice,” security sector reform funding generally aims to
professionalize the military and civilian sectors within recipient states (US Department of State
2009). The increasing exposure of the gravity of child solider usage by the UN, Department of

It is important to emphasize that South Sudan’s age, particularly that is was a brand new country, makes it a
unique case. Importantly, full waivers may have been viewed as giving the new state an opportunity to comply with
US expectations. However, it is important to put this in context as the SPLA/M had been the beneficiary of US
security assistance prior to independence.
62
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State, and numerous reports from organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International contributed to South Sudan’s demotion to partial waivers. A State Department
official suggested, “This is speculative, but my anticipation is that South Sudan has not held up
its end of the bargain when it comes to [stopping] its child soldiering practices” (Interview I).
This is reflected in the type of waiver South Sudan has received since 2014. The continued use of
child soldiers at high levels and in direct hostilities, coupled with the government’s lack of
implementation of military enlistment procedures and no criminal accountability mechanism
arguably constrained the ability of the US to continue its justification of full waivers (US
Department of State 2017). However, the state’s strategic value, as captured by the significant
investment in security assistance in previous years, likely curtailed decisions to fully restrict
security assistance. This suggests support for H1, but does not rule out the validity of H2.
While the South Sudanese case clearly lends some support for strategic importance as a
key predictor for CSPA waivers, interviews with peacekeeping experts lend mixed support for
H2. The shift in waiver status—from full to partial—suggests that the US decision makers were
unwilling to ‘fully’ tolerate the continued systemic nature of child soldering. Specifically, US
security aid restrictions though influenced by a state’s strategic importance, may only matter to a
certain point. In the case of South Sudan, child soldiers were rampant in the national army,
illustrating an institutional problem. Still, the importance of South Sudan based on historical
investment suggests that full implementation of the CSPA was never a viable option. “If we
think about South Sudan, the fragility of a new state cannot be discounted,” and in such
instances, “…it is important to try and assist in professionalizing their [armed] forces” (Interview
X). Non-lethal military assistance packages, such as IMET, are specifically designed to achieve
this by providing “students from allied and friendly nations valuable training and education on
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U.S. military practices and standards, including exposure to democratic values and respect for
internationally recognized standards of human rights” (US Department of State-IMET). From
2011 to 2014, South Sudan received approximately $2.4 million in IMET in an effort to
strengthen civil military relations and professionalize its military (USAID-South Sudan 2018).
This was $1 million more than both Rwanda and Chad over the same time period (CAR only
received IMET training in 2010 and 2016, totaling approximately $360,000). Further, from
2011-2015 South Sudan received over $130 million earmarked for Security Sector
Transformation (SST) as part of Peacekeeping Operations Funds. Specifically, these funds aimed
to “support transformation of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA) to a
professional, conventional force (through infrastructure support, equipment and training), in
support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)” (USAID-South Sudan 2018). The
evolution of waivers in the case of South Sudan suggests that the continued employment of child
soldiers in the national army can lead to states’ demotion in waiver status. In other words, lethal
forms of security assistance covered by full waivers is unlikely to continue when child soldiering
is an institutional issue, but waivers for non-lethal aid are likely to be granted (i.e. military
professionalization).

Chad
Chad’s designation on the CSPA list in 2010 was quickly followed by the government’s signing
of an action plan with the United Nations in June 2011 (Becker 2014, 605). The action plan
called for UN assistance in the verification and monitoring of military installations,
criminalization of child soldiering to reflect international law, measures for punitive action
against violators, and other preventive measures (Office of the Special Representative of the
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Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 2011). By the following October (2012),
Chad was removed from the CSPA list. After a year-long hiatus, Chad was relisted in October
2013 (FY 2014). However, in each year of listing, Chad has received a full national interest
waiver.
While recent years have seen increased US spending in Chad given the country’s
partnership in combating terrorism, between 2008 and 2010 (i.e. the years preceding its listing),
Chad received roughly $1.7 million across the six security assistance categories covered under
the CSPA. For comparison, in 2013 the Chadian National Army (ANT) received over $7 million
in funding for just one category (section 1206-Train and Equip Authority).63 This influx in
funding has largely been attributed to the ANT’s partnership with US efforts to combat Boko
Haram in neighboring Nigeria. Though the total dollar amount in security assistance was
relatively low in the years proceeding Chad’s first appearance on the CSPA list, its rising
importance as a strategic partner for counterterrorism efforts in the region has seen a dramatic
uptick in the dispersion of security assistance, most notably in the US train and equip program
which alone has seen Chad receive nearly $30 million between 2013-2015 (USAID 2018).
The relatively low levels of security assistance provided to Chad in both 2009 and 2010,
suggest that the full waivers given in FY2010 and 2011 do not appear to be driven by its strategic
interest when only considering the dollar amount in security assistance provided. In 2009, Chad
ranked 36 out of 44 African states in the Department of Defense disbursements at $224,000,
$172,000 of which was provided for IMET and the remaining $52,000 given for Foreign Military

Section 12016 grants the Secretary of Defense authority to ‘train and equip’ a foreign military to perform/assist in
support of US counterterrorism efforts (Public law 109-163).
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Sales (USAID-Foreign Aid Explorer-Chad; Security Assistance Monitor-Chad 2018). Given the
apparent lack of strategic value at the time, it is interesting to note that the US granted Chad a
national interest waiver, let alone a full waiver, suggesting a lack of initial support for H1.
However, the strategic interest in Chad drastically changed given the rise of Boko Haram shortly
before the CSPA took effect. September 2010 saw roughly 700 inmates escape in a large prison
break, coinciding with the rejuvenation of the terror group which has gone on to carry out
hundreds of attacks within Nigeria and surrounding states (Cook 2011; Global Terrorism
Database 2018). An interview with a former Army officer and peacekeeping expert provides
additional support for this change in Chad’s strategic importance: “Chad was taking steps to
improve its professionalization and other security concerns in the region meant partnerships were
important” (Interview X). Thus, Chad’s strategic importance increased dramatically immediately
following its listing. Once it became clear that Chad would be an important ally for
counterterrorism efforts, the amount of security assistance disbursed increased exponentially.
This suggests that reliance on the dollar amount of security assistance as the sole proxy for
strategic importance may be too narrow and would lead to the conclusion that Chad was of
minimal importance. A broader view of strategic importance (i.e. partnerships in
counterterrorism) would lend support to H1.
Turning to the scope and nature of child soldiering, the ANT had been known to directly
incorporate children prior to its listing. A report to the UN Security Council in February 2011
(covering 2008-2010) revealed that the ANT had employed children both in the process of
former rebel integration following war and had actively recruited children (UNSG 2011, 5). In
2009 alone, the Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting in Chad identified 49 cases of child
soldier recruitment by the ANT—over half of which were Sudanese refugees (UNSG 2011, 5).
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By 2010 the task force identified a shift in ANT recruiting, reporting that documented cases of
child soldiering which originally appeared to be systematic were becoming increasingly
infrequent with only isolated cases carried out by low-ranking officers. These findings were
reflective of earlier UN reports which questioned the degree of cohesion of the ANT and its level
of discipline (UNSG 2007, 8). As the UN Secretary General concluded, “it casts into doubt the
degree to which policy-level commitments and directives are translated into action by individual
field commanders and their orders followed” (UNSG 2007, 8). In short, it suggests that child
soldering in the ANT had become more of an issue of indiscipline than an institutional problem.
During this time, the US granted full waivers to Chad. Although Chad’s strategic
importance seems paramount for its full waiver status, cutting security assistance under the terms
of the CSPA to the Chadian government would likely have undermined attempts to influence
institutions within the state—and specifically, efforts aimed at professionalization of the military.
Further, the apparent shift in behavior following designation as a violator (i.e. signing a UN
action plan) illustrates that improvements in government behavior might even be rewarded by
waivers and the subsequent delisting in following years.
Examining the level of child soldiering, Chad’s usage of child soldiers in terms of
verified cases of recruitment decreased over time, especially when compared to South Sudan.
Government efforts beginning with the 2011 action plan signaled a commitment to change
recruitment behavior. A State Department official stated, “Signaling matters a lot for delisting. If
states take steps in the right direction we reconsider listing them as a violator… We recognize
there are reputational consequences to being listed and also understand the process of eradicating
child soldiers from the [government’s] military isn’t always a fast process” (Interview VII).
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While verified cases of child soldiering are not a perfect indication of the actual practices,
Chad’s commitment to eradicating child soldiers in the ANT was reflected in the conclusions
reached by the UN Secretary General’s 2014 report on children and armed conflict (UNSG 2014,
10-12). The UN’s general consensus suggested that the government made significant
improvements in meeting all obligations aimed at demobilizing children within the ANT and was
refraining from further recruitment. Between January 2013 and December 2013, no new cases of
child soldering were documented. The UN reiterated that most child soldiers in the ANT were
the result of demobilized child soldiers from other armed groups being absorbed into the national
military, not the result of a systematic practice by the military (UNSG 2014, 12). By all accounts,
child soldier usage by the ANT was a rare practice and often the result of a lack of monitoring
and screening recruits. Thus, the low numbers of child soldiers in the rank-and-file, coupled with
the identification by the UN that the ANT was no longer engaged in the systematic recruitment
of children lends some support for H2. This finding also suggests that listing on the CSPA and
the receipt of subsequent waivers, might actually assist with institutional transformation. Though
beyond the scope of the current study, this finding might qualify earlier studies that point to the
existence of a moral hazard between donor and recipient.
Pertaining to the roles of child soldiers in the ANT, children were directly involved in
combat during Chad’s civil war between 2005 and 2010. An interview with an ANT officer
offered a glimpse into the army’s perception of children: “Child soldiers are ideal because they
don’t complain, they don’t expect to be paid, and if you tell them to kill, they kill” (HRW 2007).
However, the ANT’s practices during conflict—actively recruiting children to fight—and in the
years following—reorienting its practices—suggest a fundamental change. Further, the
incorporation of child soldiers in the ANT as a consequence of the integration of former rebels of
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the United Front for Change is consequential (UNSG 2007, 8). While the Chadian government
signed a peace agreement with the United Front for Change in 2006 and explicitly declined to
accept children into the military who were formerly part of the United Front, the questionable
discipline level of the ANT led both to its absorption of child soldiers and their subsequent
employment as combatants (UNSG 2007, 8). However, following the conclusion of the civil war,
there is little evidence to suggest that any children in the ANT were engaged in combat.
Overall, while the number of children within the military at Chad’s listing in 2010 was
relatively low, evidence points to the fact that both a lack of oversight and strategic decision
making during civil war led to the children serving as active combatants in the ANT. Given that
child soldiering was less of an institutional problem post 2010 and that children were employed
as active soldiers during Chad’s civil war from 2005 to 2010, expectation would suggest that at a
minimum, partial waivers would be granted for FY 2011. However, the receipt of a full waiver in
Chad’s first year suggests that when child soldiering is not a systemic problem, restrictions are
unlikely. The draw-down of conflict in 2010 (the same year the CSPA came into effect) and the
increased efforts by the Chadian government to signal commitment to demobilization of active
child soldiers as early as 2007 as evidenced by the governments signing of a UNICEF protocol to
protect children in conflict64 (UNSG 2007, 12), further demonstrates that shifts in government’s
practices can improve prospects for the continuation of security assistance, particularly when
monitoring and verification corroborate a genuine commitment. In short, in each year listed,
Chad saw decreasing levels of child soldiering and no clear evidence to suggest that children in
the ANT saw active combat after the civil war ended. Taken together, while the strong increase
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in Chad’s strategic value provides a robust explanation for the provision of full waivers, the shift
in organizational behavior related to its child soldiering practices appears to also be a significant
contributor in the waiver decision-making process.

The Central African Republic (CAR)
The Central African Republic first appeared on the CSPA list in October 2013 as reports
emerged in 2012 that the government was actively supporting self-defense militias that employed
child soldiers (US Department of State 2013). The civil conflict resulted from the rise of Séléka
in 2012, a coalition of former rebel groups from the country’s previous civil war. An already
fragile peace agreement was undone when President Bozizé, winning re-election in January
2011, was accused of reneging on the terms of peace agreements signed with the main rebel
factions in 2007/08 (Mehler 2011). By late 2012, Séléka staged a series of attacks in the north,
swiftly moving to the capital and overthrowing Bozizé in March 2013 (Bahr 2013). Séléka
would go on to control the government for nearly a year before mounting pressure resulted in the
resignation of Séléka leader Michel Djotodia in January 2014 (Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi
2014).
CAR stands in contrast to the case of Chad as its two-year stint on the CSPA list occurred
in the midst of violent civil war. While the Séléka rebel coalition was consistently condemned
for its use of child soldiers, pro-government self-defense militias—termed “anti-Balaka”—were
also implicated in the use of child soldiers during the conflict. These militias were used by
Bozizé as auxiliaries to the army (Child Soldiers International 2016).
Turning to the strategic value of the Central African Republic (H1), the country has
consistently ranked in the bottom third of African states in the total dollar amount of US security
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assistance outlined under the CSPA (USAID-Foreign Aid Explorer-Central African Republic).
For instance, in FY 2012, the year prior to its listing, CAR received no more than $115,000 to
support IMET although verification of whether this funding was actually provided is inconsistent
(Security Assistance Monitor – CAR 2018). With the lack of security assistance given to the
government in the previous year(s), it is unsurprising that the CSPA was fully implemented.
Coupled with the volatility in the state, descending into civil war, the cost of cutting security
assistance to CAR was minimal.
A senior official at Human Rights Watch explained, “The Central African Republic often
gets lost in the mix…neighboring states like South Sudan, the DRC, and Chad each have drawn
significant attention from the US in terms of security investment” (Interview XI). This was also
reflected during an interview with an official at the Bureau of Democracy, Labor, and Human
Rights in the US State Department who claimed, “If we decide to cut assistance, we give up
potential leverage in a country and jeopardize relationships. In CAR during this time period, the
lack of stability in the government made for a more universally accepted decision to not provide
a waiver” (Interview VII). Not surprisingly, CAR has historically been seen as less strategically
important in comparison to its neighbors both in terms of security aid disbursements and in terms
of military partnerships. This is further complicated by its trajectory towards civil war and the
subsequent overthrow of its president in early 2013. Given these complexities, it is still plausible
that its lack of strategic value, as illustrated by the low amount of security assistance disbursed in
2012, significantly contributed to the US willingness to fully implement the CSPA. In addition,
little opportunity existed to invoke the national interest waiver under the CSPA given the lack of
a stable government and ongoing civil war, a conflict that would witness a rebel organization
overthrow the government.
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Shifting to the incorporation of children by the Central African Republic army, it is clear
that while the government had been accused of child soldering in past conflicts, its support of
self-defense units battling the Séléka coalition was the reason for listing in 2013. A 2009 annual
report of the UN Security Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict claimed
that while the government had worked to eliminate the inclusion of child soldiers within the
ranks of the national military, it had continued to support these self-defense militias that included
children (UNSC-Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict 2009). Thus, institutional
norms within the national army were not the apparent issue. Instead, CAR’s willingness to
tolerate and support ‘bad behavior’ by self-defense units, coupled with an already dismal amount
of security assistance in previous years, seemed to only increase the likelihood it would face full
CSPA implementation
This brings two important points to light. First, given that child soldiering was not
identified as an institutional issue within the national army, one would expect that some form of
a waiver would be likely (H2). However, the lack of strategic value (H1) seems to be a stronger
explanation for full implementation of the CSPA. Secondly, although the national army was not
identified as using child soldiers, the reports of government-backed militias actively engaged in
child soldiering seem to suggest that ‘where’ children are present can matter for security aid
restrictions. Recalling that a state is in violation of the CSPA if supporting non-state actors that
use child soldiers, the case of CAR illustrates that if a government backs rebel organizations that
use children, it may be more likely to face full security restrictions than cases where children
occupy positions in the national army. Put differently, the notion that the practice of child
soldiering could be remedied with the provision of non-lethal aid (aimed at professionalization)
is not justifiable.
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The full security assistance restrictions in 2014 were followed by President Obama’s
determination to provide CAR with a partial waiver for IMET training in FY 2015 (White House
Office of the Press Secretary 2014). The establishment of a transitional government headed by
Catherine Samba-Panza, along with commitments to demobilize child soldiers active on all sides
of the conflict, led to a shift in CAR’s waiver status. A State Department official claimed that,
“[Samba-Panza] taking power was a window of opportunity so giving CAR a waiver was at least
partly a strategic attempt to help stabilize [the country]” (Interview VII). Thus, the stated
provision of non-lethal security assistance aimed at military professionalization and institutional
change appeared to be done with the intent of assisting a transitioning regime overcome
challenges in a post-conflict environment rather than specifically addressing institutional
problems related to child soldiering. Since it was granted the waiver for FY 2015, CAR has not
reappeared on the CSPA list.
The character of child soldiering in CAR appears to have varied significantly during its
listing period. Estimates suggest that upwards of 10,000 child soldiers were active participants in
the civil war from 2012-2014, having been employed as combatants, human shields, spies, and
for sexual purposes. A 2014 UNICEF report noted that the number of child soldiers surged as a
consequence of the deteriorating situation within the country in late 2012 and early 2013,
attributing much of the recruitment of children to the anti-Balaka units (UNICEF 2014). Further,
in this case, children were clearly involved as combatants with reports suggesting that children
within anti-Balaka militias were manning checkpoints, being trained in handling weapons and
combat, with many were reportedly killed in clashes with Séléka forces (UNSG 2016b). In short,
children served in all roles within armed groups. As expected, when children are being employed
as active combatants, security aid restrictions are more likely given the nature of participation. In
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the case of CAR, the gravity of the human rights violations and specifically the fact that children
were actively dying in conflict contributed to the US decision to fully cut security assistance in
2014. The prospect of cutting security aid is a “balancing act and in the case of CAR, the
situation had deteriorated to the point where few options were left” (State Department Interview VII). The state’s receipt of a partial waiver for non-lethal security aid in 2015 speaks
to the importance of considering the character of child soldiering.
Overall, the case of the Central African Republic is complex, depicting the myriad of
factors which can contribute to the full implementation of the CSPA. Though lending some
support for a state’s strategic value (H1) and character of child soldiering (H2) as important
factors in the restriction of security aid, the instability and lack of a clear ruling government
cannot be understated as they likely impacted security assistance decisions. In other words, the
country went through three different leaders between 2013 and 2014, including the overthrow of
the Bozizé government by a rebel organization and increasing levels of sectarian violence that
jeopardized any chance for a successful transitional government. However, this case also
uncovers a novel theoretical insight, pointing to the importance of examining where child
soldiers operate (within or outside of the national army) and illustrating how attention to such
factors can help predict US decisions pertaining to waivers and security restrictions under the
CSPA.

Rwanda
Rwanda has appeared on the CSPA list three times. The first appearance came in 2013 and
Rwanda faced full restrictions in FY 2014. The following year, Rwanda was again listed but
received a full waiver. Most recently, the government’s implication for child soldiering in 2016
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has led to its relisting, but was only granted a partial waiver for FY 2017. Given these patterns,
Rwanda is a particularly interesting case as it has experienced all three variations in the degree of
implementation of the CSPA—no waiver, partial waiver, and full waiver.
Turning first to Rwanda’s strategic importance (H1), US security assistance to Rwanda
since the establishment of the CSPA has been relatively low. This is not to say that the country
fully lacks strategic importance, but does suggest that the US has been less robust in the
provision of security assistance (Security Assistance Monitor-Rwanda 2018). Part of this might
be attributed to its size, and specifically the size of its military (with a 2009 estimate suggesting
around 35,000 soldiers) (Beswick 2014). In addition, Rwanda’s perceived improvement
following the 1994 genocide has often led to the conclusion that its security sector
transformation is an overwhelming success story, with accolades for being one of the top
providers of female soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions. UN officials called Rwanda “a model
country when it comes to professional peacekeeping missions, systematic demobilization of
soldiers, and reconciliation processes” (Beswick 2014, 220).65
Between 2011 and 2013 (the three years preceding its listing), Rwanda received
approximately $1.4 million in IMET funding to train roughly 35 soldiers, $300,000 in FMF, and
$200,000 in FMS (Security Assistance Monitor-Rwanda 2018; USAID Foreign Aid Explorer –
Rwanda). However, in late 2013 amongst reports from both the State Department and UN,
Rwanda was condemned for its support of the Mouvement Du 23 Mars (M23) rebels operating in
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It is important to note the complexity of Rwanda post-1994. Although it has seen a dramatic change in
professionalization of its military, it is important to recognize the intricacy of how such professionalization was
achieved, especially given the authoritarian nature of the government.
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the Congo. This coincided with US decisions to fully implement the CSPA.66 Thus, Kagame’s
regime would not benefit from US security assistance in FY 2014. Given the limited security
assistance in previous years, it is not entirely surprising that the US fully restricted security
assistance (H1). The restrictions would only see Rwanda miss out on approximately $2 million
in security assistance. However, when one considers that Rwanda had been a pivotal contributor
to peacekeeping operations—contributing the highest percentage of troops per capita since
2004—the state’s strategic importance to the broader security of the region is not insignificant.
Still the full implementation appears to be consistent with the theoretical expectations evoking
the importance of strategic value.
Examining the character of child soldiering, the Rwandan case draws similarities to the
Central African Republic. Specifically, the support of a non-state actor using child soldiers, not
the government’s direct employment of children, seem to have been a significant factor in the US
decision to fully restrict security assistance. Rwanda’s listing was directly attributed to the
country’s support of the M23, operating across the border in the DRC. The M23, an ethnically
Tutsi organization, gained notoriety for mass atrocities within the DRC including the
employment of many child soldiers, targeting civilians in conflict, and widespread rape—in one
infamous case raping an eight-year-old girl (UNSC-Committee concerning the Democratic
Republic of the Congo 2014). The group was primarily comprised of former members of the
Congolese military who deserted following an army mutiny in 2012 (BBC 2013). The

This point speaks directly to the question of Rwanda’s strategic value. Although accounting for monetary
assistance can offer insight into its perceived value, the government’s behavior, particularly in its incongruence with
US policy objectives, resulted in a shift in US policy toward Rwanda. The government’s involvement in the war in
Congo, which directly challenged US policy objectives, likely influenced security aid decisions and the state’s
strategic value.
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organization was largely suspected of being supported by Kagame’s regime both within the
DRC, but also within Rwanda where they were granted sanctuary for recruitment and training
with evidence showing that the Rwandan Defense Forces were actively engaged in training new
M23 recruits and even returning M23 deserters, including children (US Department of State
2014). Rwanda’s support in the form of sanctuary is an important point, as the text of the CSPA
suggests that states are only in violation if supporting non-state actors operating within its own
borders (Public Law 110-457). A State Department official claimed: “The government’s support
of the M23 within the territorial confines of Rwanda are what ultimately got them listed [in
violation of the CSPA] in the first place. If Kagame [Rwanda] only supports the M23 within
Congo, then legally there was no ability to list them in violation [of the CSPA]” (State
Department Interview VII).
The Rwandan government’s support of the M23, rather than its direct inclusion of
children in their national military, suggests that full security restrictions were likely. “Going after
the M23 directly was not an option from a US standpoint, but the CSPA allowed us to go after
them indirectly by holding Rwanda accountable” (Department of Homeland Security – Interview
VIII). As in the earlier case of CAR, full implementation of the CSPA has occurred when
governments are indirectly involved in the use of child soldiers and the US cannot justify even
non-lethal support which targets military professionalization and security sector reform. While
cutting aid to a Rwandan government directly employing child soldiers would have likely be
counterproductive (jeopardizing the opportunity to assist in professionalization of the military),
cutting aid to a regime supporting a rebel group was universally accepted (State Department –
Interview VII).
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An important consideration qualifying the degree of support for the proposed hypotheses
is the UN’s involvement in the DRC, specifically the international efforts taken to combat the
M23. Concerns over M23’s increasing violence heightened demands for UN intervention. The
result was the employment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as part of the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission of the DRC (MONUSCO) (UNSC 2013). The FIB was
authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2098 and tasked with carrying out operations
targeted specifically at defeating the M23 (Kok 2013, 178). The decision was unanimously
passed by the Security Council, leading to a paradox for the US. As a permanent member of the
UNSC, it became impractical to continue to provide security assistance to Rwanda. Thus, the
UN’s involvement adds a moderating factor to the strength of the hypotheses and points to yet
another novel theoretical factor for CSPA implementation—the importance of international
organizations.
Rwanda was relisted on the CSPA in 2014 largely a consequence of their support of the
M23 rebels. However, the presidential determination issued in September 2014 granted a full
waiver to the Rwandan government, making the state eligible for all categories of security
assistance in FY 2015. As the TIP Report of 2014 noted, the Rwandan government “refrained
from reinforcing the M23 during final combat operations against the group and Rwandan
support…ceased following the group’s [M23] defeat” (US Department of State 2014). Thus,
while the CSPA alone did not lead to Rwanda’s compliance, the penalty incurred and its
designation as a violator appeared to have some effect on its shift in behavior. Interestingly, the
full waivers granted for FY 2015 appear to be the result of no documented evidence that Rwanda
was still actively engaged in support of the M23 nor was the government reported to have
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engaged directly in child soldering throughout 2014.67 Subsequently, Rwanda was removed from
the CSPA list in 2015.
However, the delisting ‘success story’ was short-lived as Rwanda was relisted in October
2016. The 2016 TIP report claimed that Rwandan security forces “reportedly facilitated or
tolerated the recruitment activity [of refugees, including children]” and officials “threatened,
intimidated, harassed, and physically assaulted those who refused recruitment attempts” (US
Department of State 2016). Although relisted, Rwanda was granted a partial waiver “to allow for
the provision of IMET, PKO assistance, and non-lethal Excess Defense Articles for humanitarian
and peacekeeping purposes, to the extent such assistance or support would be restricted by the
CSPA” (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2016). Given the violations which landed
Rwanda back on the CSPA list in 2016—specifically that the fact that Rwandan military officials
were implicated in the recruitment of child soldiers—the direct involvement of the military in the
recruitment of children, signaled a potential institutional issue. Cutting non-lethal forms of
security assistance (i.e. IMET) would seem to undermine the intent of the CSPA’s goal of
eliminating child soldiering by recipient states. Taken together, this case illustrates the
mechanism by which ‘indirect’ child soldiering can increase the probability of full CSPA
implementation while ‘direct’ involvement in child soldiering increases the likelihood of partial
implementation (restrictions on non-lethal security aid).

67

Although being listed in violation, this can generally be thought of as a byproduct of peculiarities in the timing of
the listing. For instance, although the CSPA list is not announced until October, the determination is based off of
TIP reports that only cover the April of the previous year through March of the year of listing. For this case,
Rwanda’s designation in 2014 was a consequence of the TIP report which covered March 2013-April 2014.
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Discussion and Implications
This paper sought to explore the conditions that lead to the full, partial, or lack of
implementation of the Child Soldier Prevention Act. The findings suggest this process is
complex, but generally illustrate support for the main hypotheses. First, a state’s strategic
importance appears to be a robust indicator for when a state is likely to receive some form of
waiver. Higher levels of security assistance in previous time periods appear to significantly
increase the likelihood that a violator will receive a CSPA waiver. However, the variation in
types of waivers suggests that there are additional factors that can impact US decisions to
provide or withhold security assistance. In line with the theoretical expectations, after
considering a state’s strategic value, the character of child soldiering helps explain variation in
CSPA implementation. States where child soldiering is a systemic problem are likely to face
security restrictions, but only on lethal forms of aid. In other words, if child soldiering is an
institutional problem, violators are more likely to be recipients of a partial waiver.
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Table 12. Summary of Hypotheses and Inductive Insights
Country

Year

H1 Expectation

H2 Expectation

Outcome

Review of
Hypotheses

Central African
Republic

2013

No Waiver

Partial Waiver

Aid Restricted

H1 supported

Central African
Republic

2014

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Partial Waiver

H2 supported

Chad

2010

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

Full Waiver

H2 supported

Chad

2011

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

Full Waiver

H2 supported

Chad

2013

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

Full Waiver

H2 supported

Rwanda

2013

Partial Waiver

Partial Waiver

Aid Restricted

H1/H2 not
supported

Rwanda

2014

No Waiver

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

H1/H2 not
supported

Rwanda

2016

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

H1 supported

South Sudan

2012

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

H1 supported

South Sudan

2013

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Full Waiver

H1 Supported

South Sudan

2014

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Partial Waiver

H2 supported

South Sudan

2015

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Partial Waiver

H2 supported

South Sudan

2016

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Partial Waiver

H2 supported

South Sudan

2017

Full Waiver

Partial Waiver

Partial Waiver

H2 supported

Additional Insights

Illustrates the importance of where child
soldiers operate (within or outside of the
national army). Supporting non-state actors that
use child soldiers increases the chances of
CSPA security aid restrictions.
Highlights how the expansion of strategic
importance as captured by counterterrorism
cooperation can helps explain security
assistance waivers to the CSPA. In addition, the
case illustrates how genuine shifts in behavior
can increase prospects for full waivers.
Illustrates the importance of where child
soldiers operate (within or outside of national
army) for security aid restrictions. Findings also
suggest the importance of considering the role
of international organizations in involvement.

Strategic importance can only help violators
overcome security aid restrictions to a certain
point. Continued violations and the character of
child soldiering then assists in explaining the
type of CSPA waiver granted.

* The entire amount dispersed was to train foreign troops deploying for peacekeeping missions (Security Assistance Monitor – CAR 2018)
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Together, this study offers at least three novel contributions to the literatures on the
relationship between human rights violations, aid disbursements, and child soldiering. First, it
demonstrates how strategic interests, can limit the effectiveness of human rights enforcement
mechanisms by donor states. This offers substantial support for the strategic value hypothesis
(i.e. once a state begins receiving aid, it is unlikely that it will stop receiving assistance in
subsequent years). While human rights abuses by foreign governments have factored into
decisions on the distribution of certain forms of security assistance, US security assistance in
previous years is consequential. One important exception is the case of Chad. If only examining
spending in previous years, one would have anticipated full implementation of the CSPA. As the
case narrative illustrated, strategic importance was dramatically altered during Chad’s first year
of listing as it became a pivotal partner in combating terrorism in the region. Further, spending
on security assistance grew exponentially in the years that followed, and unsurprisingly, Chad
continued to benefit from full waivers before ultimately being delisted.
Second, and surprisingly, this study found that governments that directly employ child
soldiers are less likely to see full security aid restrictions when compared to those governments
that are listed as a result of their support of non-state actors who employ children. Although
counterintuitive, this finding suggests that cutting non-lethal forms of security assistance to states
that directly employ children in their national militaries can ultimately undermine the intent of
the CSPA. While security assistance restrictions serve the purpose of incentivizing recipient
states not to engage in child soldiering, certain forms of the aid covered can be pivotal for states’
military professionalization. In turn, this can change institutional deficits, leading to the cessation
of child soldiering in national militaries. On the other hand, states that support non-state actors
who use child soldiers, but forego direct use, may be more responsive to security assistance
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restrictions as the cost of compliance is comparably low. This can also happen quickly relative to
the reorientation and professionalization required to systematically change a government’s
military recruitment practices. Put differently, if these states simply refrain from providing
support to non-state armed groups, they increase the likelihood of receiving security assistance
and being removed from the list of violators.
Third, this paper provides improved measure of child soldiering which have largely been
overlooked in extant literature: the level of child soldier usage and the roles of child soldiers over
time. While concrete numbers of child soldiers are non-precise, what they do provide is
meaningful insight into the gravity of the practice. This helps to identify whether a practice is
systematic or more fortuitous in nature and how it fluctuates across different time periods.
Further, children often undertake diverse roles within militaries and non-state actors. This paper
shows that their experiences within these organization can contribute to US decisions on security
restrictions. Taken together, replacing the traditional binary indicator that has been the standard
in a majority of child soldiering literature with a more diverse set of measurements which
captures the gravity of the abuse provides an improved understanding of the factors which may
lead to punishment.
At a broader level, this paper speaks to the tensions between states’ interests and norms in
foreign policy decision-making. The US, through multiple pieces of legislation, has rhetorically
invoked the importance of human rights records for decisions on security assistance. However,
as this paper has shown, a clear paradox exists between strategy and norms as full
implementation of the CSPA rests heavily on the strategic importance of recipient states. Recent
reports of Saudi Arabia’s employment of child soldiers of Sudanese decent in their efforts in
Yemen elucidate this paradox (Kirkpatrick 2018). Having negotiated a reported $110 billion

199

arms deal with Saudi Arabia, President Trump is unlikely to revoke the agreement on the basis of
the Saudi regime’s child soldiering practices. Irrespective of whether Saudi Arabia is technically
in violation of the CSPA, the strategic value, as illustrated in this project, is paramount. Although
this realist perspective appears to prevail in the majority of cases discussed, this paper also has
shown that human rights can matter for degree of US security assistance when states are both
directly and indirectly involved in child soldiering and when the problem is systemic.
Though the current study focuses exclusively on the conditions leading to the variance in
implementation, future work should use this as a foundation to more critically assess the CSPA
and its effectiveness in actually curtailing government child soldiering. While some preliminary
evidence in the case narratives of this paper suggest certain governments (i.e. Rwanda, Chad)
might be persuaded to rethink their behavior, scholars should work to understand how state
leaders within foreign governments respond to threats to security assistance due to the CSPA and
other targeted human rights legislation. Such research would generate significant insights both
for human rights advocates and policy analysts.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation aimed to explore four questions related to the topic of child soldiering. First, it
investigated the effect of foreign state sponsors on rebels’ proclivity to include child soldiers in
their insurgencies. In doing so, it argued and showed that simply considering the presence or
absence of foreign state support only tells a partial story about the effect of external support on
rebel recruitment. Specifically, it emphasized the need to consider donor states’ characteristics in
shaping rebel behavior. Proposing a theory of a democratic constraining effect, the statistical
tests illustrated a probable association between the percentage of democratic donor states and the
likelihood that rebel groups will use child soldiers. In other words, rebels that rely on support
from states that are more likely to care about human rights abuses are less likely to have children
in their rank and final. Qualitative investigations of the PKK in Turkey and PYD in Syria bolster
these findings while providing a more nuanced perspective on the interaction between donor
states and rebel groups. Specifically, the case of the PYD shows that rebels may actually monitor
donors’ perceptions of their behavior and shift their recruitment practices in an effort to retain
support.
Next, the dissertation explored plausible explanations for rebels’ preferences for certain
members, specifically asking why groups may be more likely to employ children in the absence
of women. Reexamining theories which suggest societal gender inequalities and group ideology,
can constrain women’s mobility into rebellion, this project illustrated the complexities of rebels’
internal dynamics related to recruitment. Descriptive analyses revealed that women are rarely
present in rebellion in the absence of children (both girls and boys). Further, the vast majority of
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groups that include children and women espouse ideological foundations that are
ethnically/nationally motivated. Importantly, Islamist groups are least likely to employ women,
but all else equal, appear to recruit children at similar rates to their non-Islamist counterparts.
Lastly, it emphasized that child soldiers are present in over 15 percent of rebellions when women
are excluded. After accounting for Islamist ideology the percentage of groups drops to
approximately 10, but still points to something potentially unique about these organizations and
their preference for child soldiers. Examining the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad
and the Kosovo Liberation Army in the former Yugoslavia, the paper demonstrates that societal
gender inequalities, societal perceptions of masculinity, preservation of patriarchal relations, the
normalcy of child soldiers in pre-war society, and strategic calculations during conflict can each
assist in identifying when child soldiers are more likely to be selected over women.
Chapter four offered a within case exploration of child recruitment practices in the PKK.
This project provided a novel contribution to the literature on child soldiering as most studies fail
to consider when child recruitment begins and how patterns of recruitment vary over time.
Leveraging a unique dataset on Kurdish militants, this chapter showed that child recruitment into
the PKK began even before the organization’s official founding. Fragmentation of Kurdish
organizations and the competitive environment in with the PKK emerged necessitated the
inclusion of a diverse set of recruits. Turning away potential members due to their age would
have limited the pool of recruits and jeopardized the durability and longevity of the group.
Insights into the recruitment behavior of a rival Kurdish organization, the KUK, bolster these
findings as the KUK also recruited children, but at a lower rate. In addition, the lack of firmly
established international norm against child soldiering illustrates why the PKK first recruited
children and lacked a genuine incentive to comply. Evolving conflict dynamics, most notably the
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indiscriminate counterinsurgency efforts of the Turkish government, ultimately backfired as the
PKK saw an influx of recruits at the height of the conflict and decreased barriers to entry to
accommodate new recruits. The post-1999 period saw significant shifts in the PKK’s rate of
child recruitment and opportunities for peace and prospects for increased Kurdish autonomy
within and outside of Turkey motivated the group’s decision to sign the Geneva Call to refrain
from recruiting child soldiers. However, I discovered that the commitment was dubious as the
PKK drastically altered its recording behavior; no longer systematically providing information
on the age of new recruits. Nevertheless, this discovery suggests that certain insurgent groups
(i.e. secessionist rebellions) are aware of the evolution and strengthening of international norms
and recognize the benefits in signaling compliance.
In chapter five, the dissertation reoriented focus from rebel child soldiering to state child
recruitment. It explored the consequences states may face for child soldiering. In doing so, this
chapter investigated the conditions that are most likely to lead to the implementation of the Child
Soldier Prevention Act, a relatively new mechanism that, in theory, constrains the United States
ability to provide security assistance to governments that still recruit child soldiers. First, it
argued and showed that a state’s strategic value appears to be paramount in identifying when
security assistance is likely to be restricted. However, it also argued that variation in the degree
of implementation might better be explained by considering the character of child soldiering
across violating states. Specifically, it showed that when child soldiering is an institutional
problem, governments are most likely to see restrictions on lethal aid. At the same time, when
child soldiering appears to be more inadvertent (non-systemic), states are less likely to face
security restrictions if they are viewed as strategically valuable. An unexpected finding also
emerged. Case evidence from Rwanda and the Central African Republic suggests that when a
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state supports non-state armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers, they appear most likely
to face full security assistance restrictions. Inductively, I argued that because child recruitment
was not technically an institutionalized problem, and one that could be overcome the relative
ease, these states were more likely to face accountability. Put differently, less was required for
these states to achieve compliance with the CSPA. Taken together, this chapter accentuates the
competition between the US strategic interests and policy advancements and the promotion of
international human rights norms.
Moving forward, it is imperative that researchers engage critically with past
investigations on the determinants of child soldiering, how and why recruitment patterns vary
over time across groups, and the consequences of child recruitment, not only for violators, but
for the children that are recruited. The results of this dissertation underscore the importance of,
and need for, such efforts. First, and with data limitations aside, it is clear that scholarly
understanding of the causes of rebel child soldiering are multifaceted and in-depth investigations
on specific organizations will help illuminate the casual mechanisms at work. For instance, the
in-depth exploration of the PKK in chapter four challenges many earlier studies about rebel
groups’ initial decision to recruit children and qualifies others about the effects of conflict
dynamics on recruitment practices. Secondly, while scholars continue to embark on important
research examining the recruitment of different populations independently, more work is
necessary to understand the diversity of recruits that are often recruited or absorbed by rebel
groups. Third, this dissertation challenges scholars to more fully investigate governments’
human rights abuses and the implications for security assistance. At the macro-level scholars
have repeatedly noted that human rights do little to influence security assistance decisions, yet as
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chapter five demonstrated, micro-level investigations into specific human rights violations can
tell a different story.
To conclude, it is important that the discussion return to the motivating topic of this
dissertation, child soldiers. Ongoing conflicts in Yemen, South Sudan, and Syria represent just a
few cases that have seen children put in precarious conditions as soldiers, directly engaged as
fighters, and often forced to kill or be killed. To borrow from the mission statement of the
recently closed humanitarian NGO, Child Soldiers International, “no child should ever be
recruited for war” (Child Soldiers International 2019). The continued use of children as direct
participants in conflict is not only an archaic practice and morally reprehensible, but should
remain at the forefront of the international human rights regime until children’s inclusion in war
as soldiers becomes an exception rather than the norm. This is not much to ask and children who
must bear witness to conflict deserve heroic efforts by the international community to work
towards the complete eradication of their recruitment into rebel groups and government
militaries. As scholars continue to seek answers to the causes and consequences of child
soldiering, it is pivotal that researchers remember the reasons they study this topic. True success
will only be found when the topic of child soldering is no longer an area of research; not because
we know all of the answers, but because children are no longer used as soldiers.
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To assess potential multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) for each variable across
each model were calculated. Table 13 reports these results. On average, the VIF is well below 5
(O’brien, 2007), indicating that the models do not suffer from multicollinearity.

Table 13. Variance Inflation Factors
Model
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Model 10

Mean VIF
1.54
1.78
1.86
1.55
1.81
1.91
1.69
1.78
1.82
1.72

Variable with the highest VIF
Average GDP per capita (2.19)
Average GDP per capita (2.84)
Average GDP per capita (2.87)
Average GDP per capita (2.15)
Average GDP per capita (2.84)
Average GDP per capita (3.26)
Average GDP per capita (2.72)
Average GDP per capita (2.84)
Average GDP per capita (2.84)
Average GDP per capita (2.72)

Table 14 reports bivariate models which focus solely on the relationship between the main
variables of interest, External State Sponsorship (binary, Donor Group Polity2 Average, and
Percent Democratic and the level of child recruitment (ordinal measure).

Table 14. Bivariate Models

External State Sponsorship
(binary)
Donor Group Polity2 Average

Bivariate model
Foreign Support
0.960***
(0.240)

Bivariate model
Donor Polity Avg

0.001
(0.030)

Percent Democratic
Cut1
Cut2

Bivariate model
Percent Democratic

-0.726***
(0.186)
2.257***
(0.277)
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-1.728
(0.239)
1.317
(0.212)

-.25477
(0.487)
-1.774
(0.246)
1.276
(0.215)

N
Chi2
Log pseudolikelihood
Pseuo-R2

Bivariate model
Foreign Support
301
13.76
-273.49
0.029

Bivariate model
Donor Polity Avg
152
0.00
-136.86
.000

Bivariate model
Percent Democratic
152
0.27
-136.72
0.001

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Reduced form models
Table 15 reports reduced form models from the main text using the ordinal dependent variable.
Models 6 and 10 are reported in this table in reduced form, excluding supply side variables like
IDPs and Refugees and the demand side variable Rebel Strength. Results are reflective of those
reported in the tables in the main text.

Table 15. Reduced Form Models
Percent Democratic

Model 6
-1.726**
(0.693)

Total HROs (ln)
One-sided Violence
Secessionist Conflict
Youth Unemployment (ln)
GDP per capita (ln)
Population (ln)
Strength Central
Conflict Intensity
Conflict Duration
Constant cut1

0.000799**
(0.000356)
1.068**
(0.541)
-1.374***
(0.435)
0.0750
(0.220)
0.317*
(0.186)
-0.669*
(0.370)
0.848*
(0.485)
0.0457
(0.193)
0.654
215

Model 10
-2.408***
(-0.778)
0.349**
(-0.156)
0.000675**
(-0.00028)
1.282**
(-0.554)
-1.400***
(-0.44)
0.0845
(-0.222)
0.336*
(-0.187)
-0.738*
(-0.377)
0.776
(-0.486)
0.0816
(-0.199)
1.09

Constant cut2
Observations
Pseudo R2
LogLik
chi-square
probchi2

Model 6
(3.313)
4.629
(3.349)
129
0.202
-92.86
46.92
4.07e-07

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 10
(-3.34)
5.232
(-3.389)
129
0.224
-90.3
52.03
1.13E-07
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Table 16. Statistics on PKK recruits Pre-1984-2016
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Table 17. List of Interviews

Organization

Date

Interview I*

US Department of State

6 March 2018

Interview II*

US Institute of Peace

7 March 2018

Interview III*

Hoover Institute

7 March 2018

Interview IV*

Stimson Center

7 March 2018

Interview V*

US House of Representatives - Aide

7 March 2018

Interview VI*

Council on Foreign Relations

8 March 2018

Interview VII*

US Department of State

8 March 2018

Interview VIII*

US Department of Homeland Security

8 March 2018

Interview IX*

US Department of Homeland Security

8 March 2018

Interview X**

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

20 March 2018

Interview XI**

Human Rights Watch

20 March 2018

Interview XII**

Enough Project

30 March 2018

*Face to Face; ** Virtual
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Funding Agency:
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etc.) before obtaining IRB approval. A Modification Form cannot be used to extend the approval period of
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If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 02/11/2019,
approval of this research expires on that date. When you have completed your research, please submit a
Study Closure request in iRIS so that IRB records will be accurate.
Use of the approved, stamped consent document(s) is required. The new form supersedes all previous
versions, which are now invalid for further use. Only approved investigators (or other approved key study
personnel) may solicit consent for research participation. Participants or their representatives must receive
a copy of the consent form(s).
All data, including signed consent forms if applicable, must be retained and secured per protocol for a minimum of
five years (six if HIPAA applies) past the completion of this research. Any links to the identification of participants
should be maintained and secured per protocol. Additional requirements may be imposed by your funding agency,
your department, or other entities. Access to data is limited to authorized individuals listed as key study personnel.
In the conduct of this research, you are responsible to follow the requirements of the Investigator Manual.
This letter is signed by:
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Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
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Orlando, FL 32826-3246

APPROVAL
February 14, 2019
Dear Christopher Faulkner:
On 2/14/2019, the IRB reviewed the following submission:
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IRB ID:
Funding:
Grant ID:
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• Informed Consent Revisions.pdf, Category: Consent
Form;
• IRB Protocol_Faulkner, Category: IRB Protocol;
• Interview Questions Template, Category: Recruitment
Materials;

The IRB approved the protocol from 2/14/2019 to 2/13/2020. NOTE: Because
this study was not approved before the IRB expiration date, there was a lapse in
IRB approval from 02/11/2019 to the new approval date.
In conducting this protocol, you are required to follow the requirements listed in
the Investigator Manual (HRP-103), which can be found by navigating to the IRB
Library within the IRB system.
If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or
irb@ucf.edu. Please include your project title and IRB number in all
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Sincerely,
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